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Summary:  
 
This thesis examines responses to the problem of stock market short-termism (‘SMST’). 
SMST is defined as investors preferring short-term financial returns over potentially more 
profitable longer-term investment opportunities. Such short-termism may result in serious 
real-world consequences. Company executives appear to respond to short-term pressures in 
ways that jeopardize the long-term sustainability of listed companies negatively impacting 
investors and other stakeholders including employees, customers and the community at large. 
This thesis provides an original contribution to the academic literature via an in-depth 
examination of all significant regulatory and financial industry efforts meant to reform SMST 
in major capital markets after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
 
I hypothesize that the extensive discussion of the SMST issue has generated substantial 
reforms. Based on an analysis of the implemented reforms, I reveal that the anticipated surge 
of SMST reform has not occurred. I then explore why the widespread SMST discussion has 
not resulted in greater reform efforts. This examination reveals the complex nature of the 
SMST problem and the evidentiary issues inherent in viably identifying and measuring the 
harms of SMST. However, I determine that there is probable cause for concern justifying 
SMST reform measures. Further, I conclude that SMST issues arise because investors are 
biased towards short-term returns when calculating risk. This bias is evident in share pricing, 
meaning that share prices are not a reliable indicator of fundamental corporate value. Based 
on this conclusion, an original dual pathway for SMST reform is proposed.  
 
This dual pathway indicates that SMST reform measures must either: (1) reduce the actual or 
perceived excessive discounting of future returns by investors (i.e. make share prices better 
reflective of long-term value); or (2) cut-off the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the 
listed company (i.e. sever the link between share prices and corporate decision-making). 
Assessing the reforms against this dual pathway reveals that few of the reforms are 
conceptually effective. Of the few reforms that are conceptually effective, most are relatively 
‘light’ touch. A ‘light’ touch approach may not be problematic, however, as such measures 
are easier to implement than ‘hard’ law. In the case of regulatory reforms, a ‘light’ touch 
approach provides scope for flexibility to minimize the many potential harms associated with 
‘hard’ law measures. Consequently, this thesis concludes that SMST reform is more likely to 
occur if reformers pursue a ‘lighter’ touch approach meant to reduce excessive discounting of 
future returns and ‘nudge’ capital markets away from their harmful short-termism focus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The ongoing short-termism in the business world is undermining corporate investment, 
holding back economic growth, and lowering returns for savers.’1 
 
In the decade following the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 (the ‘GFC’), there 
has been considerable discussion about the role of modern corporations, and, in particular, the 
functioning of the world’s largest publicly listed companies.2 Central to this conversation is 
the proposition that modern listed companies and their intermediaries and investors are too 
focused on short-term financial objectives, and corrective measures are needed. This short-
term financial focus hinders the development of sustainable long-term focused listed 
companies that create employment, develop valuable products and services, generate 
earnings, and return profits to shareholders. Alarming claims have been made that such short-
termism in stock markets is increasing drastically, and the ‘destructive impact of short-
termism has reached crisis proportions’3. It has been asserted that capital market short-
termism was a contributing factor in the GFC, and continues to jeopardize the operations of 
listed companies, and consequently erode the long-term growth potential of modern markets.  
 
Despite these claims, there is considerable debate on whether short-termism is a real 
problem. Notable proponents asserting that there is a short-termism problem justifying a 
regulatory and financial industry response include UK economics professor John Kay – who 
was commissioned by the United Kingdom (‘UK’) Government in 2011 to investigate UK 
capital market short-termism –4, Bank of England economist Andrew Haldane5, Delaware 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine6, United States (‘US’) noted economist Alfred 
Rappaport7, and former US Democratic Presidential Candidate, Hillary Clinton8. Adding 
weight to the argument that there is a capital market short-termism problem requiring 
correction, such short-termism concerns have also been raised by the financial industry itself, 
                                                 
1  Barton & Wiseman, 2014, p. 3.  
2  The Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance for the 21st Century, Statement on Economics, <Online: 
https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com /economics-and-msv/>. 
3  Rappaport, 2011, p. 3. 
4  Kay Review. 
5  Haldane & Davies, 2011. 
6  Strine, 2015. 
7  Rappaport, 2011. 
8  Jacobs, 2015. 
 2 
 
most prominently by Larry Fink – Chief Executive Officer (‘CEO’) of BlackRock, Inc. 
(‘BlackRock’), which is the world’s largest asset management firm9.  
 
Despite an extensive dialogue led by these prominent voices, not all agree that a 
harmful short-termism problem exists. The commonplace assumption that stock markets are 
too obsessed with short-term financial returns has been questioned in the popular press. In 
The New Yorker, James Surowiecki acknowledged the political appeal of calls to make stock 
markets less short-term focused, and that certain investors may be myopic, but argued that 
markets on the whole are not short-term focused.10 Additionally, Harvard Law professor 
Mark Roe acknowledged that US markets may be net short-termist   ̶  although he found the 
evidence unconvincing as he argued that stock-markets often value the long-term  ̶ , but this 
stock market short-termism is mitigated in the US economy as a whole  ̶  e.g. by non-stock 
market capital structures such as venture capital markets, private equity markets, and other 
non-traded means of raising capital.11 Accordingly, Roe argued that there is currently no 
justification for regulation to correct the alleged stock market short-termism problem. If listed 
companies feel they are not properly valued in public markets, they can look to private 
sources of capital, and thus no more than ‘watchful waiting’ is required.12  
 
Evidence of a short-termism problem in stock markets, which evidence includes 
survey results, analysis of investor bias, evidence of increasing discounting of long-term cash 
flows, and proxies used to measure short-termism, is undoubtedly mixed. There are also 
questions on what exactly is short-termism behaviour: is it duration of shareholding or short-
term financial gains  ̶ , or rather is it corporate behaviour or objectives  ̶  i.e. short-term 
projects or financial returns. Regardless of this uncertainty, it is highly probable that 
policymakers and the financial industry will maintain their drive for longer-term sustainable 
investment in and by listed companies, and that SMST will continue to be viewed as a 
contributing factor hindering such longer-term investment. Consequently, clarity around 
these issues is crucial before short-term reform measures can be properly assessed and further 
implemented. This thesis aims to provide some clarity on this unclear and politically charged 
area of capital market reform. As discussed further in this thesis, many of the calls for reform 
                                                 
9  Turner, 2016; Oyedele, 2017; 2018 Blackrock Letter.  
10  Suroweicki, 2015. 
11  Roe, 2013, p. 977. 
12  Ibid, p. 1005. 
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and the resulting reform efforts are based on an unsubstantiated assumption that short-
termism is a problem. To address this lacuna, I investigate further into what is causing such 
short-termism in stock markets and whether in fact such short-termism is problematic, 
through vigorously and systematically assessing the most probable causes, transmission 
methods and harms of short-termism. As the analysis in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?) 
demonstrates, short-termism is a recurring theme, and is prone to re-emerge in force with the 
next round of market turmoil. Further, if short-termism is the genuine problem it is alleged to 
be, effective reform to correct the problem is justified now in the absence of any triggering 
event. The intent of the analysis in this thesis is, therefore, to provide a useful framework for 
assessing whether current or future reform proposals, in theory at least, may conceptually act 
to reduce the short-termism issue. It is hoped that this objective framework, and the 
supporting analysis provided in this thesis, may be of use to policymakers and the financial 
industry – particularly investors and those who manage money on their behalf – as they 
continue to grapple with how best to address this slippery and complicated concept.  
 
Specifically, this thesis examines the short-termism discussion and provides an 
original contribution to the academic analysis by conducting a comprehensive multi-
jurisdictional examination of regulatory and financial industry measures meant to contend 
with the alleged short-termism problem. A logical conclusion to be drawn from the 
significant level of attention given to the short-termism issue is that extensive reforms meant 
to correct short-termism are in the works or have been implemented. This thesis, therefore, 
tests the hypothesis that the extensive discussion of the short-termism issue has generated 
substantial reforms, and reveals that, in fact, the anticipated surge of reform has not occurred. 
Having shown that the reform output is much less than expected, this thesis explores why the 
substantial discussion of short-termism has not resulted in greater reform efforts. To properly 
determine the body of reforms meant to address the short-termism issue, and thereby assess 
the validity of the hypothesis, the first step is to adequately identify and rigorously define the 
concept of stock market short-termism (‘SMST’). An examination is also required of the 
debate on whether SMST is a problem, and if so, what is causing SMST, how it is transmitted 
into the listed company, and – if SMST is harmful – the most probable harms caused by such 
SMST. Based on such analysis, this thesis concludes that reform is warranted and not enough 
has been done. In doing so, this thesis also provides a further contribution to the academic 
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literature by offering policymakers and the financial industry a tangible framework for 
reform, oriented around a proposed dual pathway for conceptually effective reform. 
 
Based on an examination of the literature in this area, SMST is defined in this thesis 
as asset owners and intermediaries in the chain of parties, that connect listed companies with 
their ultimate investors, weighing near-term financial outcomes too heavily at the expense of 
more profitable longer-term investment opportunities. This weighing is reflected in share 
pricing as short-term financial actions by company managers have positive impacts on share 
price and longer-term objectives are undervalued. This impact to share prices causes 
company managers of listed companies to take actions that prioritize short-term financial 
returns to the detriment of listed companies, which by extension includes such listed 
companies’ investors and broader constituent elements. Using this definition and accepting 
that there is at least some plausible evidence that SMST is a problem as discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Is SMST a Problem?), this thesis identifies SMST-driven reforms and considers if 
such reforms at least conceptually address the SMST issue so defined.  
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, Methodology and 
Limitations) discusses the parameters of the research conducted. Evidence is provided in this 
Chapter demonstrating that, although SMST has been discussed for decades, usage of the 
term ‘short-termism’ has increased considerably in the period following the GFC. This 
increase in attention to the concept of SMST, and the resulting financial industry and 
regulatory responses to such discussion, justifies the in-depth analysis provided in this thesis. 
SMST is weavings its way into the fabric of listed company corporate governance, and it is 
highly probable that SMST will continue to motivate financial industry and regulatory reform 
for years to come. It is therefore important to understand the most plausible causes of SMST, 
and to properly assess whether implemented reforms, at least from a theoretical perspective, 
at least conceptually address such causes. The methodology for the research conducted in this 
thesis is primarily qualitative and involves a comprehensive survey and analysis of all 
discussions and reform efforts globally, although the focus in this thesis has been on 
developed capital markets, namely the US, the UK and the European Union (the ‘EU’) given 
financial significance of these jurisdictions to the global market and that the short-termism 
discussion has been considered most seriously in these jurisdictions. The limitations of the 
research are also presented in this Chapter, which include the justification for focusing on the 
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equity securities of listed companies and the jurisdictional limitations of the research. These 
limitations set the parameters for the definitions offered in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues). 
 
Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues) provides a detailed examination of the term ‘short-
termism’ and its narrower application to the context of stock market investing. Terms 
relevant to the definition of SMST are also considered in this Chapter, including the terms 
‘stock market’, ‘listed company’, ‘equity security’, and the ‘financial intermediation chain’ – 
defined in this Chapter as the ‘equity ownership chain’. Each of the key components of the 
equity ownership chain – articulated as asset owners, intermediaries and company managers 
– and their relationship to SMST, are then separately analyzed in this Chapter. Further, as the 
focus of this thesis is on regulatory – and to a lesser degree, financial industry – reforms 
aimed at correcting the alleged SMST problem so defined, the difference between ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ law and is examined as this distinction is particularly relevant to regulatory reform. The 
concept of ‘light’ touch regulation is also presented as it forms the basis for the 
recommendation in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms), that a ‘light’ 
touch approach is the optimal approach to ‘nudge’ capital markets away from their current 
short-termism focus. A ‘light’ touch approach is recommended given the complexities around 
defining SMST and proving that it is problematic and harmful, and in implementing ‘hard’ 
law reform. These definitions guide the analysis provided in the remainder of the thesis.  
 
 Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?) examines the development of the SMST concept 
from when it was first clearly articulated as an issue in the 1970s in response to concerns of 
hostile takeovers of primarily US companies, to its wide-spread usage post-GFC. This 
examination of the development of the SMST concept brings to the forefront the question of 
whether SMST is a substantive issue or if it is instead merely compelling rhetoric that 
overlaps with the capital market concerns of the day. This Chapter considers the SMST 
concerns raised during the US takeover boom of the 1970s and 1980s by US corporate lawyer 
and market commentator, Martin Lipton, the dialogue in the 1990s and 2000s around SMST 
and national competitiveness, and the changing market conditions known as the rise of 
agency capitalism. Also considered are the SMST concerns raised in the corporate scandals 
of the early 2000s, and in the GFC itself. The key aspects of the SMST discussion post-GFC 
are also examined. This Chapter hypothesizes that although there appears to have been some 
SMST rhetoric used in the development of the discussion, the SMST concern appears to have 
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developed because of the increasing financial intermediation of public markets and the 
corresponding increased reliance on short-term performance of asset managers rather than the 
underlying performance of an investment. The substantive evidence of the existence of a real 
SMST problem is then considered further in Chapter 5 (Is There a SMST Problem?).  
 
 Before assessing whether SMST is in fact a problem, Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?) examines the most significant regulatory and financial industry reforms proposed or 
implemented to date that are meant to address the alleged SMST problem. These reforms are 
categorized into asset owner, intermediary and company manager reforms on the basis that 
each of these groups serves a distinct role within stock markets, and SMST manifests 
differently in each role. The reforms directed at correcting the SMST of asset owners, 
intermediaries and company managers are each discussed in this Chapter, and separately 
summarized in Appendix ‘A’ (Table 1), (Table 2) and (Table 3), respectively. Each of the 
reforms in these tables is color-coded to indicate which are ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law reforms and 
voluntary initiatives. A summary of all the SMST reforms which have actually been 
implemented are included in Appendix ‘B’ (Implemented SMST Reforms), Table 4 
(Implemented SMST Reforms). The results of this analysis indicate that despite the 
significant discussion and many proposals, the actual output of SMST reform in all 
jurisdictions surveyed has been relatively modest, and of the implemented reforms, many are 
‘light’ touch in that they are disclosure or ‘comply or explain’ based or contain an ‘opt-out’ 
mechanism. The complexity of the alleged SMST problem and the inconclusive evidence on 
the harms of SMST may help explain why there has been so little substantive reform, despite 
significant discussion on SMST and calls for reform. The basis for this complexity and 
inconclusive evidence of the harms of SMST is explored further in the following Chapters. 
 
 Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) delves into the financial and legal discussion 
around whether SMST is a problem, and if so what is causing SMST. This Chapter considers 
the evidence presented supporting the argument that there is a SMST problem. After 
assessing the strength of this evidence and accepting that there is at least some basis for 
concern, this Chapter then considers how SMST may be evident in share pricing, as share 
prices are an important communication mechanism between listed companies and the market. 
The primary question then considered in this analysis is whether there can be a short-termism 
problem at all if share pricing is an adequate indicator of long-term corporate value. This 
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analysis requires a consideration of market efficiency theory. Specifically, I consider whether 
share prices are informationally efficient   ̶ meaning that all publicly available information is 
reflected in the share price  ̶, or fundamentally efficient  ̶  meaning that share prices are a 
decent measure of the underlying long-term value of the listed company. Accepting that stock 
markets are generally informationally efficient, I question the basis of their fundamental 
efficiency, given the apparent excessive discounting of future returns by asset owners and 
intermediaries. This apparent excessive discounting, and the resulting impact on share prices, 
is known to company managers and, accordingly, there is a strong incentive to prioritize 
short-term financial results of listed companies. Consequently, this Chapter questions if share 
prices are a decent measure of the long-term value of listed companies. 
 
 The next two Chapters look at two fundamental issues stemming from the conclusions 
drawn on the cause of SMST in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?). The first of these 
issues is analyzed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) and is that SMST requires 
a transmission mechanism through the equity ownership chain into the listed company. For 
the excessive discounting identified in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) to be a 
problem, it must somehow result in short-termism actions of listed companies. The main 
argument in this respect is that the short-term interests of asset owners and intermediaries, 
primarily asset managers, are transmitted into listed companies mainly through shareholder 
activism and executive compensation and the resulting actual or perceived impact of such 
practices on share prices of listed companies. Consequently, the upstream short-term interests 
impact the actions of listed companies by causing company managers to forgo longer-term 
value maximization in favour shorter-term returns. As considered in Chapter 8 (Conceptual 
Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms), if SMST is transmitted into the listed company in this 
manner, any remedy to the alleged SMST problem requires either addressing the excessive 
discounting issues around share pricing or cutting off these transmission mechanisms. 
 
The second issue stemming from the conclusions drawn in Chapter 5 (Is There A 
SMST Problem?) is that for SMST to be a material problem there needs to be some 
demonstrable harm. Particularly, why does it matter if company managers are consistently 
saying that they prioritize short-term returns? How is such prioritizing harmful? Chapter 7 
(What Harm Does SMST Cause?) discusses the difficulties around measuring the impacts of 
SMST, and analyzes the research conducted demonstrating the harms of SMST. This research 
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identifies four key categories of harm: (1) reduced firm productivity, (2) reduced trust in the 
stock market, (3) societal costs, and (4) wealth transfer from future to current asset owners. 
Based on an assessment of the research in each category, the arguments (1) reduced firm 
productivity and (3) societal costs are rejected as a sufficiently viable basis justifying reform. 
Although significant questions remain around the evidence presented in support of the 
arguments (2) reduced trust in the stock market, and (4) wealth transfer from future to current 
asset owners, these two arguments are the more probable – although still unproven – areas of 
potential harm from SMST. The specific wealth transfer concern is that short term financial 
gains are paid out to current shareholders. This payout is at the expense of developing 
sustainable long-term focused listed companies that create employment, develop valuable 
products and services, generate earnings, and return profits to shareholders. Consequently, 
this Chapter concludes that SMST appears to be detrimental, even if some investors may 
benefit in the short-term, as it results in executives failing to make decisions that will yield 
financial success over the longer-term, to the detriment of employees, customers and the 
community at large. The analysis provided in this Chapter, Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?) and Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) provides the basis for the 
examination of the conceptual effectiveness of the SMST reforms provided in Chapter 8 
(Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms).  
 
Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) analyzes if the reforms 
identified in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) solve the SMST issue. Based on the analysis 
in the previous Chapters, this Chapter presents a dual pathway for reform. This dual pathway 
provides that an effective remedy to the alleged SMST problem involves either: (1) 
minimizing the excessive discounting of future returns; or (2) cutting off the transmission 
mechanisms of SMST into the listed company. Option (2) of this dual pathway requires 
‘hard’ law reform. After examining the reforms, this Chapter concludes that few of the SMST 
reforms set out in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) adequately hit the mark and address the 
SMST issue. Further, of the implemented SMST reforms that do employ one of these options, 
most are disclosure-based, voluntary or limited in scope and proceed via Option (1) of the 
dual pathway either by reducing performance uncertainty or helping investors appreciate the 
harms of SMST. Given the inherent difficulty in effectively regulating to correct SMST, it is 
not surprising that the few implemented SMST reforms to date have been minimal and 
relatively ‘light’ touch. This Chapter goes on to explore whether this ‘light’ touch approach 
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may not be a bad idea, as ‘light’ touch measures are easier to implement than ‘hard’ law, and, 
in the case of regulatory reforms, provide scope for flexibility to minimize some of the many 
harms which may be associated with ‘hard’ law measures. This Chapter concludes by 
advocating for a ‘light’ touch approach focused on Option (1) of the dual pathway. 
Specifically, this Chapter argues that SMST is more likely to be solved if reformers forsake 
bold initiatives and seek a ‘light’ touch approach to reduce excessive discounting of future 
returns thereby ‘nudging’ capital markets away from their current short-termism focus. 
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CHAPTER 1 – RESEARCH PURPOSE, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
‘Performing data analysis on qualitative data basically involves dismantling, segmenting and 
reassembling data to form meaningful findings in order to draw inferences.’13 
 
This Chapter sets out the research purpose, methodology and limitations of this thesis. 
Specifically, I outline the purpose of the research conducted in this thesis, which is to survey 
all significant SMST-driven financial industry and regulatory reform efforts on a broader 
scale than what has been done previously, and to assess these reforms against a detailed 
multi-disciplinary  ̶  specifically legal, financial and economic  ̶  analysis of the most probable 
causes of the alleged SMST problem. Though the focus of most SMST-driven reform and 
discussion has been in the US and the UK, as discussed below, this thesis may have wider 
impact because of the increasing influence investors from these jurisdictions could have 
outside of these two markets. It is intended that this research will be useful to policymakers 
and the financial industry as they assess the necessity and effectiveness of implemented 
reforms and consider whether further reforms aimed at correcting the alleged SMST issue are 
required. This Chapter also sets out the research framework and methodology for the 
collection, analysis and presentation of the reforms categorized in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?) and provides the rationale for the limitations of the research in this thesis. 
 
A. PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
The research in this thesis has been undertaken primarily as a result of the 
considerable calls for regulatory and financial industry reform to address SMST, and the 
resulting need to analyze whether implemented reforms conceptually address potential SMST 
concerns. Demonstrating that allegations of short-termism in financial markets have 
increased significantly since the GFC, Figure 1 (Citations of the Term ‘Short-Termism’) 
below illustrates the increased use of the term ‘short-termism’ in major international business 
papers from 1999 to 2017. The data for Figure 1 (Citations of the Term ‘Short-Termism’) 
was compiled from Factiva, a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & 
Company which provides access to over 32,000 sources globally. As additional sources may 
have been added to Factiva during the time period surveyed, the Wall Street Journal citations 
are included separately to corroborate the general observation of an increase in the use of the 
term ‘short-termism’. All regional publications of the Wall Street Journal, and all major news 
                                                 
13  Boeije, H, ‘Analysis in Qualitative Research, (London: Sage Publications Ltd.; 2010) referred to in 
Wahyuni, Dina ‘The Research Design Maze: Understanding Paradigms, Cases, Methods and 
Methodologies’ (2012) 10:1 Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research 69, p. 75 <Online: 
file:///C:/Users/ASW/Downloads/SSRN-id2103082.pdf>. 
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and business sources have been included in these search results. Further, as short-termism 
may be used in business outside the context of stock market investing, the search term ‘short-
termism’ has also been narrowed to ‘short-termism’ AND ‘share’ or ‘market’ or ‘stock’. As 
illustrated by the results of each of the Wall Street Journal and the narrowed definition 
searches, the use of short-termism has followed an upward trend. This increasing usage of the 
term ‘short-termism’ in the context of stock-market investing, and the development of the 
SMST concept generally are considered further in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?).  
 
Figure 1. Citations of the Term ‘Short-Termism’  
 
 
 
Specifically, this thesis explores the extent to which increased attention on the 
concept of problematic short-termism involving public companies has generated reforms by 
regulators and the financial industry. Both regulatory and financial industry reforms are 
included in this analysis as they each have the ability to significantly impact capital market 
behaviour. However, regulatory reform is the primary focus of this research, and such 
regulatory reform includes both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law reforms, as defined in Chapter 2 
(Defining the Issues). Financial industry reforms are more difficult to define, but essentially 
include concerted efforts by financial market players  ̶ including asset owners and asset 
managers, as well as advisory firms auxiliary to the investment process, and listed companies 
 ̶  to address the perceived SMST issue. Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) compiles and 
categorizes these identified reforms and attempts to include all implemented – or seriously 
considered – measures that have identified correcting SMST as a rationale for reform.  
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Jurisdiction-specific academic analysis of SMST has been previously conducted, 
particularly in the US, UK and EU.14 However, to the best of my knowledge, to date there has 
not been a comprehensive academic analysis of all implemented – or seriously considered – 
SMST reform efforts. This broader analysis is warranted because, as discussed further in 
Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), SMST concerns are being raised in markets around the 
world and modern capital markets are increasingly interconnected. This interconnectedness, 
which was highlighted by the GFC15, has the potential to further the globalization of issues 
such as the alleged SMST problem. Although ‘western’ stock markets, specifically the US 
and the UK, have been the primary focus of the SMST discussion,16 capital market short-
termism has been discussed by policymakers outside the US and the UK, notably in the EU. 
As an example, commenting on the Swedish capital market, Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall of 
the Stockholm School of Economics, discusses how after years of high taxes, family 
ownership has been falling, and with domestic institutional investors continuing to act in a 
markedly passive manner, the opportunities for private equity, foreign industrial owners and 
foreign – passive and short-term – institutional investors has grown.17 According to 
Nachemson-Ekwall, this trend has resulted in the Swedish capital market thus generally 
having features associated with ‘value-destructive short-termism’.18  
 
Short-termism may not presently be a significant concern outside the Anglo-American 
capital market model. However, it is, and arguably should be, of interest globally. Equity 
market interconnectivity facilitated primarily by US investors diversifying risk and looking 
for high growth by seeking investment opportunities outside of their home jurisdictions19 
                                                 
14  See for example, Dallas, 2012 summarizing US reform proposals after the GFC, which focuses mostly on 
reforms to the US banking industry, the Kay Review assessing SMST in the context of UK capital markets 
and Bowdren, 2016 further examining short-termism in the UK context, and Johnston & Morrow, 2014, 
considering whether amendments to the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive address SMST.  
15  The total and country by country statistics provided by the World Federation of Exchanges Database, 
‘Market capitalization of domestic listed companies – all countries and economies’ (current US$) <Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org> provides demonstrates the impact of the GFC on market capitalization, as the 
total statistics and statistics for most of the countries included in the database show a significant decline 
during the time of the GFC.  
16  For example, see the Thornhill, J, ‘Rewrite tax regimes to spur greater investment’, Financial Times (6 
December 2016), in which the author observes that ‘[o]ne of the startling features of Anglo-American 
capitalism is that corporate investment remains so low when profits are so high’, and Barton 2011, p. 86, in 
which Dominic Barton sees the issues in terms ‘East’ v. ‘West’, with Eastern countries favouring longer 
term investment and the West, US and Europe focused on near-term returns. 
17  Nachemson-Ekwall, Sophie ‘Swedish institutional investors as large stake owners: Enhancing sustainable 
stakeholder capitalism’ (2017) Book chapter in Sustainable Development and Business, Eds. Kallifatides, 
M and Lerpold, L, SSE Institute for Research (SIR) pp. 255–276, p. 267. 
18    Ibid.  
19  ‘International Investing’ US Securities and Exchange Commission (7 December 2016) <Online: 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsininvesthtm.html>.  
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could further issues of short-termism.20 Relevant to the short-termism discussion is foreign 
portfolio investment (‘FPI’), rather than foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). FPI is defined by 
the European Commission (the ‘EC’) as where ‘an investor buys equity in or debt of a foreign 
company <but> [t]he investor does not necessarily have a long-term interest in the company 
or an influence over its management’21. Unlike FDI, which involves buying a controlling 
interest in a business22, FPI is highly liquid and passive – i.e. in the equity context, the 
investment is generally under 10% of the voting rights.23 Despite declines in FPI in 2008 due 
to the GFC and 2015 due to global political uncertainty, FPI is generally following an upward 
trend24, which is particularly evident in the Euro-area25. Therefore, policymakers outside of 
the US and the UK are, and should continue to be, alive to the issue of SMST, and there is 
merit in a global analysis whereby regulators and the financial industry can learn from what 
is being done outside their respective jurisdictions. Consequently, this thesis contributes to 
the existing body of research by providing a global survey of reforms in Chapter 4 (What Has 
Been Done?) and assessing in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) if 
such reforms at least conceptually address the SMST concerns they purport to solve. 
 
There are undoubtedly differences in financial markets around the globe, particularly 
with respect to operating cultures and regulatory frameworks. As a result, any definite reform 
efforts will need to be tailored to the relevant implementing jurisdiction. Illustrating these 
differences, Anglo-American corporate governance systems, such as the US, UK, Canada and 
Australia, are often seen to have a similar approach based on prioritizing shareholder value, 
often with a dispersed shareholder base.26 In contrast, in the EU – excluding the UK – a 
greater reliance generally on bank lending and debt, rather than equity, has been identified.27 
Also, in the EU, listed companies have traditionally not been widely-held as share ownership 
has been concentrated in a limited number of resident shareholders, such as, for example, 
                                                 
20  Atkins, Ralph, and Williamson, Hugh, ‘Call to Resist Anglo-American model of ‘short-term-ism’, Financial 
Times (26 April 2007).  
21  European Commission, Trade Policy, Definition of ‘Investment’, <Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/>.  
22  See the definition of ‘foreign direct investment’ in www.Investopedia.com. 
23  ‘Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual’ International Monetary Fund Sixth 
Edition (BPM6) (2009) p. 110 <Online http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/bpm6.pdf>.  
24  World Investment Report, 2017, ‘Investment and the Digital Economy’, UNCTAD, p. 13, Figure I.12 
<Online: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf>.  
25  Portfolio Investment, net (BoP, current US$), Euro Area, The World Bank <Online: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.KLT.PTXL.CD?locations=XC>.  
26  Anatomy, pp. 29-30. 
27  Brecht, Kira, ‘How U.S. and EU Capital Markets are Different’ (29 October 2015) <Online: 
http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/10431/how-u-s-and-eu-capital-markets-are-different>.  
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family groups or the state.28 In Asia, concentrated ownership of listed companies is also a 
common feature.29 For example, the Chinese government holds a significant portion of the 
equity of Chinese listed companies, and approximately 75% of Hong Kong listed companies 
have a dominant shareholder.30 However, many companies appear to be moving towards an 
Anglo-American shareholder capitalism model, with its distinctive features of a dispersed and 
globalized shareholding structure.31 As explored further in this thesis, SMST may be more or 
less pronounced depending on the corporate structure, and particularly, the presence of a 
dominant shareholder. Consequently, the analysis in this thesis is not meant to be a panacea 
or to offer a set of reform proposals for all concerns relating to the perceived SMST issue 
world-wide. Instead, it is hoped that this analysis may prove useful to policymakers and the 
financial industry as the ongoing impact of the current implemented SMST-driven reforms 
and the need for further SMST reforms are considered. Any future reforms meant to address 
SMST will need to be tailored to the specific circumstances of each particular jurisdiction.  
 
B. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK, METHODS, AND DATA PRESENTATION 
 
This Section B summarizes the framework for the research conducted in this thesis, 
which may predominately be classed as a qualitative review of existing research and reforms, 
and then sets out the specifics of the methodology used for the survey of the regulatory and 
financial industry SMST-driven reforms examined in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?). In 
addition, this Section B also explains how the results of the research have been presented.  
 
1. Research Framework 
 
The two main questions asked in this thesis are: (1) what has been done globally to 
address the perceived harms of SMST; and (2) do these reforms conceptually address the 
alleged SMST concerns? The specific hypothesis I test in this thesis, and ultimately disprove, 
is that the significant level of discussion and attention given to the stock market short-
termism has resulted in substantial implemented regulatory and financial industry reforms, 
which will, conceptually at least, address the perceived short-termism problem. There are 
numerous methodologies for answering research questions, which may generally be broken 
                                                 
28  Grant, Jeremy and Kirchmaier, Thomas, ‘Corporate Ownership and Performance in Europe’, Centre for 
Economic Performance, CEP Discussion Paper No. 632 (April 2004) and Anatomy, pp. 29-30.  
29  Anatomy, p. 30. 
30  OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia (2017) <Online: 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Survey-Corporate-Governance-Frameworks-Asia.pdf>.  
31  Bena et al, 2017, p. 123, and the discussion generally in Hansman & Kraakman, 2017.  
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down into qualitative and quantitative research methods. Although quantitative research   ̶
which is research that involves an empirical investigation of an observable phenomenon 
using statistics, mathematics or computational techniques32   ̶ has been assessed in this thesis, 
a qualitative approach has been taken to test the hypothesis set out above. 
 
The definition of qualitative research is less clearly articulated than quantitative 
research. However, qualitative research essentially encompasses a range of methodologies 
aimed at understanding how individuals or organizations behave in certain circumstances, 
which methods may include case studies, interviews, surveys, or observation.33 Qualitative 
research has been defined as ‘a form of social inquiry that tends to adopt a flexible and data-
driven research design, to use relatively unstructured data, to emphasize the essential role of 
subjectivity in the research process, to study a small number of naturally occurring cases in 
detail, and to use verbal rather than statistic forms of analysis’.34 Though the analysis in this 
thesis considers previously conducted quantitative empirical research on SMST – particularly 
in Chapters 5 (Is There a SMST Problem?), 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) and 7 (Is 
SMST Harmful?) –, a key component of the novel research conducted in this thesis is a 
qualitative survey of all regulatory and financial industry reforms made globally that are 
intended to correct SMST. This research is then layered onto existing qualitative and 
quantitative research on SMST in an attempt to answer the research questions and to test the 
hypothesis of this thesis set out above. In particular, this qualitative research assists with 
precisely defining the SMST issue, determining if there is a harmful SMST problem and how 
this problem is transmitted into the listed company. Through this pragmatic research 
approach35, I intend to further the existing research on the alleged SMST problem and 
provide a practical framework for policymakers and the financial industry to assess if the 
implemented and future reforms conceptually address perceived SMST concerns.  
 
                                                 
32  Given, Lisa M, ‘The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods’ (Los Angeles, California: Sage 
Publications, 2008). 
33  Hammersley, Martyn, ‘What is Qualitative Research’ (Bloomsbury Academy: 2013), Chapter 1, p. 12.  
34  Ibid.  
35  See the discussion by Wahyuni, Dina, ‘The Research Design Maze: Understanding Paradigms, Cases, 
Methods and Methodologies’, 10:1 Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research 69 (2012), where 
the author identified ‘pragmatism’ as a branch of research paradigm that ‘refuses to join the ‘paradigm war’ 
between the positivist and interpretivist research philosophies…and [i]nstead of questioning ontology and 
epistemology…pragmatist researchers start off with the research question to determine their framework’ (p. 
71). This approach emphasis what works best to address the research problem because, the author argues 
this approach ‘enables them [researchers] to better understand social reality’ (p. 71).   
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2. Research Methods 
 
The starting point of the research in this thesis was the Kay Review, Professor John 
Kay’s report commissioned by the UK Government in 2011 to investigate UK capital market 
short-termism, as this review has been the most visible articulation of a government 
commissioned report to consider the SMST issue post-GFC. The Kay Review is described 
further in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?) but was essentially a comprehensive review 
commissioned by the UK Government to look at short-termism in UK stock markets. 
Analysis of the Kay Review led to an exploration of US reform proposals, including the 2009 
and 2010 reports on short-termism provided by The Aspen Institute36, an international 
nonprofit think tank headquartered in Washington D.C.37 Academic articles that directly 
considered short-termism in the context of equity markets were also reviewed. The starting 
point for this analysis was a 2012 paper by Professor Lynne Dallas considering short-termism 
and the financial crisis in the US published in the Journal of Corporate Law, which is the 
most cited scholarly SMST article on Google Scholar post-GFC38. Articles citing Dallas’s 
work were also reviewed.39 Polemic texts, including a 2011 book authored by noted US 
economist, Professor Alfred Rappaport, on short-termism40 were also considered. These 
initial sources were then used to formulate a precise set of short-termism related search terms 
(the ‘Search Terms’), which were used to identify regulatory and financial industry reforms 
and reform proposals meant to correct the perceived capital market short-termism problem.41 
 
The research net was then cast as wide as possible using the Search Terms in an 
attempt to capture all discussions of SMST-driven reform since it was first articulated as an 
issue in the 1970s in order to identify regulatory and financial industry reforms and the 
underlying motivation and rationale for such reforms. This research required an expansive 
review of academic publications – primarily in the fields of law, finance and economics –, 
financial industry and popular press, and polemic and academic textbooks for any discussions 
                                                 
36  Aspen Report, 2009, and Aspen Report, 2010.  
37  www.aspeninstitute.org. 
38  Dallas, 2012, which has been cited in 235 published articles <source: GoogleScholar>.  
39  Citations of Dallas, 2012 include a subsequent notable analysis by Harvard Law School Professor Lucien 
Bebchuk whether insulating boards serves long-term value (Bebchuk, 2013, cited in 153 published articles 
<source: GoogleScholar>) and his analysis with Alan Brav, and Wei Jiang on the impact of hedge fund 
activism in the short-termism debate (Bebchuk et al, 2015 cited in 263 published articles <source: 
GoogleScholar>). 
40  Rappaport, 2011, which has been cited in 50 published articles <source: GoogleScholar>.  
41  These terms include: short-termism, short-term, investor short-termism, shareholder short-termism, asset 
manager short-termism, quarterly capitalism, short-term investing, managerial myopia, stock market, and 
capital market.   
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of SMST. Of particular use were the postings by legal and financial practitioners, and 
academics on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation (the ‘Harvard Law Forum’)42. A detailed review of all major business news and 
business sources was also conducted using the Search Terms on Factiva, a search engine of 
newspapers, journals and magazines worldwide owned by Dow Jones.43 The emphasis of this 
Factiva review was on the leading business publications, namely the Financial Times and the 
Wall Street Journal. To capture discussions outside of the US, however, publications in all 
regions including the UK, Europe and Asia were included. Also reviewed were any non-
governmental organization (‘NGO’), and financial industry or ‘think tank’ projects or reports 
considering short-termism – e.g. the 2017 report on promoting wealth by Tomorrow’s 
Company, a UK corporate governance think-tank44 –, which reports were accessed directly 
through the websites of each organization. During this review, I recorded whenever a specific 
jurisdiction or reform initiative was mentioned in connection with SMST. 
 
When a reform related to SMST was identified, I followed up with consideration of 
the full text of the reform itself, and an analysis of all of the relevant and accessible 
background material prepared by, or submitted to, the relevant implementing organization. 
For example, when the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive45 was considered, 
specifically, the amendments made to the EU Shareholder Rights Directive in 2017 meant to 
counter short-termism by encouraging long-term shareholder engagement, I reviewed the text 
of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive itself, its legislative history, and discussion 
papers and submissions relating to its introduction and subsequent amendments. Also 
considered in this analysis were publications from legal and accounting practitioners 
discussing the practical implications of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive.  
 
As SMST-driven reform is an emerging area, both implemented regulatory and 
financial industry reforms, and reform proposals have been considered. Of the SMST-driven 
reforms and reform proposals, the greatest weight has been attached to reports commissioned 
by government departments, regulators or other legislative bodies as such recommendations 
form the basis for ‘hard’ law reform. As explained further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?), ‘hard’ law reforms may be more significant as they evidence a stronger intent from 
                                                 
42  https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/.  
43  https://global.factiva.com. 
44  Tomorrow’s Company Report, 2017.  
45  Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 May 2017, amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement (effective as of 9 
June 2017)  (‘EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive’). 
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legislators to effect change than ‘soft’ laws. As noted above, SMST-driven reforms from the 
financial industry may have a significant impact on market practice, and financial industry 
initiatives and reform suggestions from market participants have been included. 
 
3. Data Presentation  
 
Each of the implemented or seriously considered reforms discussed in 
Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) have been compiled into a summary table – see 
Appendix ‘A’ (Proposed and Implemented Reforms by Jurisdiction), Table 1 (Asset Owner 
Oriented Reforms), Table 2 (Intermediary Oriented Reforms), and Table 3 (Company 
Manager Oriented Reforms). This categorization breaks down SMST-driven reforms by each 
element of the equity ownership chain – as defined in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues) –, 
allowing for analysis on this basis in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST 
Reforms). As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues) and Chapter 6 (SMST 
Transmission Mechanisms), SMST has different – albeit occasionally overlapping – 
considerations for each element of the equity ownership chain. The reforms in each of these 
three tables have been further organized by jurisdiction and have been colour coded to 
identify ‘hard’ law, ‘soft’ law or financial industry initiatives.  
 
The reforms which have actually been implemented are summarized in an additional 
table  ̶ see Appendix ‘B’ (Implemented SMST Reforms), Table 4 (Implemented SMST 
Reforms). As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), ‘hard’ law is defined as binding 
legislation and regulations promulgated under such legislation, and ‘soft’ law is defined as 
non-statutory measures including codes of conduct or other standard setting documentation. 
Although ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law reforms are both significant in governing the operations of 
listed companies, ‘hard’ law reforms evidence a legislative intent to effect change and they 
are legally binding. Arguably, this position is weakened when the ‘hard’ law is ‘light’ touch 
and contains an ‘opt out’ or is ‘comply or explain’ based, rather than mandating a specific 
course of action with penalties for failure to comply. Based on this distinction, ‘hard’ law 
SMST-driven reforms are further categorized in Table 4 (Implemented SMST Reforms) into 
prescriptive and ‘comply or explain’/‘opt-out’ reforms. Such categorization facilitates further 
analysis of whether such regulatory reforms will achieve what they set out to do. 
 
Each of the implemented or seriously considered SMST-driven reforms in Chapter 4 
(What Has Been Done?) are then assessed in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the 
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SMST Reforms) against the analysis provided in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), 
and Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) to determine if these reforms actually 
address the perceived SMST problem. The results of the analysis in Chapter 8 (Conceptual 
Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) are then set out in Appendix ‘C’ (Conceptual 
Effectiveness of Reforms), Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner 
Oriented SMST Reforms), Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Intermediary 
Oriented SMST Reforms), Table 7 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Company 
Manager Oriented SMST Reforms), and Table 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented 
SMST Reforms). Specifically, Tables 5 to 8 categorize the implemented SMST-driven 
reforms by whether they address the inefficiencies around long-term value in share pricing – 
i.e. excessive discounting –, and/or whether they cut off SMST transmission mechanisms. In 
doing so, Tables 5 to 8 visually demonstrate which of the implemented SMST-driven reforms 
identified, in theory at least, actually may effectively remedy the alleged SMST problem.  
 
C. LIMITATIONS 
 
This focus of this thesis is on the specific articulation of short-termism in the context 
of capital markets as provided in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues). As discussed further in 
Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), short-termism is, however, a broad and nebulous concept. It 
has been considered generally in respect of human behaviour  ̶  i.e. the natural human 
tendency to seek out instant gratification46  ̶ , and in the context of numerous fields including, 
for example, politics47, sports48 and marketing strategy49. The examination of short-termism 
as it relates to financial markets in this thesis is thus an important  ̶  but albeit only one  ̶  
branch of inquiry. This research is also further constrained by the limitations set out below. 
                                                 
46  Baumeister Roy, F and Bushman, Brad J, ‘Social Psychology and Human Nature’ Second Edition 
(Wadworth: 2010).  
47  For example, see Kuper, Jeremy, ‘Working lives: political short-termism perpetuates the housing crisis’ (3 
October 2012) The Guardian <Online: https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2012/oct/03/jeremy-
kuper-shelter-political-short-termism> and ‘Now for the Long Term', The Report of the Oxford Martin 
Commission for Future Generations (October 2013) <Online: 
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf>, 
which looks generally at short-termism in politics and business.  
48  Cooper, Joe, ‘Short-Termism’s Damaging Effect on the Premier League’ (7 May 2014) HuffPost <Online: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/joe-cooper/premier-league-short-termism_b_4904887.html>. 
49  Pate, Neil, ‘The Psychology of Instant Gratification and How It Will Revolutionize Your Marketing 
Approach; (24 June 2014) The Entrepreneur <Online: https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235088>.  
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1.  Listed Companies Instead of Banking or Non-Listed Companies  
 
The research in this thesis is intentionally limited to SMST in the context of publicly 
traded companies – also known as listed companies –, the equity securities of which are listed 
for trading on a recognized stock market. Each of the terms ‘equity securities’, ‘listed 
company’ and ‘recognized stock market’ are defined in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues). With 
respect to financial markets, short-termism has also been a significant part of the discussion 
resulting in enhanced regulation of the banking sector post-GFC.50 The impact of short-
termism of the banking industry raises special issues unique to the banking industry51 that are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus of this thesis has been on the alleged short-
termism of listed companies, which would include banks that list their equity securities on a 
stock market – for example, the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation the shares of which 
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The rationale for focusing on SMST in the 
context of the equity securities of listed companies rather than on private, semi-public, or 
public but non-listed companies52 – referred to collectively in this thesis as ‘non-listed 
companies’ – is because, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) 
and Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms), the alleged SMST issue, at least 
conceptually, is transmitted through market pricing of the equity securities of listed 
companies. Non-listed companies lack a dynamic and liquid public market for their equity 
securities and, consequently, are not specifically included in the research in this thesis.  
 
2. Equity Securities Rather than Derivatives or Debt Instruments  
 
The research also deliberately focuses on the equity securities of listed companies 
rather than debt instruments – i.e. bonds or debt-like preferred shares. A bond is a debt 
security that represents a fixed-income claim on the cash flows and assets of a company.53 
Bonds have considerable importance in global capital markets. Specifically, the global bond 
                                                 
50  For example, see the discussion in Blair, S, ‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis: The Dangers of Short-
Termism’, Harvard Law Forum (4 July 2011).  
51  See the discussion in Dallas, 2012 and Blair, 2011.  
52  There are public companies that are not listed on a recognized stock exchange and semi-public companies 
that elect to stay just under the shareholder number threshold which attracts public company reporting 
requirements. For a discussion of these distinctions in the US see, Coffee, John C, ‘The Challenge of the 
Semi-Public Companies’ The CLS Blue Sky Blog (1 April 2013) <Online: 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/01/the-challenge-of-the-semi-public-company/>.   
53  Thakor, Anjan, ‘International Financial Markets: A Diverse System Is the Key to Commerce’ Center for 
Capital Market Competitiveness (Winter 2015) <Online: http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/021881_SourcesofCapital_fin.pdf>, p. 1. 
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market was worth approximately US$80 trillion in 2012. By comparison, the equity market 
capitalization of listed companies in the same period was less, at approximately US$60 
trillion during the same period54. Despite the significance of debt markets, short-termism is 
arguably not as significant a concern with these instruments, as it is with equity securities. 
Publicly traded debt securities – and debt-like preference shares – have clearly defined 
parameters, namely repayment timeframes and amounts and are generally non-voting. Thus, 
these securities appear less likely to have the same long-term valuation concerns that may 
arise with respect to equity securities which are discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?), and also lack the requisite transmission mechanism into the listed company, 
which mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms). 
 
Like bonds, derivatives are also an additional important component of public capital 
markets. The value of over-the-counter derivatives at the end of 2013 was about US$710.2 
trillion globally55, which is considerably higher than the combined amount of bond and equity 
global markets. A derivative in its simplest form is a security, the price of which is derived 
from an underlying asset – i.e. an equity security of a listed company.56 A common example 
of a derivative is a futures contract, whereby one party wants security on the future price of 
equity securities of a listed company – e.g. 100 Apple shares –, and another party agrees to 
buy those 100 Apple shares at a set price on a pre-determined future date. However, despite 
the significance of the derivative market, trading in derivative instruments does not generally 
impact the prices of the listed company shares underlying such derivatives. Therefore, the 
interests of such derivative holders – and similarly non-voting debt instruments and 
preference shares – lack the requisite direct transmission mechanism into the listed company, 
which mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms). Although 
SMST may manifest as pricing issues of derivatives, these issues would stem from the 
pricing issues inherent in the underlying equity securities. Consequently, derivatives are not 
excluded from this study, but rather focusing on SMST in respect of equity securities is the 
most feasible and logical method of tackling any potential SMST issues with derivatives, and 
derivatives instruments are not separately considered in this research. The focus of the 
research in this thesis is thus on SMST in the context of equity securities of listed companies.  
 
                                                 
54  See Figure 2 (Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (current US) (trillions)) in Chapter 2 (Defining 
the Issues), Subsection B(2).  
55  Ibid. 
56  See the definition of ‘related party transaction’ in Investopedia <Online: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp>. 
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3. Jurisdictional Limitations 
 
Of the US$65 trillion global market capitalization in 2016, approximately US$27.5 
trillion was attributed to companies listed in the US, and a further approximately US$8 
trillion was attributed to companies listed in the EU  ̶  of which approximately US$3 trillion 
was attributable to UK listed companies.57 Although the survey in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?) has intentionally been as made broad as possible to capture all efforts to correct the 
alleged SMST problem worldwide, the significant market capitalization of the US, the UK 
and the EU justifies an increased focus and analysis of the SMST discussion and the resulting 
SMST-driven financial industry and regulatory reforms in these jurisdictions.   
  
4. Rhetoric Not Substance 
 
Financial industry and regulatory reforms in which SMST rhetoric appears to be used 
in a manner unconnected to the intention of the reform are not included in the compilation of 
reforms in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?). As an example, the EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive contains provisions meant to increase minority shareholder oversight on 
related party transactions.58 Related party transactions are business transactions between one 
or more connected parties, which in the listed company context often involve deals between a 
listed company and its majority shareholders.59 Such transactions may negatively impact 
minority shareholders. The EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive reforms are generally 
meant to strengthen long-term shareholder engagement and address the behaviour of 
institutional investors and asset managers who ‘often do not engage properly with 
companies…and…exert pressure on companies to perform in the short term, which 
jeopardizes the long-term financial and non-financial performances of companies’60. 
Article 9c of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive provides institutional investors 
and asset managers – parties which the EU has identified have short term interests – with 
additional rights in related party transactions. While providing such rights may serve a valid 
corporate governance function, doing so does not appear to be in any way connected to 
correcting the short-termism of such actors. Therefore, these EU related party transaction 
reforms, and other similar reforms which appear to use short-termism as rhetoric, are not 
                                                 
57  World Federation of Exchanges Database, ‘Market capitalization of domestic listed companies’ (current 
US$) <Online: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2016&start=1975>. 
58  See Article 9c regarding the voting, disclosure and third-party appraisal rights of minority shareholders in a 
related party transaction.  
59  See the definition of ‘related party transaction’ in www.investopedia.com.  
60  EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, Whereas Clause (9).  
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included in the analysis in this thesis. Where the impacts of the reforms on the alleged SMST 
issue are less easy to discount – for example, with depositaries and proxy advisors – they are 
included in the consideration of SMST-driven reforms in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?). 
 
5. Intra-Company Operations 
 
It is certainly logical that the listed company response to the apparent short-termism 
of investors does not stop at company managers – i.e. the top-level decision makers in a listed 
company. The success of an organization depends on its activities at the operating level.61 It 
follows that the actions of company managers and employees at the operating level may 
contribute to the perceived short-termism of listed companies, and this level of operations of 
a listed company would need to be included in any effective corrective efforts. However, 
intra-company relationships are unlikely to pursue short-term goals without a queue from the 
senior management of a listed company. Consequently, alleged SMST implications of intra-
company operations are intentionally excluded from the scope of analysis of this thesis.   
  
6. Time Limitations 
Of necessity, the analysis in this thesis has been restricted to reforms in place, or 
proposed, at the time of writing. The rapid pace of change in modern financial markets, and 
ongoing political uncertainty, in particular the UK’s decision to exit the EU, may drastically 
impact the focus of financial market reform. As a result, the heightened attention given to 
SMST in the years since the GFC may wane as a motivator for financial market reform. 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), the SMST conversation has 
been developing for over forty years and is unlikely to disappear entirely from policymaker 
and boardroom agendas. Consequently, it is intended that the analysis in this thesis will be 
helpful to analyze current SMST-driven reforms and reform proposals, and also when SMST 
is inevitably raised as a rationale for future financial industry or regulatory reform.   
 
                                                 
61  See the discussion of the significant of operating units in Rappaport, 2011, pp. 114-116, and in Koller, 
1994. 
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CHAPTER 2 – DEFINING THE ISSUES 
 
‘Although it has no off-the-shelf definition, short-termism is generally taken to refer to the 
tendency of agents in the financial intermediation chain to weight too heavily near-term 
outcomes at the expense of longer-term opportunities.’62 
 
This Chapter provides a detailed definition of perceived short-termism in the context 
of stock market equity investing and defines terms relevant to such short-termism. These 
definitions provide the necessary framework for the analysis of the short-termism reforms in 
this thesis. Articulations of the term ‘short-termism’ generally, and its narrower form of 
short-termism in the context of stock market investing, are first examined, and a definition of 
the alleged ‘stock market short-termism’ problem is then provided. There is considerable 
discussion amongst academics, policy makers and the financial industry and in the popular 
press about stock market short-termism, and why and if it is problematic. Although there 
have been some efforts to define the concept, further efforts to define the term with precision 
are warranted. Therefore, this Chapter attempts to attempts to narrow this discussion of short-
termism into a precise articulation of the issue. This definition is then used to identify and 
analyze the SMST-driven reforms in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?).  
 
Salient terms relevant to the definition of SMST including ‘stock market’, ‘listed 
company’, ‘equity security’, and the financial intermediation chain – defined in this Chapter 
as the ‘equity ownership chain’ – are then considered and defined in this Chapter. Each of the 
key components of the equity ownership chain – articulated as asset owners, intermediaries 
and company managers – and their relationship to the definition of SMST, are then separately 
analyzed. Although there is undoubtedly overlap of the SMST issues in each category, this 
separation facilitates an examination of how the alleged SMST problem manifests in each 
key element of the equity ownership chain. Further, as the focus of this study is on regulatory 
– and to a lesser degree, financial industry – reforms aimed at correcting the perceived SMST 
problem so defined, I also examine a distinction particularly relevant to regulatory reform, 
namely the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. Each of the definitions provided in this 
Chapter frames the analysis of the SMST-driven reforms set out in the following Chapters. 
 
A. DEFINING SMST 
 
Many articles in the popular and financial press take it as a given that short termism 
behaviour in stock markets is not only occurring, but that it is problematic. Headlines such as 
                                                 
62  Davies et al, 2014, p. 16.  
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‘Short-Termism is a Wolf Stalking the Equity Market’63 are emblematic of this pervasive 
popular opinion. For the third year running, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s 
largest asset management firm, has denounced short-termism, and put out a call to action 
against SMST which has generated considerable press.64 Despite the popularity of this 
opinion, many questions have been raised about SMST.65 These questions include: Is there 
short-termism in capital markets at all? If so, who is receiving the benefits of management’s 
focus on short-term financial returns? Who is harmed by this short-term focus? If short-
termism is occurring, what is driving this short-term behaviour in stock markets? Is it 
company managers, intermediaries, or asset owners, or a combination of some or all of them, 
causing the short-term focus? If SMST is primarily caused by asset owner pressure – as is 
often argued by company managers66 – why are asset owners with long-term investment 
horizons encouraging short-term investment strategies, which strategies appear ultimately 
harmful to their own long-term interests?67 This Chapter examines questions around the 
perceived SMST issue and clarifies what SMST means in the context of this thesis.  
 
1. Short-Termism Generally 
 
As observed in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, Methodology and Limitations), short-
termism is a broad and nebulous concept based on the natural human predisposition to seek 
out instant gratification. Quick decision-making undoubtedly has its merits, but the 
problematic behaviour identified is the human propensity to make impulsive decisions for 
immediate benefit at the expense of our longer-term best interests. Professor Kay describes 
this behaviour as our ‘natural human tendency to make decisions in search of immediate 
gratification at the expense of future returns: decisions we subsequently regret’68. Generally, 
                                                 
63  Walker, Simon, ‘Short-Termism is a Wolf Stalking the Equity Market’, The Telegraph (13 November 
2014).  
64  Turner, 2016, Oyedele, 2017, and 2018 Blackrock Letter. 
65 Most notably see Roe, 2013, where Harvard Law Professor Mark Roe acknowledges that US markets may 
be net short-termist   ̶  although he finds the evidence unconvincing as stock-markets often value the long-
term ̶, but that this short-termism is mitigated in the US economy as a whole  ̶  e.g. by private equity. 
Consequently, Professor Roe argues that there is no justification for regulation to correct SMST.  
66  For example, see CPP & McKinsey, 2013, referencing a CPP and McKinsey international survey of 
directors and CEOs where 79 percent of directors and senior executives said they felt the most pressure to 
demonstrate strong financial performance over a time period of less than two years. 
67  Question asked by in a discussion paper of the Initiative for Responsible Investment at the Hauser Institute 
for Civil Society, Trustee Leadership Forum for Retirement Security (2016) at p. 2 <Online: 
http://iri.hks.harvard.edu/files/iri/files/tlf-note-on-long-term-investing.pdf> (‘TLF, 2016’), which paper also 
asserts that institutional investors help create the short-termism problem by rewarding managers and 
companies for short-term behaviour.   
68  Kay Review, p. 14. 
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Professor Kay claims that this tendency manifests in actions where ‘[w]e speak and act in the 
heat of the moment, we eat and drink too much, and we do not save enough’69.  
 
Warnings of the perils of short-termism abound in literature – e.g. the fables of the 
Tortoise and the Hare and the Boy Who Cried Wolf. Professor Kay provided the example of 
Ulysses tied to the masts to avoid the calls of the sirens as an illustration of the difficulties 
humans face in overcoming alluring short-term rewards.70 This apparent inclination for short-
term reward is perhaps most noticeable in the behaviour of young children. It may be said 
that a common objective of most parents is to encourage children to appreciate longer-term 
value – e.g. the benefits of eating a healthy meal over the immediate gratification of sweet 
treats. The Stanford marshmallow experiment71, and the resulting adorable videos of young 
children fighting their primal instincts for instant gratification when faced with the choice of 
eating ‘one marshmallow now in place of two later’72, is a popular illustration of the parental 
challenge of the difficulty of overcoming natural human short-term impulses. Although most 
evident in children, adults are certainly not immune to these short-termism behaviours, 
particularly when it comes to the time pay-offs of stock market investing.  
 
Andrew Haldane, Chief Economist of the Bank of England, observed that allegations 
of short-termism in capital markets are certainly not new, and classical economists such as 
William Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, Arthur Pigou and John Maynard Keynes have all 
grappled with the implications of the human tendency to prefer instant gratification and 
discount future outcomes.73 Arthur Pigou, for example, stated that humans have a ‘defective 
telescopic faculty’ such that ‘we see future pleasures on a diminished scale’74.  
 
More recently, neuroscientists have attempted to place this ‘defective telescopic 
faculty’ in an anatomical context, and have identified that different parts of the brain are 
responsible for valuing short-term and long-term monetary payoffs.75 Using magnetic 
resonance imaging, neuroscientists have observed that from a neuroscience perspective, when 
                                                 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Mischel, Walter et al, ‘Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in delay of gratification’ (1972) 21:2 Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 204. 
72  For example, see the IntegratedMedia.com video (24 September 2009) available on YouTube <Online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QX_oy9614HQ>.  
73  Haldane & Davies, 2011, p. 2.  
74  Ibid. 
75  See Knustson et al, ‘Distributed Neural Representation of Expected Value’ (2005) 25:19 Journal of 
Neuroscience 4806 and Onoda et al, ‘Inter-individual discount factor differences in reward prediction are 
topographically associated with caudate activation’ (2011) 212:4 Experimental Brain Research 593. 
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the choice involves an immediate gain, the medial pre-frontal cortex – a part of the brain 
associated with automatic, emotional thinking that is connected to the mid-brain dopamine 
system – is used disproportionately, i.e. it feels good to get short-term results. The same 
process reveals that when the decision involves a delayed reward, a different calculating part 
of the brain – the parietal cortex – is used to make a more rational and patient choice. This 
part of the brain does not produce the same good feeling. Consequently, it may be said that 
our brains are ‘hard-wired’ to cause us to prefer short-term results.76  
 
But this ‘hard-wiring’ in our brains does not mean that we cannot overcome our 
supposedly anatomically driven human inclinations towards short-term gratification. 
Behavioural economics theory attempts to understand these natural inclinations – often 
termed biases – and adjust such undesirable behaviour through a variety of means including 
legal and financial industry reforms. Behavioural economics is essentially a field of study in 
the social and behavioural sciences developed from cognitive psychology, which field of 
research has gained traction in inter-disciplinary research in recent years. Based primarily on 
psychological experimentation, research in this area aims to develop theories on human 
decision-making, which are based largely around biases inherent in human behaviour, and 
apply such theories to real world circumstances – for example, personal and public finance, 
health, energy, and marketing.77 As considered further in Chapter 8 (Conceptually Effective 
SMST Reform) behavioural economists have discussed how law can be used to de-bias 
certain behaviours, either by restricting undesirable behaviours – e.g. the controls on 
gambling –, or by reducing undesirable behaviours by offering guidance towards the desired 
outcome – e.g. compelling disclosure on boardroom diversity.78 Consequently, although a 
bias towards instant gratification in decision-making may be hard-wired, there is hope that 
any negative effects in the context of stock market investing could be corrected or at least 
‘nudged’ through appropriately structured regulatory or financial industry actions.  
 
Translated generally into a business context, Professor Kay proposed in the Kay 
Review that ‘short-termism occurs when companies invest too little, either in the physical 
assets of their business or in the intangibles which are generally the course of their 
competitive advantage – their reputation, their capacity for innovation, and in skills and 
                                                 
76  See the summary of these neurological studies in ‘Behavioural finance: short-termism’, Fidelity 
International (April 2015) <Online: http://www.fidelity.com.au/insights-centre/education/behavioural-
finance-short-termism1/#_ftn1>.  
77  See further discussion in Samson, Alain (ed), The Behavioral Economics Guide 2014 (2014), Behavioral 
Science Solutions <Online: http://www.behavioraleconomics.com>. 
78  Jolls & Sunstein, 2006. 
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capabilities of their employees’79. The question is how this natural human tendency to prefer 
short-term rewards translates into the type of short-termism allegedly seen in capital markets 
and railed against by financial industry leaders such as Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, 
Ronald O’Hanley, president and CEO of State Street Investors, and William McNabb, 
Chairman and CEO of Vanguard.80 It is possible that these asset management giants may just 
want to be seen to be doing something about an area of growing public concern, rather than 
be substantially invested in the issue. Regardless of such intentions, answering the question 
about how the human tendency for short-term reward translates into the context of stock 
market investing is at the crux of satisfactorily defining the alleged SMST problem.  
 
2. Short-Termism in Equity Capital Markets 
 
This Subsection analyzes how short-termism has been defined in relation to equity 
capital markets. As demonstrated below, many definitions of stock market short-termism 
have been presented and examples of short-term behaviour provided. However, considerable 
uncertainty still exists on what constitutes short-termism in equity capital markets. For 
example, Charles Nathan, of the financial services consultancy firm, Finsbury, observed that 
a complicating factor in this discussion on short-termism is the uncertainty on whether the 
debate should be about investor behaviour or objectives, or corporate behaviour or 
objectives.81 Specifically, is it investors that are behaving in a short-term manner by holding 
shares for shorter time periods, or is it companies that are prioritizing short-term financial 
objectives, such as quarterly earnings per share? As an example of the wide range of 
activities that fall under the short-termism umbrella, the US Trustee Leadership Forum 
offered a list of short-term activities which included trading practices such as high frequency 
trading (‘HFT’)82, pressure from activist investors, leveraged buy-outs, short-selling, CEO 
pay tied to share price, and money manager incentives based on short-term performance.83 
Given the broad assortment of activities associated with short-termism – which arguably 
constitutes many of the features of modern capital markets –, it is necessary to pin down a 
workable definition of SMST that concisely articulates the perceived problem and its 
                                                 
79  Kay Review, p. 14. 
80  Tulay, 2017.  
81  Nathan, 2015. 
82  HFT includes a number of characteristics, but essentially means using sophisticated technological tools and 
computer algorithms to rapidly trade securities (Dallas, 2012, p. 299). The short-termism concerns of HFT 
have been articulated as the costs of such trades which erode ultimate saver value (Aspen Report, 2009, p. 
2), and create a negative trend in equity markets favoring securities trading over building trust relationships 
(Kay Review, p. 39). 
83  TLF, 2016, p. 1. 
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causation. Having greater clarity around what constitutes stock market short-termism is an 
essential cornerstone for analyzing if there is in fact a SMST problem and whether the 
reforms discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) do at least conceptually address the 
perceived SMST issue. 
 
As set out above, broad allegations of short-termism in capital markets are certainly 
not new, although there has been a spike of interest since the GFC.84 The profile of the 
alleged short-termism problem as it relates to equity capital markets has possibly been raised 
post-GFC given the increased inter-connectedness and rapid pace of change in modern equity 
capital markets 85, which was highlighted by the GFC. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3 
(An Evolving Concern?), there has been much discussion on short-termism and why short-
termism has been seen as problematic in the context of capital markets. These discussions 
have undoubtedly been influenced by the relevant political issues of the day – e.g. takeovers 
in the 1980s, national competitiveness in the 1990s, and concerns about market vulnerability 
post-GFC – which is explored further in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?). Although short-
termism was discussed vaguely prior to the GFC, numerous broad definitions have been 
articled post-GFC, possibly in response to the widespread nature of the harms caused by the 
GFC. For example, the Financial Times defines it as ‘an excessive focus on short-term results 
at the expense of long-term interests’86 and a Barclays’ report on short-termism defines it as 
‘our tendency to constantly be solving today’s problems rather than taking a long-term 
view’87. These definitions have captured the imagination of corporate commentators but are 
not particularly helpful in articulating the harms or causation of short-termism.  
 
Dallas offered a more detailed definition of short-termism as it relates to capital 
markets. She defined SMST as ‘the excessive focus of corporate managers, asset managers, 
investors, and analysts on short-term results, whether quarterly earnings or short-term 
portfolio returns, and a repudiation of concern for long-term value creation and the 
fundamental value of firms’88. Similarly, J.W. Mason released a report with the Roosevelt 
Institute defining short-termism as ‘the focus on short-term horizons by both corporate 
managers and financial markets, prioritizing near-term shareholder interests over the long-
                                                 
84  See the search results in Figure 1 (Citations of the Term ‘Short-Termism’), in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, 
Methodology and Limitations).   
85  See opening remarks in the speech by Haldane & Davies, 2011, p. 1. 
86  http://lexicon.ft.com. 
87  Barclays, 2015, p. 3. 
88  Dallas, 2012, p. 268. 
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term growth of the firm’89. Both Dallas and Mason’s definitions articulate that the perceived 
problem is the excessive focus on short-term results, but neither explain exactly what is 
problematic about doing so that jeopardizes long-term growth of the firm. Further, Dallas’s 
definition suggests that the long-term and fundamental values of listed companies are 
‘repudiated’. Arguably this is an unhelpful value judgment on the behaviour of corporate 
managers, which would be difficult, if not impossible to substantiate, as doing so would 
require demonstrating that corporate managers are unconcerned about long-term value or 
have taken the effort to ‘repudiate’ such long-term and fundamental values.  
 
Harvard Law Professor Mark Roe, noted for his claims that SMST is exaggerated90, 
offered clarity around what is problematic about favouring short-term returns. He articulates 
the SMST issue as corporate directors and managers favoring ‘immediate but lower-value 
results over more profitable long-term results’91 – emphasis mine. Authors from The 
Economist – Richard Davies – and the Bank of England – including Andrew Haldane, Chief 
Economist – bulk up Roe’s definition and provide additional clarity on how this short-term 
preference translates into behaviours at the firm level. Davies et al claim the problem is 
caused by ‘agents in the financial intermediation chain weighing near-term outcomes too 
heavily at the expense of longer-term opportunities and thus forgoing valuable investment 
projects and potential output’92 – emphasis mine. They provide evidence in support of this 
reasoning demonstrating systematic and increasing excessive discounting of future returns in 
US and UK stock markets. This evidence, and the harms of SMST, are assessed further in 
Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) and Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?). 
However, the heart of the argument presented by Davies et al, and included in Roe’s 
articulation of the SMST issue, is that short-termism results in investors as a whole receiving 
lower financial return in the short-term over greater financial benefit in the future.   
 
Assuming for the sake of argument that short-termism is harmful to listed companies, 
and, therefore, by extension to their investors and broader constituent elements, such as 
employees and customers, the definition of SMST also needs to identify causation. There is 
considerable discussion about what is driving short-termism in capital markets, which is 
considered in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?). However, the basis of the argument 
                                                 
89  Mason, 2015, p. 4. 
90  Roe, 2013, and Roe, 2016, in which Mr. Roe claims that short-termism is a chimera, which has turned into 
a bigger political issue than it deserves to be. 
91  Roe, 2013, p. 981. 
92  Davies et al, 2014, p. 16. 
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that I present is that if a short-termism problem exists, it is mainly caused by asset owners, 
and intermediaries who act on asset owner’s behalf, preferring short-term returns, which 
preference is transmitted to company managers through a variety of methods, which are 
explored in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms). Consequently, SMST is defined in 
this thesis as asset owners and intermediaries in the equity ownership chain – which term is 
defined below – weighing near-term financial outcomes too heavily at the expense of more 
profitable longer-term investment opportunities. This weighing causes company managers of 
listed companies to take actions that prioritize the short-term financial returns of the listed 
company to the detriment of listed companies, which by extension includes their investors 
and broader constituent elements. Although certain activities in capital markets may be short-
term oriented in a temporal sense – such as HFT – the reforms meant to address short-
termism are only analyzed against SMST as defined in this thesis. Such analysis of the SMST 
reforms also requires further explanation of the stock market terminology discussed below.    
 
B. STOCK MARKET TERMINOLOGY 
 
1. Stock Markets 
 
This thesis focuses on perceived short-termism as it relates to organizations that have 
equity securities listed for public trading on a ‘recognized’ stock market – defined in this 
thesis as a ‘stock market’ –, which are also known as stock exchanges or equity markets. The 
complete list of ‘recognized’ stock markets varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.93 
However, ‘recognized’ stock exchanges essentially include all of the major stock markets in 
the world, most of which – other than the London Stock Exchange (the ‘LSE’)94 – are 
members of the World Federation of Stock Exchanges95. The majority of the largest stock 
markets96 are private sectors enterprises that compete nationally and globally for business.  
 
The two primary functions of a stock market are to: (1) provide liquidity to investors 
                                                 
93  See for example, the list of designated recognized exchanges provided by the UK Government in respect of 
Section 1005 of the UK Income Tax Act 2007 <Online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/552552/table1-rse2016.pdf>.  
94  Stafford, Phillip, ‘London Stock Exchange to Quit World Federation of Exchanges’ (28 November 2013) 
Financial Times <Online: https://www.ft.com/content/584714e4-582a-11e3-82fc-00144feabdc0>. 
95  www.world-exchanges.org. 
96  Of the top ten stock markets based on market capitalization, only the Chinese stock markets (Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) were government owned. The remaining stock markets are 
themselves publicly listed (e.g. LSE and NYSE) or owned by a group of private investors (e.g. Tokyo Stock 
Exchange) – Simpson, Stephen ‘Who owns the stock exchanges’ Investopedia (9 March 2011) <Online: 
http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0311/who-owns-the-stock-exchanges.aspx>. 
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based on reasonably reliable pricing; and, (2) facilitate the raising of capital by listed 
companies.97 The reliability of share prices of listed companies is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?). For the purpose of defining stock markets, it 
suffices here to say that stock markets facilitate their two primary functions – liquidity and 
capital raising – by providing a trading platform whereby investors can achieve liquidity for 
their investments, and also companies with appealing growth prospects may be able to raise 
significant amounts of capital in the primary market from a large pool of public investors.98 
Evidencing their commitment to this trading role, two of the world’s largest stock markets, 
the New York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’) and National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (‘NASDAQ’)99, both have corporate strategic objectives focused on 
providing technology, products and services to facilitate trading. The existence of a large 
number of investors, at least theoretically, is meant to lower the investment risk for all 
investors in the listed company and, thus, the cost of capital for the listed company, as each 
investor is not required to invest as much as they would need to do in a non-listed 
company.100 Given this large pool of investors and a liquid secondary market among such 
investors, listed companies are theoretically at least able to raise large amounts of capital for 
activities with time horizons that may exceed the horizons of individual investors.101  
 
Although arguably the role of stock markets as a capital raising mechanism may be 
diminishing in importance102, this liquidity function based on reliable pricing continues to 
serve a valid function. Specifically, properly functioning stock markets may reduce investing 
risk by providing liquidity for asset owners and asset managers103, and may also provide a 
viable exit option for company founders and other early stage investors104. Arguably, another 
useful, but perhaps often over-looked function of stock markets, is that listed companies 
provide a benchmarking tool for private company valuations. Consequently, though the focus 
                                                 
97  Stock Exchanges and Sustainability, 2015, p. 6, and see definition of ‘stock exchange’ at 
www.businessdictionary.com. 
98  Ibid. 
99  The NYSE and NASDAQ are the first and second largest stock exchanges in the world, respectively, based 
on market capitalization as at 31 January 2015 (www.world-exchanges.org). 
100  Stock Exchanges and Sustainability, 2015, p. 6. 
101  Ibid.  
102  See the Kay Review, p. 22, where Professor Kay observes that ‘[e]quity markets have not been an important 
source of capital for new investment in British business for many years…[l]arge UK companies are self-
financing – the cash flow they obtain from operations through profits and depreciation is more than 
sufficient for their investment needs’. Also, in the US, which accounts for almost half of global market 
capitalization, the number of listed companies has fallen from 8,090 in 1996 to 4,331 in 2016 World 
Federation of Exchanges database, ‘Listed domestic companies, total’, <Online 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=US&name_desc=true>.  
103  Arestis, et al. 2001, p. 18. 
104  See the Kay Review, p. 28, where Professor Kay observes that ‘[e]quity markets today should primarily be 
seen as a means of getting money out of companies rather than a means of putting it in’. 
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of this thesis is on listed companies, it is worth briefly highlighting the contribution made to 
the economy generally by private companies, to demonstrate the benefits that a well-
functioning public equities market provides to non-listed companies in the private sector.  
 
Non-listed companies are important because they contribute significantly to 
employment and gross domestic product (‘GDP’) growth in most developed countries. In the 
US, for example, out of the 27 million US businesses, less than 6,300105 were publicly traded 
on the major US exchanges in 2012.106 The remainder of US business was privately held, and 
these businesses generated a majority of new jobs and more than half of the US GDP in 
2012107. Stock markets play an important role in ensuring that the private sector is viable. In 
addition to the capital raising and liquidity – including exit options for early investors – 
functions, a liquid, properly functioning stock market is also useful as a benchmarking tool 
for non-listed companies. Specifically, the simplest method of estimating non-listed company 
value is to use comparable company analysis (‘CCA’).108 CCA involves finding public 
markets for firms which most closely resemble the private firm, and basing valuation 
estimates on the values at which the private company’s publicly-traded peers are traded.109 
CCA assists with accurately valuing private companies, which valuations are useful in a 
range of private company financial transactions including share and debt issuances, credit 
facilities and merger and acquisitions transactions. The impact of the SMST problem on 
proper stock market functioning is considered further in the following Chapters. In particular, 
Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?) examines whether SMST is degrading the 
quality of stock markets, consequently impacting the ability of stock markets to fulfill their 
primary liquidity and capital raising functions, as well as their important valuation role.  
 
2. Listed Company 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, Methodology and Limitations), this 
thesis focuses on short-termism exclusively as it relates to listed companies rather than non-
listed companies. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) and 
                                                 
105  There were 4,331 domestic US companies publicly trading on recognized US stock exchanges in 2016 
World Federation of Exchanges Database, Total US Listed Domestic Companies, <Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=US>. 
106  Biery, Mary Ellen, ‘Comparing private, public company trends’ (25 July 2012) Forbes <Online: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2012/07/25/comparing-private-public-company-
trends/#5976ea812bab>.  
107  Ibid.  
108  ‘Valuing Private Companies’ Investopedia (16 November 2016), <Online: 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/11/valuing-private-companies.asp>.  
109  Ibid.  
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Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms), this focus is because the alleged SMST issue, 
at least conceptually, is transmitted through market pricing of the equity securities of listed 
companies. Non-listed companies lack a dynamic and liquid public market for their equity 
securities and, consequently, are not specifically included in the research in this thesis. Listed 
companies go by various names in different jurisdictions – e.g. quoted companies or publicly-
traded or publicly-quoted companies. However, the term ‘listed company’ is used in this 
thesis to specifically mean a legal entity the equity securities of which are listed – or quoted – 
for public trading on a stock market, as defined above.110  
 
Listed companies are materially significant to most major national economies, and the 
global economy. As illustrated in Figure 2 (Market Capitalization of Listed Companies 
(current US) (trillions)) below, the combined global market capitalization of listed companies 
has been increasing – with fluctuations most notably during the GFC –, and the total market 
capitalization of all listed companies had risen to almost $65 trillion in 2016.111 On a national 
level, domestically listed companies also have considerable economic impact. For example, 
UK listed companies employed approximately 3.7 million people – equating to about 16% of 
private sector employment –, and also accounted for approximately 47% of domestic 
investment in 2011.112 In the US, statistics on the cumulative impact of listed companies are 
not as readily accessible. However, employment by S&P 500 companies113 increased as a 
share of US non-farm payroll employment, from 15% in 1990 to 17.3% in 2015 – although 
such increase may include non-US based employees. Regardless, the importance of US listed 
companies – for example, Apple Inc. (NASDAQ: AAPL), Microsoft Corporation (NASDAQ: 
MSFT), Exxon Mobile Corporation (NYSE: XOM) and General Electric (NYSE: GE) – to 
the US national economy, and globally, is apparent, and, therefore, assessing the impact of 
short-termism on listed companies is a meritorious endeavour.  
                                                 
110  See http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=listed-company. 
111  World Federation of Exchanges Database, ‘Market capitalization of domestic listed companies – all 
countries and economies’ (current US$) <Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2016&start=1975>.  
112  Tomorrow’s Company Report, 2017, p. 7.  
113  The S&P 500 is an index of 500 stocks seen by Standard & Poor’s, a US financial analysis firm, as a 
leading indicator of US equities (Investopedia, <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sp500.asp>).  
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Figure 2. Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (current US) (trillions) 
 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges Database (http://data.worldbank.org) 
 
3. Equity Securities 
 
Investors may hold a wide range of publicly tradable interests in listed companies – 
generally classed as debt114, equity, and derivative115 securities. However, it is the equity 
securities of listed companies that are of particular interest in the short-termism discussion, 
and specifically voting common shares, also known as common stock. The term ‘equity 
security’ as used in this thesis refers to this type of equity securities. Equity securities are 
essentially a publicly traded contractual and statutory interest in a listed company comprising 
a bundle of rights. These rights most typically include voting rights in respect of significant 
matters of the listed company – i.e. the election of the board of directors –, rights to receive 
dividends out of earnings of the listed company as declared by the board of directors, and a 
right to receive a proportional interest in any assets of the listed company remaining after 
payment to all creditors upon dissolution or liquidation of the listed company.116  
 
The prices at which equity securities are bought or sold on a stock market are – at 
least theoretically – linked to the stock market’s expectation of the present value of the risk-
adjusted future returns of the listed company – i.e. the expected future value of any payments 
                                                 
114  See the discussion of debt securities and the definition of ‘bond’ in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, 
Methodology and Limitations). 
115  See the definition of ‘derivative’ in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, Methodology and Limitations). 
116  See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commonstock.asp for a discussion of ‘equity securities’. Also, 
see Berle & Means, 1932 as discussed at Alces, 2010, p. 791, where the author describes Berle & Means 
identification of shareholders as the ‘owners’ of the residual interest in the firm. This identification by Berle 
& Means forms the basis for the influential – although much debated - shareholder primacy theory. This 
theory provides that the goal of corporate management should be to maximize value for shareholders given 
that in doing so the value of the firm’s wealth, which equates to the residual claim, will increase and is 
discussed further in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?) and Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms).     
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to the holders of the equity securities.117 As set out in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?), it is this assessment of the future value of payments by the listed company, and 
the resulting impact on the trading prices of equity securities, that raises potential SMST 
concerns. Consequently, as discussed further in Chapter 1 (Research Purpose, Methodology 
and Limitations), the analysis in this thesis is limited to the equity securities of listed 
companies. Debt instruments, including preference shares with debt-like terms118, generally 
have their payment parameters fixed at the time of issuance, and are, therefore, less likely to 
generate the same SMST concerns discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, short-termism 
related to derivative instruments – and non-voting debt instruments and preference shares – 
are excluded as such short-termism lacks a clear transmission mechanism into the listed 
company given that these instruments generally do not have voting rights.  
 
C. EQUITY OWNERSHIP CHAIN 
 
The equity ownership chain connecting listed companies with their ultimate investors 
is complex. In order to explain how the main elements of this equity ownership chain create 
the alleged SMST concerns, I have divided the equity ownership chain into three functional 
sub-sets. As illustrated in Figure 3 (Equity Ownership Chain) below, these three functional 
sub-sets may generally be classed as: (1) asset owners; (2) intermediaries; and (3) company 
managers. Admittedly, the activities of individual market participants may not perfectly 
delineate into these three orderly sub-sets, as a single firm in the equity ownership chain may 
supply more than one role. For example, asset owners may serve an intermediary function by 
also providing asset management services in-house – e.g. Blackrock is an asset owner, but it 
also provides a significant asset management role to third parties. The division of the equity 
ownership chain into these three functional sub-sets is beneficial, however, as it facilitates 
further analysis on how the perceived SMST issue may impact each role.  
 
                                                 
117  Articulations of this concept abound, but it is perhaps best summarized by noted U.S. economist Malkiel, 
Burton, in Malkiel, 2016, pp. 31-33.  
118  Preference shares may be structured with defined dividend payments, redemption prices and a specified 
liquidation preference, which makes these types of financial instruments less susceptible to the valuation 
concerns raised in Chapter 5 (What is Actually causing SMST?) in respect of equity securities generally.  
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Figure 3. Equity Ownership Chain 
  
 
 
Understanding how this equity ownership chain functions is important, because, as 
aptly stated by the UK governance think-tank, Tomorrow’s Company, this intermediation 
chain ‘does not simply allocate savers’ funds, it also helps determine how the assets owned 
on their behalf are run’119. In the equity ownership chain, asset owners cede control to asset 
managers, who in turn do not hold shares of a listed company directly. Rather, shares are 
generally registered in the name of a central depositary, and instructions to the listed 
company on significant voting matters may need to flow through this central depositary. This 
equity ownership chain undoubtedly has benefits for asset owners. Professor Kay observed 
that financial intermediation serves a valuable purpose as it, ‘enables savers to achieve 
diversification and liquidity’120. Particularly, asset managers can pool multiple clients’ funds, 
purchase a wide range of securities and offer clients the ability to quickly redeem their 
investment based on their own liquidity needs. Theoretically, at least, the ultimate purpose of 
this equity ownership chain is to achieve the best possible financial returns for asset owners.  
 
The benefits provided by financial intermediation are, however, not without a cost. 
Professor Kay has argued that ‘[t]he price for diversification and liquidity is a loss of 
information and control’121. Observations have also been made that ‘[o]ver the past few 
decades, the link between individual savers and the companies that ultimately beneﬁt from 
their capital has become tenuous as the ‘chain of intermediation has lengthened 
                                                 
119  Tomorrow’s Company, 2017, p. 19. 
120  Kay Review, p. 22. 
121  Ibid. 
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considerably’.122 It is this increasing disconnection and complexity between ownership and 
which may create or exacerbate short-termism concerns, as discussed further in this thesis.  
 
1. Asset Owners 
The term ‘asset owners’, often called shareholders, investors or asset holders123, 
describes the parties holding the economic ownership interest in the equity securities. Asset 
owners may be institutional investors – including sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds and collective investment schemes – or 
individual retail investors. Institutional investors are by far the most significant of this group 
as they hold the largest percentage of equity securities in most major stock markets.124 There 
is no accepted definition of the term ‘institutional investor’ and they come in many forms and 
serve a wide variety of interests. However, institutional investors are generally synonymous 
with ‘intermediary investors’, as they are ‘an institution that manages and invests other 
people’s money’.125 Examples of prominent institutional investors include California Public 
Employees, the pension fund of the State of California, and companies which also have a 
notable asset management role, e.g. Legal & General Group plc, a British multi-national 
financial services company based in London, UK and BlackRock, a US asset management 
firm based in New York. Although institutional investors come in many different shapes and 
sizes, the common link is that they hold an economic interest in the equity securities of listed 
companies for someone else – e.g. who are termed ‘savers’ in the Kay Review126, which may 
often be ultimate individual owners, or beneficiaries in the case of pension funds. Asset 
owners may hold equity securities directly on the register of the listed company, or more 
likely, through a host of intermediaries in the equity ownership chain. The connections 
between SMST and asset owners and the rationale for why asset owners may excessively 
discount long-term returns are explored further in the subsequent Chapters. 
                                                 
122  Garratt & Hamilton, 2016, p. 797, where the authors provide an example of individual pension savers who 
entrust their savings to a fiduciary, who then selects an investment committee, which in turn appoints 
potentially dozens of investment managers, which each then engage brokers and advisors.  
123  The used in the Kay Review (p. 31) to refer to parties (e.g. pension funds) which may hold legal title to 
shares but often act as pooling agents for ‘savers’. 
124  For example, the Kay Review observes that individuals hold only 11% of UK equities securities (p. 29). 
Individual equity security ownership ranges from 2% to 22% across Europe, see 2015 Shareholder’s Guide, 
Individual Share Ownership in Europe <Online: http://www.plus.airliquide.com/en/ouverture/actionnariat-
individuel-europe.html>. Retail investment in the US is significantly higher and represented 38% of US 
market capitalization in 2015 according to the US investor communication firm Broadridge - Broadridge 
Press Release (1 March 2016) ‘Retail investors Remain an Important “Untapped” Shareholder Segment, 
Finds New Report from Broadridge and PwC US’ <Online: https://www.broadridge.com/press-
release/2016/retail-investors-remain-an-important-untapped-shareholder-segment>. 
125  Çelik & Isaksson, 2014, p. 96. 
126  ‘Savers’ are defined in the Kay Review as ‘the person … who holds the economic interest, and who will be 
the ultimate beneficiary of successful investment’ (p. 31). 
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2. Intermediaries 
Moving along the equity ownership chain, the next set of participants to be considered 
are intermediaries. The term ‘intermediary’ is used in this thesis to refer to all of the entities 
in the equity ownership chain between the asset owner and the listed company. The term also 
encompasses auxiliary intermediaries, most notably proxy advisers. Many variations exist, 
but the standard intermediary set includes: (1) asset managers – also called investment or 
fund managers – who manage assets on behalf of investors; (2) auxiliary intermediaries, most 
notably, proxy voting agencies, vote service providers or shareholder voting research 
providers, which are referred to collectively as ‘proxy advisors’ in this thesis; and (3) central 
depositaries in whose name the shares of listed companies are registered and held.  
Asset managers – arguably the most significant sub-set of intermediaries127 – are often 
named as the owners of the equity securities registered on the central depositary’s book entry 
system and hold and manage investments on behalf of their clients, namely asset owners. 
Asset managers include well-known names such as BlackRock, and other firms including 
Fidelity Investments, J.P. Morgan Asset Management, and Prudential Financial. Although the 
lines are blurred and many of these asset managers may also be considered institutional 
investors in their own right, for the purposes of this thesis such entities are considered 
primarily in their role as specialist investment intermediaries for asset owners. 
 Proxy advisors are third party advisory services that primarily assist asset owners 
vote their shares in listed companies. They are auxiliary intermediaries as they are not 
directly in the equity ownership chain, but they have been included in the SMST 
discussion.128 Although proxy advisors may not be a priori short-termist, they do play an 
important role in facilitating the voting of equity securities by asset owners and asset 
managers, and advising other participants in the equity ownership chain including listed 
companies.129 Specifically, third party proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (‘ISS’), which covers almost 40,000 shareholder meetings in 115 countries and has 
over 1,600 institutional clients, provides services to asset owners and asset managers to vote 
their shares at general meetings of listed companies, and may also advise listed companies on 
                                                 
127  Kay Review, p. 11, where Professor Kay notes that asset managers are the dominant players in the 
investment chain, and the FCA Asset Management Study, 2017 (p. 3), which describes the vital role of the 
UK asset management industry – which is the second largest in the world. 
128  EU Governance Green Paper, 2011, p. 14, and Nathan, 2015. 
129  Malenko, Nadya and Shen, Yao, ‘The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-
Discontinuity Design’, (2016) 29:12 Review of Financial Studies 3394.  
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strategies around shareholder voting.130 The connection of proxy advisors to the perceived 
SMST issue is explored further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms).  
Central depositaries, such as CREST in the UK, Euroclear in the EU, and Cede & Co 
in the US, are another link in the equity ownership chain which potentially adds complexity 
to the asset owner/listed company relationship, and allegedly contributing to the perceived 
SMST problem.131 There are, however, questions on how SMST is transmitted through 
depositaries, and the role of central depositaries as a contributing factor to the alleged SMST 
problem is considered further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms).  
Intermediation is generally significant to the SMST discussion as capital market 
intermediaries have been accused of contributing to, or exacerbating, short-termism concerns. 
Specifically, allegations have been made that: (1) the short-term incentives of intermediaries, 
particularly asset managers, may not align well with the long-term interests of their 
principals, namely asset owners and ultimate investors132; and (2) competition among asset 
managers has caused a short-term focus in the market133. Each of these concerns and the links 
between intermediation and SMST are explored further in the subsequent Chapters.  
3. Company Managers 
The term ‘company manager’ refers to the directors and officers charged with the 
operation and management of a listed company. Delegated management with a board 
structure is a core structural characteristic of a listed company.134 Corporate law by and large 
vests authority over the operations of a listed company in a board of directors elected by the 
shareholders.135 The operations of a listed company are typically then delegated by the board 
of directors to the officers of the listed company, with the ongoing oversight of such 
management retained by the board of directors. The purpose of an asset owner’s ability to 
elect the board of directors is to ensure that the board remains responsive to the interests of 
the asset owners.136 The company managers act, consequently, as agents for the asset owners 
in an economic sense, although legally they are agents of the listed company.  
                                                 
130  Ibid, p. 3394.  
131  Kay Review, p. 84. 
132  Ibid, p. 33. 
133  Dallas, p. 295. 
134  Anatomy, 2009, pp. 12-14. 
135  Ibid, p. 13. 
136  Ibid. 
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Company managers are perceived to be short-termist for a myriad of reasons. The 
basic argument, however, is that they are taking actions which maximize short-term financial 
returns of the listed company instead of pursuing activities with a longer term investment 
horizon – i.e. management myopia.137 A contributing fact to this managerial myopia may be 
short-term focused remuneration structures.138 Further, as the company manager’s 
employment security and market reputation, in addition to compensation, may often be tied to 
a listed company’s short-term performance metrics, company managers may be incentivized 
to use the listed company resources to maximize short-term earnings. Speaking to the origins 
of this behaviour, it has been argued that ‘[t]he practice of managerial short-termism 
represents the internal response at the business enterprise level to the external financial-
performance demands of the stock market’139. In other words, the SMST issue may not 
necessarily originate from a negative behavioural characteristic of company managers, i.e. 
greed or self-interest. Rather company managers may just be responding to the interests of 
asset owners as communicated via intermediaries. This argument, and the role of company 
managers generally in the alleged SMST problem, is considered in the subsequent Chapters.  
D. HARD V. SOFT LAW 
An objective of this thesis is to analyze the conceptual effectiveness of regulatory and 
financial industry responses to the perceived SMST problem. Doing so requires assessing and 
categorizing regulatory as well as financial industry reforms. Consequently, the SMST 
reforms discussed in detail in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) are categorized into ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law, and financial industry initiatives. The ‘hard’ v. ‘soft’ law distinction is 
admittedly not without debate, and the divide is often in practice a sliding scale.140 However, 
in this thesis ‘hard’ law generally refers to binding legislation, and the regulations 
promulgated under such legislation.141 What constitutes ‘soft’ law is more complicated, and 
can cover a wide range of different instruments.142 Nonetheless, the term ‘soft’ law is limited 
in this thesis to refer to non-statutory measures including codes of conduct or other standard 
setting documentation. These ‘soft’ laws are often implemented by regulatory authorities – 
e.g. the implementation by the UK Financial Reporting Council (the ‘FRC’) of the UK 
                                                 
137  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, pp. 427-432, where the authors outline the various ways in which company 
managers engage in earnings manipulation to produce earnings growth.  
138  For example, see Kay Review, pp. 77-79.  
139  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014. 
140  See the doctrinal discussion generally of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law in Guzman, A and Meyer, T, ‘International 
Soft Law’ (2010) 2:1 Journal of Legal Analysis 171. 
141  Ibid, p. 180. 
142  Ibid, p. 173, which states that anything ‘law-like can be described as a form of soft law’.  
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Stewardship Code143 –, but such ‘soft’ laws may also be implemented by legislators – e.g. 
guidance notes. The central point of this term is that through ‘soft’ laws regulators attempt to 
impact behaviour in a more moderated non-statutory form.  
Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law reforms are undoubtedly significant in governing the 
operations of listed companies. However, ‘hard’ law reforms arguably evidence a stronger 
intention from legislators to effect change, as they are built into legislation and are legally 
binding. Arguably, this position is weakened when the ‘hard’ law reform is ‘light’ touch and 
contains an ‘opt out’ or is ‘comply or explain’ or disclosure based, rather than mandating a 
specific course of action with penalties for failure to comply. Based on this distinction, ‘hard’ 
law reforms are further categorized in Appendix ‘B’ (Implemented SMST Reforms), Table 4 
(Implemented SMST Reforms) into prescriptive versus ‘light’ touch reforms. The 
significance of these additional distinctions is considered further in Chapter 4 (What Has 
Been Done?) and in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms). 
Specifically, Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) analyzes whether a 
‘light’ touch approach using ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ law measures and financial industry initiatives is 
the most viable method of SMST reform as it is easier to implement and provides scope for 
flexibility to minimize the harms associated with prescriptive ‘hard’ law measures. 
 
The discussion around each of the issues identified in this Chapter 2 (Defining the 
Issues) is extensive. In particular, the dialogue on how the alleged SMST issue impacts the 
equity ownership chain is complex. It suffices to here to set out the main concepts and the 
debate surrounding such concepts, and to provide the definition of SMST used in this thesis, 
which in turn provides the basis for the detailed analysis provided in the following Chapters.  
                                                 
143  ‘UK Stewardship Code’, Financial Reporting Council (September 2012) (‘UK Stewardship Code’), which 
is a good practice code adopted by the FRC in 2010 and revised in 2012, directed at asset owners and asset 
managers with equity holdings in UK listed companies. The UK Stewardship Code provides seven 
principles aimed at enhancing the quality of engagement between investors and UK listed companies to 
help improve long-term risk-adjusted returns to shareholders. The UK Stewardship Code is binding on UK 
regulated asset managers (FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook Rule 2.2.3) but demonstrating compliance 
with the seven principles of the UK Stewardship Code is on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.  
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CHAPTER 3 – AN EVOLVING CONCERN? 
 
‘In the business community, short-termism has gone from a simmer to a boil.’144 
 
This Chapter traces the development of the concept of ‘short-termism’ in capital 
markets from when it was first articulated as a material concern in the 1970s in response to 
concerns over an influx of hostile takeovers of US companies, to the ‘in vogue’ phrase used 
post-GFC with abandon by the popular press, academics and the financial industry. 
Specifically, this Chapter examines how the alleged short-termism problem intersects with 
significant trends in capital markets, initially predominantly in the US, and often appearing to 
overlap with market disruptions. I then consider how this primarily US discussion 
subsequently spread post-GFC into capital markets in other jurisdictions in the global fallout 
of the GFC, and captured the attention of policymakers, most notably in the UK and the EU.  
 
The historical analysis in this Chapter places the current short-termism discussion into 
a larger social and economic context, and in doing so brings to the forefront the question of 
whether short-termism is actually a substantive issue, or if it is instead simply compelling 
rhetoric that overlaps with the dominant capital market concerns of the day. If SMST 
concerns are simply rhetoric, regulatory and financial industry reform efforts may not be 
justified solely on the basis of SMST concerns. If, however, there is substance to the 
concerns, regulatory and financial industry reform is warranted. Arguing that there is at least 
some substance to the SMST concerns, this Chapter presents the argument that SMST 
emerged as an issue during this time period due to changing dynamics in public markets – 
specifically, the move towards financial intermediation by investors, with a corresponding 
focus on short-term investment parameters to hold asset managers to account. Answering the 
question of whether short-termism is rhetoric or substance also necessitates a review of the 
reforms themselves – which is done in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) –, and further 
examination of if SMST is a real and harmful problem, and if the reforms implemented at 
least conceptually address SMST, which analysis is provided in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
144  Rappaport, 2011, p. 5. 
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A. 1970S/1980S – ARTICULATION OF A SMST PROBLEM 
 
Concerns about short-termism in stock markets may have been around long before145, 
but the most notable first articulation of the current day version of the SMST issue was in 
1979 by the renowned US corporate lawyer and market commentator, Martin Lipton.146 
Speaking prophetically as the US takeover boom of the 1980s that generated much of the 
discussion on stock market short-termism had not yet kicked into gear, Lipton asked if, ‘[i]t 
would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the long-term interests of the 
nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators 
interested...only in a quick profit...?’147. Subsequent shakeups of large, primarily US, listed 
companies in the 1980s148 sent shock waves through the stock markets, and elevated Lipton’s 
question on short-termism to prominence, at least in the US. Lipton’s query – which 
suggested that distributing earnings out of a listed company to a select few was at odds with 
long-term value generation and national interests – spawned decades of analysis not only on 
the precise merits of US corporate takeover policies and regulation, but more broadly on US 
stock market structure and the purpose of listed companies.149  
 
Lipton specifically called out the short-term perspective of ‘certain arbitrageurs and 
professional investors’150, and opined that the ‘overall health of the economy should not in 
the slightest degree be made subservient to the interests of certain shareholders in realizing a 
profit on a takeover’151. His definition of the market problem did not, however, focus 
exclusively on the actions of certain bad actors. Rather, Lipton claimed that the threat of 
hostile takeovers themselves would have a negative impact on the stock market as a whole, as 
company managers would endeavor to pre-empt such takeovers by foregoing long-term 
planning.152 This concern may have been part of the policy rationale for subsequent takeover 
                                                 
145  See Haldane, 2011, p. 2, which refers to historical examples of classical economists such as William 
Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, Arthur Pigou and John Maynard Keynes grappling with the short-termism 
concept.  
146  Roe, 2013 p. 979. 
147  Lipton, 1979, p. 104. 
148  For example, these shake ups included the hostile takeovers of TWA in 1985 and Gulf Oil in 1984 
respectively, by so called ‘corporate raiders’ Carl Ichan and T. Boone Pickens, and the leveraged buyouts 
which followed thereafter, including most notably the management buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1988.  
149  See Gilson & Kraakman, 2005, in which the authors reviewed the impact of Mr. Lipton’s 1979 paper.  
150  Lipton, 1979, p. 104. 
151  Ibid. 
152  Ibid, pp. 109-110. 
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protection measures implemented in the US. These measures included the ‘poison pill’153, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court’s development of case law on takeover defenses, which 
essentially bolstered the ability of boards of directors to fend off hostile bids.154  
 
Although Lipton’s opinion was to some degree supported among corporate managers 
and the influential Delaware Supreme Court, this view was not universally accepted. An 
alternative line of reasoning emphasized that the corporate shakeups of the 1980s were 
instead driven by a failure of company managers over the preceding decades to effectively 
manage for shareholder value.155 In direct response to Lipton’s 1979 paper, two noted US law 
professors, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, criticized Lipton’s claim that such 
takeover activity was harmful to society, and instead they argued that ‘[s]ociety benefits from 
an active takeover market…because it simultaneously provides an incentive to all corporate 
managers to operate efficiently and a mechanism for displacing inefficient managers’156.  
 
These two opposing lines of argument are further considered in Chapter 5 (Is There A 
SMST Problem?). As discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) and Chapter 7 
(What Harm Does SMST Cause?), there is minimal quantitative evidence of a SMST 
problem during this period, which may be due to the difficulty of articulating and measuring 
the issue, but which also gives weight to the position that the SMST discussion during this 
time was largely rhetoric layered onto the debate over whether hostile takeovers should be 
restricted. It is also possible that SMST was identified as an issue during this time period as 
the hostile takeovers necessitated pooled investment by a large number of investors, which 
was part of trend of using financial intermediation to facilitate large investments in US listed 
companies. Such financial intermediation meant that investors looked less at the underlying 
                                                 
153  ‘Shareholder rights plans’, known colloquially as ‘poison pills’, are a takeover defense mechanism 
developed by Martin Lipton in 1982 which, when adopted by a company, provide for existing shareholders 
to purchase significant additional shares at discount if the company is the subject of a takeover offer. A 
detailed description of poison pills is set out in Gilson & Bernard, 1999, pp.10-18. Client interests, namely 
the interests of incumbent boards, may have been part of Lipton’s motivations in developing this 
mechanism to prevent takeovers. However, a key position in his 1979 paper (at p. 105) is that there is a 
public policy interest in defending against takeovers that would adversely impact corporate long-term 
planning, and it is not a stretch to argue that this was a rationale for developing the poison pill.  
154  See Gilson & Kraakman, 2005 summarizing the impact of Lipton, 1979 on the development of Delaware 
takeover law, which reviewed the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court case law and notes at p. 1430 
that ‘Lipton ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court that the problem of allocating discretion between 
boards and shareholders in hostile takeovers could be resolved by abstract principles’. These abstract 
principles were adverse impact on corporate long-term planning caused by the threat of hostile takeovers.  
155  Rappaport, 2011, p. 10. 
156  Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981, p. 1184. 
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fundamentals of their investments, but rather focused on the short-term financial performance 
of their asset managers. Regardless of this hypothesis, it suffices here to say that the alleged 
SMST problem was first articulated rather narrowly during this period of market disruption in 
the context of the US market for corporate control. Specifically, the focus was on short-
termist behaviour by certain ‘hostile’ market actors looking to derive short-term gain, which 
actions allegedly hindered long-term corporate planning by listed companies.   
 
B. 1990S-2000S: SHORT-TERMISM AS A FACTOR IN NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
THE RISE OF ‘AGENCY CAPITALISM’ 
 
After the takeover boom period of the 1980s, the discussion on short-termism 
continued in the US, which suggests that it was about more than just the market for corporate 
control and rather was part of a more fundamental concern over market structure. However, 
the focus moved away from takeovers, and onto why US competitiveness was in decline. 
Although national competitiveness was certainly on the agenda prior to the 1980s, US 
commentators in particular were concerned about declining overall market competitiveness 
relative to their international economic competitors, such as Germany and Japan, in the 
1990s.157 Prominent US business and economics academic Michael Porter presented evidence 
demonstrating that US listed companies invested at a lower rate and with a shorter time frame 
than competitors in Japan or Germany158. This was, he opined, because ‘[t]he American 
system is less supportive of investment overall because of its sensitivity to current returns for 
many established companies combined with corporate goals that stress current stock price 
over long-term corporate value’159. In his book, ‘Short-Term America’, former US Treasury 
director of corporate finance, Michael Jacobs, echoed Porter’s analysis and argued that 
‘business myopia’ was at the heart of the US competitive problem. Jacobs defined business 
myopia as ‘[a] preoccupation with short-term results and instant economic gratification [that] 
is undermining the long-run viability of American companies, and in some cases, entire 
industries’160. This analysis demonstrates how, prior to the GFC, commentary was focused on 
discussing short-termism, but with an increasing emphasis on attributing industry and 
national competitiveness to a perceived short-termist mindset in the US markets.  
                                                 
157  See Porter, 1991, and Jacobs, 1991.  
158  Porter, 1991, pp. 67-68. 
159  Ibid, p. 73. 
160  Jacobs, 1991, pp 7-8.  
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Adding weight to the argument that the SMST concern was really about the move 
towards financial intermediation, noted economist, Alfred Rappaport, conceptualized this 
time-period in US history as the rise of ‘agency capitalism’.161 Specifically, Rappaport 
observed that from 1986 to 2006 in the US, direct ownership of equity securities of US listed 
companies dropped from 56 to 27 percent, with a corresponding increase in institutional – 
primarily equity mutual fund – ownership.162 This rise of institutional equity ownership in the 
US, Rappaport argued, created an era of agency capitalism, which introduced additional 
agency/principal relationships into the equity ownership chain. ‘Agency problems’ are said to 
arise because of conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies, whereby the financial 
interest of one party – the ‘principal’– is dependent on the actions taken by another party – 
the ‘agent’.163 The core difficulty in the agency relationship is that the principal has handed 
control over to an agent, who thus often has better information than the principal about the 
relevant facts.164 Consequently, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically – or may 
be lazy or incompetent –, and the principal must engage in costly monitoring to reduce the 
agent’s opportunistic behaviour or accept the agency costs of the agent.165  
 
In the capital structures that rose to prominence during 1986 to 2006 in the US, 
Rappaport argued that both institutional investors and asset managers appeared to have a 
common short-term performance agenda, and, therefore, no agency conflicts.166 
Consequently, Rappaport observed that the agency conflict was then between the company 
managers and the ultimate owners in whose interests the institutional investors and asset 
managers are supposed to act.167 The concern was that the short-term interests of institutional 
investors and asset managers appeared to be dominating the market – including, for example, 
in the compensation structures of company managers, which were increasingly based on 
stock options with short-vesting periods.168 This short-termism problem, supposedly 
amplified by the agency capital structure, arguably contributed to the decline in relative US 
national competitiveness, which was discussed above by Jacobs and Porter.   
                                                 
161  Rappaport, 2011, p. 11. 
162  Ibid. 
163  See the summary in Anatomy, 2009, pp. 35-36. 
164  Ibid, p. 35. 
165  Ibid, p. 36. 
166  Ibid, p.12. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Ibid. 
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This form of agency capitalism was also observed in the UK during this time period, 
which in addition to the US experienced a significant rise in institutional ownership. The Kay 
Review noted that by the 1990s insurance companies and pension funds accounted for around 
half of the holders of equity securities of UK listed companies.169 Nigel Lawson, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer of the UK, commented on the short-termism of these institutional investors, 
when he declared in 1986 that ‘[t]he big institutional investors nowadays increasingly react to 
short-term pressure on investment performance…they are unwilling to countenance long-
term investment or sufficient expenditure on R&D’170. Short-termism was routinely cited as a 
negative consequence of agency capitalism, thereby causing declining national 
competitiveness. However, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?) and Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?), convincing quantitative 
evidence linking such concerns to a SMST problem was not provided during this time period. 
Consequently, the mention of short-termism may just be largely colorful and intuitively 
compelling rhetoric, used as part of broader concerns around agency capitalism and declining 
national competitiveness during this time period. However, financial intermediation evident 
during this time period may have spawned SMST concerns, and the SMST discussions in 
both the US and the UK during this time set the ground-work for the renewed focus on short-
termism in the fall-out of a wave of high-profile US corporate scandals in the early 2000s.  
 
C. THE EARLY 2000S: SHORT-TERMISM AND CORPORATE SCANDAL 
 
The new millennium opened in the US with a steep market decline and brought with it 
a number of high profile corporate collapses involving accounting scandals at US listed 
companies.171 The most notorious of these scandals caused the collapses of industry giants, 
Enron Corporation (‘Enron’) and WorldCom. Using a variety of underhanded accounting 
loopholes, offshore special purpose vehicles and incorrect reporting, Enron’s management 
managed to hide funds, and deceive its lenders and the investing public. When the dust 
settled, Enron filed for bankruptcy, its auditors, Arthur Anderson – one of the world’s largest 
auditing firms – were eventually dissolved, Enron’s executives were put in jail and 
                                                 
169  Kay Review, pp. 30-31.  
170  Stock Exchanges and Sustainability, 2015, p. 11. 
171  Rappaport, 2011, p. 13. 
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employees were out of work, and its investors and creditors lost billions of dollars.172 In 
2003, a year after Enron’s bankruptcy, another Arthur Anderson client, WorldCom, filed for 
bankruptcy in the US as well, which collapse was also attributed to accounting irregularities 
and outright fraud. Similar to Enron, the WorldCom scandal exposed fraudulent accounting 
practices, which involved certain WorldCom executives employing improper accounting 
practices in order to disguise reduced earnings and bolster declining share prices.173  
 
These accounting scandals have been linked with the pursuit of short-term market 
expectations. For example, as opined by Pawel Bilinski, director of the Centre for Financial 
Analysis and Reporting Research at Cass Business School in relation to WorldCom, 
‘[a]ccounting scandals happen because there is pressure to meet short-term market 
expectations in terms of financial and share price performance’174. Additionally, Malcolm 
Salter of the Harvard Business School argued that with regard to such accounting frauds 
including Enron ‘short-termism also invites institutional corruption’175. Although these 
arguments may hold popular appeal, as discussed further in Chapter 7 (What Harm Does 
SMST Cause?), and short-termism rhetoric appears to have been used in the examination of 
these scandals, the real concern was how best to shed light on and to address the accounting 
frauds underlying these scandals. In the US, the accounting scandals of this era lead to a re-
examination of corporate governance and accounting practices. The culmination of this 
process was the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (‘SOX Act’), which was US 
federal legislation that placed elaborate internal controls on listed companies and imposed 
direct responsibility for the accuracy of financial reporting of listed companies on CEOs and 
CFOs of listed companies.176 Rather than a correction of the alleged SMST issue as identified 
in this thesis through restricting more subtle attempts by company managers to manipulate 
accounting through the active management of earnings, the reforms included in the SOX Act 
attempted instead to address outright accounting fraud by imposing direct obligations on 
CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of financial disclosure.    
 
                                                 
172  Healy, Paul M, and Palepu, Krishna G, ‘The Fall of Enron, (Spring 2003) 17:2 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3. 
173  ‘Report of Investigation by The Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Worldcom, 
Inc.’ SEC <Online: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm>. 
174  Farrell, Sean, ‘The world’s biggest accounting scandals’ The Guardian (21 July 2015) <Online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/21/the-worlds-biggest-accounting-scandals-toshiba-enron-
olympus>.  
175  Salter, 2012.  
176  Rappaport, 2011, p. 13. 
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Despite increased regulation in the US meant to address accounting manipulation, 
concerns about the harms of short-term interests in US accounting practices continued. 
Instead of focusing on short-termism in the context of accounting fraud – which arguably 
declined after the introduction of SOX –, attention then turned to the more subtle aspects of 
earnings management by listed companies.177 Of note, researchers John Graham, Campbell 
Harvey and Shiva Rajgnopal, conducted a survey of 401 financial executives in the US, and 
observed that the majority of these executives would avoid initiating a positive net present 
value (‘NPV’) project if it meant falling short of the current quarter’s consensus earnings.178 
‘Net present value’ or ‘NPV’ is defined as the difference between the present value of cash 
inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time.179 This involves 
discounting the expected future cash flows for a project into present dollars. A positive NPV 
means even at the discounted rate the project would still be financial beneficial to the listed 
company. This line of research into the connection between short-term interests and earnings 
management developed post-GFC and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6 (SMST 
Transmission Mechanisms).  
 
In the years immediately preceding the GFC, the profile of SMST as a broad threat to 
capital markets was on the rise. As an example, referring to the research of Graham et al into 
earnings management, William H. Donaldson, then Chairman of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’), gave a speech at the Chartered Financial Analyst 
(‘CFA’) Institute Annual Conference in 2005, on the challenge of moving beyond short-
termism.180 The following year, in 2006, the CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity 
hosted a symposium (the ‘2006 CFA Roundtable’) on breaking the short-term cycle, which 
brought together thought leaders from the corporate issuer, analyst, asset and hedge fund 
manager, institutional investor, and individual investor community.181 During this time The 
Conference Board also hosted a corporate/investor summit series on the alleged SMST 
                                                 
177  See Dallas, 2012, p. 278 referring to Cohen, Daniel et al, ‘Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
in the Pre- and Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Periods’, (2008) 83 The Accounting Review 757, 757-59, 770; and 
the summary of articles in Dallas, 2012, p. 279 at note 80.  
178  Graham et al, 2005.  
179  Net Present Value (NPV) Definition, Investopedia <Online:  
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp#ixzz5RUe3nec8>.  
180  Donaldson, William H, Speech at 2005 CFA Institute Annual Conference (May 8, 2005) <Online: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050805whd.htm>.  
181  Krehmeyer, Dean et al, ‘Breaking the Short-Term Cycle: Discussion and Recommendations on How 
Corporate Leaders, Asset Managers, Investors, and Analysts Can Refocus on Long-Term Value’, (2006) 
CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity/Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, <Online: 
http://www.corporate-ethics.org/pdf/Short-termism_Report.pdf>.  
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problem cumulating in a Research Report released in 2006 with suggestions for future 
action,182 and the following year, a bipartisan Commission on the Regulation of US Capital 
Markets in the 21st Century established by the US Chamber of Commerce issued a report and 
recommendations to reduce earning guidance on the basis that ‘there is too much focus on the 
short-term performance of U.S. companies’183.      
 
The alleged SMST problem had, however, not yet as widely captured the imagination 
of the popular press or policymakers in the US as it would do in the post-GFC period. It is 
possible that the short termism discussion had less resonance in the popular press and with 
policymakers in the US prior to the GFC because many developed countries, including the 
US and UK, were in a period of relatively consistent GDP growth during this time.184 For 
example, as demonstrated in Figure 4 (US and UK Annual GDP (1970 to 2015) below, the 
GDP in each of the US and the UK rose relatively steadily in the years leading up to the GFC. 
When the economy is generally on an upward trend, there may be less interest from the 
financial industry to question the short-termism of capital markets. Regardless of its impact 
during the pre-GFC period, however, the financial industry, academic and popular dialogue 
on the alleged short-termism of market participants during this era of relative prosperity laid 
the foundations for the explosion of the short-termism discussion in the wake of the GFC.  
 
                                                 
182  Conference Board Report, 2006. 
183  US Chamber of Commerce Report, 2007, p. 5. 
184  Jacobs, 1991, pp. 2-9, where Mr. Jacobs provides evidence of declining US competitiveness relative 
primarily to Japan and Germany.  
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Figure 4. US and UK Annual GDP (1970 to 2015) 
 
 
 
D. 2007 TO CURRENT: AN INCREASE OF SMST CONCERN POST-GFC 
 
The GFC was triggered by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the US 
in 2007 and developed into a crisis of epic proportions in international financial markets 
throughout 2008 and 2009. The GFC has been cited as the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s185, and the end result was the collapse and eventual 
government bailouts of large financial institutions, a rout of the US and worldwide stock 
markets, a significant decline in US housing prices, a 22% drop in average US household 
savings, and drop in GDP in many countries.186 It also contributed to the European sovereign 
debt crisis, and triggered a recession in global markets, which lasted until about 2012.187  
 
‘Short-termism’ rapidly became a buzzword linked to the GFC. Given the historical 
analysis set out in Sections (A) to (C) above, it is not surprising that short-termism appeared 
on the agenda with vigor after yet another major capital market disruption. The GFC has a 
myriad of causes but may generally be said to have originated with the collapse of the US 
                                                 
185  ‘Three top economists agree 2009 worst financial crisis since great depression; risks increase if right steps 
are not taken’ (27 February 2009) Reuters <Online: 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090213005161/en/Top-Economists-Agree-2009-Worst-
Financial-Crisis>.  
186  Farrar, John H, and Mayes, David, G, (eds) ‘Globalization, the global financial crisis and the state’, 
(Cheltenham; Edward Elgar, 2013).  
187  Ibid.  
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sub-prime housing market188. The short-termist behaviour of participants in the US equity 
markets, mainly guided by Wall Street investment firms, was also entangled in post-GFC 
analysis. As demonstrated in Figure 1 (Citation of the Term ‘Short-Termism’) in Chapter 1 
(Research Purpose, Methodology and Limitations), usage of the term ‘short-termism’ in the 
popular press nearly doubled between 2006 and 2010 and has risen in major news and 
business sources globally significantly and consistently since the GFC. For example, 
headlines such as ‘Short-termism made institutions vulnerable’ in the Financial Times189 and 
‘Wall Street’s Mania for Short-Term Results Hurts Economy’ in the Washington Post190 
pinned at least part of the blame for the GFC on the short-term profit focus of market 
participants in US equity markets. Legal and economic academic commentators affirmed 
these opinions about the short-termism of US equity markets contributing to the GFC191. For 
example, Dallas argued that ‘[t]he financial crisis of 2007-2009 was preceded by a period of 
financial firms seeking short-term profit regardless of long term consequences’192.  
 
Although the GFC was primarily linked to the collapse of the US sub-prime housing 
market, the ramifications of this crisis spread throughout the global financial markets 
including into the world’s equity markets, and the resulting shock waves caused many 
observers to ask if there were broader capital market failings.193 The following Subsections 
consider this SMST discussion post-GFC, starting with the US in Subsection D(1), which as 
set out above, dominated the bulk of the short-termism conversation prior to the GFC. Given 
the Kay Review and the UK government response to the recommendations in this review, the 
                                                 
188  For a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the GFC, see the Dissenting Statement of SEC 
Commissioners Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Bill Thomas, ‘Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis’, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (27 January 2011), which statement identifies ten 
essential causes, namely the credit bubble, the housing bubble, nontraditional mortgages, credit ratings and 
securitization, financial institutions concentrated correlated risk, leverage and liquidity risk, risk of 
contagion, common shock, financial shock and panic and that the financial crisis caused an economic crisis.    
189  Jackson, 2009. 
190  Pearlstein, 2009. 
191  For example, Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, Rappaport, 2011, Chapter 2 ‘Short-Termism Produces a 
Financial Crisis’; and also see the statement on short-termism in The Modern Corporation: Corporate 
Governance for the 21st Century, Statement on Economics, para 3 <Online: 
https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com /economics-and-msv/>, signed by over 80 academics. 
Commenting on the post-GFC state of capital markets, this Statement on Economics holds that ‘short-
termism prevails and investment in productive capability diminishes’.  
192  Dallas, 2012, p. 267. 
193  See Dallas, 2012, pp. 281-293, where Ms. Dallas reviews the sub-prime mortgage market in the US, and the 
layers of complexity of the securitization of these products, the collapse of which she argues lead to the 
financial crisis. Ms. Dallas used this financial crisis as a starting point for re-examining the role of short-
termism in capital markets. Similarly, the Kay Review was an examination of broader market failings post-
GFC, and Dominic Barton cites the ‘near meltdown of the financial system’ as the reason for his call to re-
orient capital markets towards a longer-term approach (Barton, 2011, p. 85).  
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following Subsection D(2) then reviews the discussion in the UK, as it has generated the most 
substantive SMST-driven reform discussions relative to other jurisdictions which have 
considered the issue, and thus necessitates separate consideration. Next, the remainder of 
Europe is considered in Subsection D(3), where short-termism has factored into several 
significant implemented reforms. Subsection D(4) then considers SMST deliberations in the 
rest of the world, where there is less significant dialogue about reform, and finally 
discussions by the financial industry and its advisors are considered in Subsection D(5). 
 
1. SMST Discussion in the US 
 
As discussed in Sections (A) to (C) in this Chapter, the US has long been a hot bed of 
academic and financial industry discussion for short-termism reform generally. These 
discussions appeared to gather momentum during periods of market disruption, most notably 
during the hostile takeover boom of the 1970/80s, the bursting of the market bubble in the 
early 2000s, and the GFC. The alleged short-termism of market actors as a cause of the GFC 
was a consideration in the reform of the US banking industry post-GFC. In direct response to 
the GFC, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act194, known as the 
‘Dodd-Frank Act’, was signed into United States federal law by President Barack Obama on 
21 July 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act is a wide sweeping piece of legislation that created 
oversight agencies for financial institutions, brought in new rules on executive compensation 
and corporate governance, regulated investment fund advisors, and increased transparency of 
off-market trading practices.195 The primary intentions of the reforms as stated in the Dodd-
Frank Act itself196, and as confirmed by President Barrack Obama when the Dodd-Frank Act 
was signed into law197, were to improve accountability and transparency, end ‘too big to fail’ 
and bailouts by taxpayers, and implement stronger consumer protection regulations. 
However, as is considered further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), at least a few of 
these changes were also meant to mitigate some of the perceived harmful effects of SMST. 
 
                                                 
194  Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173. 
195  Dallas, 2002, pp. 323-358. 
196  The Dodd-Frank Act, Recital.  
197  ‘Text of Obama Remarks on Dodd-Frank’ Market Watch (21 July 2010) <Online: 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/text-of-obama-remarks-on-dodd-frank-2010-07-21>  and ‘Wall Street 
Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act’ The White House President Barrack Obama <Online: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform>.  
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An articulation in the US of short-termism specifically targeting policy change in 
equity capital markets after the GFC was a report issued by an Aspen Institute think-tank in 
2009.198 During 2007 to 2009 the Aspen Institute in the US sought input from a wide range of 
business, labour, investment and political sources, including Martin Lipton and noted 
financial market guru Warren Buffet. This resulted in a policy statement which claimed that 
‘short-termism is not limited to the behavior of a few investors or intermediaries’199. Instead, 
the statement claimed, ‘[i]t is system-wide, with contributions by and interdependency among 
corporate managers, boards, investment advisers, providers of capital, and government’200.  
 
The agenda for SMST-driven reform as set out in the Aspen Report was 
enthusiastically endorsed by Delaware Chief Justice, Leo E. Strine.201 Chief Justice Strine 
added further specificity to the Aspen Institutes’ proposals to promote US long-term growth 
and counter short-termism, mainly in the form of US tax reform and changes to the incentive 
structure in the equity ownership chain.202 Former SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher 
commended Chief Justice Strine on advancing the dialogue towards tangible results, and also 
observed that the SEC was best placed to facilitate a discussion between all stakeholders on 
the way forward.203 Delaware Court Justice Jack B. Jacobs also honed in on the SMST issue, 
focusing on the decline of patient capital in the US, and how the Delaware Courts and US 
legislators could best fix the growing problem of impatient capital.204 Justice Jacob’s solution 
was to propose laws meant to discourage investors from apply short-term pressure on 
company managers; specifically by longer directorship terms rather than yearly elections.205  
 
Influential US politicians have as well recently condemned short-termism in capital 
markets – demonstrating just how strongly the topic resonates with the voting public. Both 
former Democratic Vice President Joe Biden206 and former Democratic Presidential candidate 
nominee Hillary Clinton207 called for reforms to address the perceived SMST problem. Given 
the political tide change in the US in the 2016 Presidential election, the future of SMST 
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reform is uncertain, but SMST may likely take a back seat. President Donald Trump’s focus 
is on reducing corporate tax rates rather than providing tax incentives to reduce SMST. As 
evidenced in the US tax relief plan announced in September 2017208, and enacted effective as 
of 31 December 2017209, the focus of US tax reform is on reducing rates and complexity 
rather than specific changes meant to address alleged SMST. It is possible that calls from the 
financial industry for capital gains reform to correct SMST, most notably by the CEO of 
BlackRock, Larry Fink supported by other asset managers – as discussed in Subsection D(5) 
below – may keep the topic of SMST alive on the political agenda in the US. Although not 
citing SMST concerns, President Trump has also picked on financial industry concerns 
around the short-termism pressures inherent in quarterly reporting and asked the SEC to 
consider reducing the reporting requirement for US listed companies from quarterly to a six-
month system.210 The impact of these tax and quarterly reporting reform initiatives on SMST 
are discussed further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?). The policy agenda in the UK, EU 
and elsewhere has, however, progressed further towards SMST-driven reforms. 
 
2. The UK and the Kay Review 
 
Much of the substantive discussion on SMST reform post-GFC has been in the UK211, 
and the Kay Review is a leading example of how short-termism reform was put on the 
agenda. Specifically, in 2011 the UK Secretary of State for Business, Vince Cable, 
commissioned economist Professor John Kay to provide an independent report on the UK 
stock markets and long-term decision-making. Professor Kay formed an advisory board 
which widely consulted with the UK financial industry. As a result of this consultation, 
Professor Kay concluded UK stock markets are not as effective as they should be in 
supporting the long-term growth of British business and, consequently, long-term sustainable 
returns on investment for British savers, and that short-termism in UK stock markets was the 
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culprit.212 Principal causes of short-termism, according to Professor Kay, were the decline of 
trust, and misalignment of incentives throughout the investment chain.213 Professor Kay 
provided 17 recommendations meant to correct the SMST issue, which focused largely on 
rebuilding trust by changing the behaviour of company managers and asset managers. 214  
 
The UK government accepted the Kay Review recommendations, at least in 
principle215, with some in the UK government questioning if the soft-touch approach in the 
Kay Review actually went far enough.216 As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), 
however, many specifics of the recommendations have not yet been implemented. 
Regardless, the Kay Review demonstrates that short-termism has been a significant part of 
the UK market reform discussion, at least in the years following the GFC. Additionally, the 
chief economist of the Bank of England, Andrew Haldane, has entered the discussion 
claiming that ‘companies risk ‘eating themselves’ as shareholders and management [are] 
gripped by a form of short-termism’217. Demonstrating the extent to which this concept of 
‘short-termism’ has infiltrated popular culture in the UK, the Prince of Wales has also 
publicly urged UK companies to end short-termism.218 Despite all of this attention, perhaps 
indicative that SMST-driven reform may be dropping off the agenda of UK policymakers, the 
latest green paper on corporate governance released by the UK government does not pick up 
the SMST-driven reform thread.219 Instead, short-termism is only briefly mentioned in the 
context of executive remuneration packages.220 However, Tomorrow’s Company221, a UK 
non-profit think tank that aims to promote good business, continues to press a general SMST 
reform agenda. Particularly, this agenda includes the adoption of a system of long-term 
capital trusts be established to counter the perceived SMST problem, which would be 
regulated and overseen by the Financial Conduct Authority (the ‘FCA’) in the UK.222 
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Policymakers in Europe have also, concurrently with the SMST discussion in the UK, called 
for reform and considered reform measures, meant to correct the perceived SMST issue. 
 
3. Europe and the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive  
 
At the same time as the UK review, the European Commission (the ‘EC’) released a 
green paper in 2011 assessing the strength of the governance frameworks of EU 
companies.223 The EU Governance Green Paper was based on a G20 call to action meant to 
ensure sustainable growth and a stronger financial system in the wake of the GFC.224 The EU 
Governance Green Paper aligned with the EC’s general initiatives on market unification and 
corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’).225 The EU Governance Green Paper was the result of 
interviews by the EC with a large sample of EU companies from different member states, and 
extensive meetings with corporate governance experts and the representatives of the investor 
community in the EU.226 Similar concerns as in the Kay Review were raised by the EC in the 
EU Governance Green Paper. These concerns included that short-termism and excessive risk 
taking caused by short-term behaviour of market participants were damaging sustainable 
long-term growth and jeopardizing a strong financial system in the EU.227 
 
The EC observed that the majority of shareholders of EU listed companies are passive 
and often only focused on short-term profits.228 Consequently, the EC suggested that 
measures were needed to encourage shareholders of EU listed companies to take an interest 
in sustainable returns and longer-term performance.229 The EC also observed that there were 
issues in the agency relationship between institutional investors and asset managers in EU 
listed companies requiring correction, and that management short-term performance criteria 
may be having a negative influence on long-term corporate sustainability in the EU.230 A 
wide range of questions for possible reforms were presented by the EC, which set the basis 
for EU reforms. To the extent that these proposals have been implemented, they are contained 
in the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive. The EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
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Directive entered into force on 9 June 2107 and EU Member States have until 10 June 2019 
to implement these changes into national legislation.231 The specifics of the EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights Directive with regards to SMST reforms is discussed further in Chapter 4 
(What Has Been Done?). There have also been some country-specific SMST-driven reforms 
in the European economic zone – namely in France and Switzerland. These reforms appear to 
have been motivated at least in part by SMST concerns, and these country-specific reforms 
are also assessed further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?). 
 
4. The SMST Concerns of the Rest of the World 
 
There has been discussion of short-termism reform post-GFC outside of the UK, 
Europe and the US. In particular, specific governance organizations in many jurisdictions 
have advocated a longer-term approach – as discussed further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?). Short-termism has also been considered by non-governmental organizations 
(‘NGOs’)  ̶  e.g. the United Nations (‘UN’) Global Compact232, OECD Long-Term 
Investment Project233 and the World Economic Forum  ̶  Global Agenda Council on Long-
Term Investing234. Acknowledging the issue, the UN Global Compact, stated that ‘[s]hort-
termism in investment markets is a major obstacle to companies embedding sustainability in 
their strategic planning and capital investment decision’235. The focus of NGO consideration 
is, however, intertwined with supporting longer-term investments in infrastructure projects 
and sustainable development, rather than specifically addressing short-termism in public 
capital markets. There has also been some academic consideration in Singapore236 – perhaps 
motivating the Singapore Stock Exchange (‘SGX’) to consider removing mandatory quarterly 
reporting and prompting changes to the restrictions on listing dual class share structures. 
However, there is significantly less evidence of substantial short-termism driven reform 
discussion outside of the US, UK and the EU.  
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5. SMST Discussions in the Financial Industry 
 
Short-termism driven reform has been of considerable interest to the financial 
industry – including consulting firms auxiliary to the financial industry such as McKinsey & 
Company (‘McKinsey’). McKinsey is a consulting firm that provides advice to listed 
companies, intermediaries and asset owners. Dominic Barton, the global head of McKinsey, 
has been a long-time prominent advocate for financial industry-driven long-termism 
initiatives. He is credited with coining the phrase ‘quarterly capitalism’, which he defined as 
the continuing pressure on public companies to maximize short-term results.237 The phrase 
‘quarterly capitalism’ was given a boost of popularity when it was taken up by Hillary 
Clinton in her run for the Democratic Party nominee for US president.238 Barton has also 
claimed the financial industry must correct the issue or change will be legislated upon it.239  
 
Specifically, Dominic Barton’s solution to the quarterly capitalism problem can be 
summarized as: (1) businesses must revamp rewards towards long-term goals of at least five 
to seven years; (2) executives must infuse organizations with the objective of serving all 
major stakeholders, which in turn builds corporate value; and (3), to counter disengaged and 
dispersed ownership, boards must be bolstered to act like owners. Building on Barton’s 
proposals, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (‘CPPIB’) and McKinsey co-founded 
the online platform titled ‘Focusing Capital on the Long Term’ (‘FCLT’) in 2013 which 
developed practical structures, metrics, and approaches for longer-term behaviour in the 
investment and business worlds.240 Supported by Mark Wiseman, the President and CEO of 
CPPIB, Barton reiterated his proposals to counter quarterly capitalism in 2014, and called for 
the major players in the market, namely asset managers, to join in the fight.241   
 
Consistent with Barton and Wiseman’s message, for the third year running, Larry 
Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset management firm, has denounced short-
termism and put out a call to action against short-termism which has generated considerable 
press. Arguably as an outcome of the ‘secret summits’ triggered by Chief Justice Strine’s 
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calls for action and Hillary Clinton’s decry of short-termism242, Fink sent letters to CEOs of 
S&P 500 and large EU companies first in February 2016243, and again in 2017244 and most 
recently in 2018245 expressing BlackRock’s concerns about increasing short-termism in stock 
markets. Larry Fink’s calls have been echoed by other notable asset management firms. For 
example, soon after the 2016 letter, Ronald O’Hanley, president and CEO of State Street 
Investors warned of ‘the perils of companies focusing on short-term results at the expense of 
long-term value creation’, and William McNabb, Chairman and CEO of Vanguard, 
emphasized that good governance is key to long-term value.246 
 
In his 2016 letter, Fink called for short-termism to be corrected by: (1) excess cash not 
being returned to shareholders at the expense of value-creating investments; (2) CEOs clearly 
laying out an annual strategic framework for long-term value creation; and (3) environmental, 
social and governance (‘ESG’) issues being focused on by asset managers and handled well 
by companies.247 In his 2017 letter to CEOs, Fink reiterated this call to action to S&P 500s, 
and also commented that ‘the private sector alone is not capable of shifting the tide of short-
termism afflicting our society…[w]e need government policy that supports these goals – 
including tax reform, infrastructure investment and strengthening retirement system’248. In his 
2018 letter to CEOs, Fink again called on CEOs to ‘publicly articulate your company’s 
strategic framework for long-term value creation and explicitly affirm that it has been 
reviewed by your board of directors’249. ‘The statement of long-term strategy is essential’ 
Fink said, ‘to understanding a company’s actions and policies, its preparation for potential 
challenges, and the context of its shorter-term decisions’250. 
 
Larry Fink was also part of a small group of executives consisting of CEOs of asset 
managers, activist investors, a public pension plan and several public companies, which 
included Mary Barra of General Motors, Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., and 
Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, that signed a statement of ‘Commonsense Corporate 
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Governance Principles’.251 These principles were meant to serve as guidance for the good 
governance of public companies, and cover a wide range of governance matters, focusing 
primarily on the long-term financial health of US public companies. Speaking directly to the 
alleged SMST issue, these principles encourage asset managers to use voting rights to act in 
the long-term interest of the public company252, and also state that companies should place 
quarterly reporting in a broader context and avoid earnings guidance253.     
 
It remains to be seen whether SMST will feature as prominently in asset manager 
communications with CEOs in 2019, or if the momentum around short-termism will fade. As 
demonstrated in this Chapter, SMST is not a new issue but rather an evolving concern, which 
has interwoven with the main issues of the time period but appears to be generally linked to 
the increasing financial intermediation of public markets and the resulting need to measure 
asset managers on short-term results. Takeover concerns in the 1970/80s in the US brought a 
denunciation of the short-termism of bad actors. Fear of losing pace with national competitors 
in the subsequent decades resulted in a rally against the short-termism of US companies. The 
1990s and early 2000s saw the short-term interests of institutional investors and asset 
managers raised as a concern, as agency capitalism became the norm in US markets. Around 
the time of the bursting of the market bubble in the early 2000s, short-termism was cited as a 
contributing factor to high profile accounts frauds, which set the stage for a broader analysis 
of the short-term decision making of company managers. Despite the rising profile of SMST, 
GDP growth during these periods was relatively stable, and arguably it took the catastrophic 
financial fall out of the GFC to cast SMST into the limelight.  
  
The potential harms of SMST in capital markets have without a doubt been on the 
radar of academics, the financial industry and policy makers both before and, with renewed 
vigor, after the GFC. However, with GDP growth stability returning in most major markets   ̶ 
see Figure 4 (US and UK Annual GDP (1970 to 2015)) above  ̶ , it is possible that interest in 
SMST may now take a back seat to other more pressing capital market concerns, such as for 
example, global political uncertainty. Nonetheless, if SMST is indeed the real and harmful 
problem it is made out to be rather than merely a rhetorical tool, regulatory and financial 
industry reform is warranted now rather than waiting until the next inevitable capital market 
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disruption event. Consequently, Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) analyzes the SMST 
reforms which have emerged in the post-GFC period, and the remaining Chapters then 
provide further examination of whether SMST is an actual problem, and if the reforms 
discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) at least conceptually address SMST. 
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CHAPTER 4 – WHAT HAS BEEN DONE? 
 ‘Public policy could help keep the plums in the pudding. Without intervention, the long could 
become shorter still.’254 
Before analyzing in detail what may actually be causing the alleged SMST problem, it 
is first useful to examine the public policy and financial industry reforms implemented to date 
that are meant to address the perceived SMST issue. Consequently, this Chapter surveys 
reforms in all jurisdictions that have identified a SMST concern and assesses whether such 
reforms are ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, or financial industry initiatives. The review in this Chapter 
is categorized into asset owner, intermediary and company manager reforms on the basis that 
each of these groups serves a distinct role within stock markets, and SMST allegations 
manifest differently in each role. Specifically, Section A reviews the SMST reforms directed 
at correcting the perceived SMST of asset owners. Section B focuses on the alleged SMST of 
intermediaries, including asset managers affiliated with particular asset owners, and SMST-
driven reforms addressing company managers are then reviewed in Section C.  
Although the SMST reforms in this Chapter are categorized into asset owner, 
intermediary and company manager reforms, there is undoubtedly cross-over between the 
groups. For example, the UK Investor Forum255 is discussed in Section A under asset owners 
but also impacts intermediaries and company managers. SMST reformers, most notably 
Professor Kay, have advocated a comprehensive approach to reform. As mentioned in the 
Kay Review, ‘[n]o single reform will provide the solution, but when implemented together, 
we believe our recommendations will help to deliver the improvements to equity markets 
necessary to support sustainable long-term value creation by British companies’256. Given the 
overlap of SMST concerns in each category of market participant, a holistic approach may be 
most prudent for policymakers. However, the reforms have been delineated in this Chapter to 
provide a thematic framework to identify the reforms and how they propose to correct SMST.   
The results in this Chapter demonstrate that not much SMST-driven reform has 
actually been implemented and, of the implemented SMST reforms, many are ‘soft’ law or 
financial industry initiatives. Further, the survey results also provide evidence that of the 
implemented reforms, many are ‘light’ touch in that they are disclosure, ‘comply or explain’ 
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based, or contain an ‘opt-out’ mechanism. The complexity of the alleged SMST problem and 
the inconclusive evidence on the harms of SMST may help explain why there has been so 
little implemented reform, despite significant discussion on the SMST issue and calls for 
reform. The basis for this complexity and indeterminate evidence is explored further in the 
following Chapters, culminating in an attempt in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the 
SMST Reforms) to examine if the implement reforms surveyed in this Chapter are at least 
conceptually effective as measured against the most probable causes of the SMST concerns.  
A. ASSET OWNER SMST REFORMS  
The following Section A considers the asset owner SMST reforms, which reforms are 
summarized in Appendix ‘A’ (Table 1). These SMST reforms relate to: (1) measures 
favouring long-term share ownership, (2) changes to taxation policy associated with the 
duration of share ownership, (3) disclosure by listed companies, (4) direct communication 
with shareholders, (5) changes to stock-lending regulation, (6) formation of a long-term 
index, and (7) hedge funds. As most SMST reform attention has focused on measures 
favouring long-term share ownership, taxation and disclosure reforms257, these areas are 
discussed first in this Section A, followed by a discussion of disclosure and communication-
related SMST reforms. Specific proposals around stock-lending, a long-term index meant to 
address SMST, and hedge funds, which have received less attention, are then discussed.  
Although the SMST reforms examined in this Section A may also impact 
intermediaries and company managers, such reforms are considered in this Section A on the 
basis that the primarily intention of such reforms appears to be to correct the SMST of asset 
owners. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), the main concern raised is that 
asset owners, particularly those who hold shares of listed companies for short time periods, 
appear to exhibit a preference for short-term financial returns, which is detrimental and 
should be discouraged. Alternatively, another argument made is that long-term shareholding 
or ‘patient’ investing should be encouraged as long-term asset owners have, or should have, a 
vested interest in the long-term viability of listed companies.258 Though there is much 
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consideration of ‘hard’ law SMST-driven reform advancing these propositions, as 
demonstrated in the discussion below, few ‘hard’ law reforms have actually been enacted, 
and most implemented reform in this space is ‘soft’ law or financial industry initiatives.  
1. Measures Favouring Long-Term Share Ownership  
This Subsection A(1) compiles the regulatory and financial industry reforms that 
encourage longer-term ownership of listed companies in an attempt to address SMST-
concerns. The areas of reform considered are: (1) additional voting rights and rewards for 
long-term shareholders, (2) board nomination rights for long-term shareholders, and (3) dual 
class structures. Underlying these measures is the rationale that longer-term shareholders are 
vested in the long-term financial sustainability of the listed company. Further, some asset 
owners – e.g. high-frequency traders – may hold their shares for substantially less time than 
other longer-term asset owners, and those short-term shareholders may be incentivized to 
push for short-term share price maximization or financial returns, which may provide short-
term benefits at the expense of the long-term viability of the listed company.259 
 
a. Additional Voting Rights and Rewards for Long-Term Shareholders 
Long-term asset owners, who may be more committed to long-term corporate 
financial sustainability, should, it has been argued, receive a voting advantage or other 
incentives based on duration of their share ownership.260 Such advantage could be ‘Loyalty’ 
or ‘L-Shares’ with greater voting rights, or rights to receive additional securities/dividends 
after a time period.261 L-Shares would reward long-term shareholders, and potentially 
discourage short-term share trading. There has been much discussion on L-Shares262, and 
with respect to increased voting rights based on duration of share ownership, the ‘one 
shareholder, one vote’ corporate democracy principle has been questioned by SMST 
reformers.263 Generally accepted by corporate law scholars as the basis for efficient 
distribution of corporate voting rights, the principle is that each unit of ownership has the 
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same voting power in an organization.264 The suggestion made by SMST reformers is that 
actually all shareholders are not equal, and that long-term shareholders should be afforded 
enhanced voting rights in order to ensure that the long-term interests of the listed company 
are furthered. Despite this extensive ongoing discussion, the only enacted ‘hard’ law reforms 
based on SMST concerns has been the Florange Law265 enacted in France.  
The Florange Law reverses the prior position and provides that shares held in 
registered form for at least two years in French listed companies are automatically afforded 
double voting rights, unless the listed company’s articles are expressly amended by two-
thirds of the shareholders to provide otherwise. The stated purpose of the Florange Law is to 
promote long-termism, as evidenced by the title of the amendments, ‘Mesures En Faveur De 
L'actionnariat De Long Terme’266 – ‘Measures to Protect Long-Term Ownership’, and it aims 
to counter short-termism by encouraging more loyalty between investors and companies267. 
This law has been criticized as protectionist.268 Particularly, the assertion has been made that 
the French State and large trade unions, which together exercise significant voting positions 
in French listed companies,269 gain additional control of French listed companies at the 
expense of non-French minority shareholders.270 The timing of such changes may also be 
particularly fortuitous for such French shareholders, as they look to raise cash by selling 
shares in domestic companies while still retaining voting influence.271 Though it is a ‘hard’ 
law change, the Florange Law does provide an ‘opt out’ if shareholder approval is obtained.  
French law has long permitted French listed companies to voluntarily offer L-Shares 
with bonus dividends to their shareholders who have held shares in registered form for at 
least two years in order to encourage long-term shareholdings.272 These bonus dividends are 
limited to 0.5% of the listed company’s capital, and a maximum of 10% of the regular 
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dividend.273 This structure is not unique to France. The Netherlands, for example, also has 
listed companies which grant multiple voting rights to certain categories of shareholders.274 
At the EU level, loyalty shares were considered at the start of the process to amend the EU 
Shareholder Rights Directive. However, as the amendments took shape, the EU opted against 
including any guidance on loyalty shares.275 These types of L-Shares with either bonus 
dividends or extra voting rights do not appear to materially be in use elsewhere, other than in 
fairly limited circumstances in Europe.276 Further, use of these L-Shares is also entirely 
optional, and, other than in respect of the Florange Law, SMST does not appear to have 
significantly factored into the previous legislative motivation in France for facilitating such 
types of L-Share structures. However, the impetus by listed companies for using such 
structures appears to relate to rewarding loyalty and maintaining a stable shareholder basis277, 
which coincides with the intended use of such shares to address SMST concerns discussed 
above. Consequently, L-Shares are included in the analysis in this Chapter as an implemented 
– albeit on a limited scale – financial industry-driven voluntary SMST-reform.    
Increased voting rights for long-term shareholders were temporarily introduced in 
Italy, but a campaign against this legislation by independent directors got such support that 
the legislation was not extended past its sunset clause of 31 January 2015.278 In the UK, 
increased voting based solely on length of ownership was considered but rejected in the Kay 
Review as impractical to implement and unlikely to achieve the desired ameliorative effect 
on SMST.279 The UK Government endorsed Professor Kay’s conclusion, and observed that 
UK company law was sufficient flexible to allow companies to reward long-term 
                                                 
273  ‘Other Services – France: Loyalty Bonus Shares’ (September 9, 2016) Clearstream, <Online: 
http://www.clearstream.com/clearstream-en/products-and-services/market-coverage/europe-
t2s/france/other-services---france/61430>.   
274  See Delvoie & Clottens, p. 21, where the authors confirm that such structure has been used since 2006, but 
there is no specifically legal basis for  ̶  or prohibition against   ̶ doing so. 
275  Delvoie & Clottens, p. 23.  
276  Conaghan, Thomas P et al, ‘Worldwide: Rewarding Long-Term Shareholders: European And US Loyalty 
Share Programmes’ Mondaq (18 September 2017) <Online: http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/629580 
/Shareholders/Rewarding+LongTerm+Shareholders+European+And+US+Loyalty+Share+Programmes>. 
277  For example, Ferrari N.V., a Netherlands company, indicates in the terms and conditions of its special 
voting shares that the purpose of its loyalty voting program is to reward the long-term ownership of 
common shares and promote stability of the company’s shareholder base <Online: 
http://corporate.ferrari.com/sites/ferrari15ipo/files/dms-20012424-v1-index_13_-
_ferrari_terms_and_conditions_special_voting_.pdf> .  
278  Temporary legislative amendments in July 2014 allowed Italian listed companies to modify their statutes 
via a simple shareholder majority vote to introduce double voting rights to shareholders owning shared for 
two years (Law Decree No. 91 of 24 June 2014, converted into law by Law No. 116 of 11 August 2014 
amended the Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998).  
279  Kay Review, p. 63. 
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shareholders.280 As noted above, at the EU level, Sergio Cofferati, rapporteur for the 
Committee on Legal Affair of the European Parliament, proposed an amendment to the EU 
Amended Shareholder Rights Directive giving shareholders holding shares for two years or 
more benefits including additional voting rights.281 However, such provisions were not 
included in the final amendments to the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive.  
b. Board Nomination Rights for Long-Term Shareholders  
Additional board nomination rights – i.e. the ability to propose candidates to be 
elected as directors – based on length of share ownership were briefly introduced in the US 
by the SEC the Proxy Access Rule as authorized under the Dodd-Frank Act.282 As discussed 
in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), the intention of the Dodd-Frank Act was to improve 
accountability and transparency, end ‘too big to fail’ and bailouts by taxpayers, and 
implement stronger consumer protection regulations in the wake of the GFC. Arguably, 
however, at least a few of the changes implemented in the Dodd-Frank Act also meant to 
mitigate some of the harmful effects of short-termism in equity markets. It is difficult to 
precisely isolate SMST-driven reforms from the sweeping body of reforms in the legislation. 
However, the set of reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act which are said to be meant to address the 
alleged SMST issue are those contained in Title IX – Investor Protections and Improvements 
to the Regulation of Securities of the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, these include Subtitle A 
– Increasing Investor Protection, Subtitle E – Accountability and Executive Compensation, 
and Subtitle G Strengthening Corporate Governance. Indeed, it is this set of reforms that are 
cited by commentators who have looked at whether the Dodd-Frank Act addressed SMST.283  
The Proxy Access Rule mandated that US public companies must include shareholder 
director nominees in proxy materials under certain circumstances, which mostly significantly 
included that the shareholder nominating the board candidate must hold at least 3% of the 
voting power of a company’s securities for at least three years.284 The SEC’s rationale for 
imposing this condition was short-termism concerns. Specifically, the SEC expressly stated 
that ‘… long-term shareholders are more likely to have interests that are better aligned with 
                                                 
280  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 51. 
281  Jones, Huw, ‘Deep splits among EU lawmakers over shareholder rights reforms’, Reuters, (20 January 
2015).  
282  SEC Rule 14a-11 (the ‘Proxy Access Rule’).  
283  Dallas, 2002 and Thomas et al, 2010.  
284  Kastiel, 2015. 
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other shareholders and are less likely to use the rule solely for short-term gain.’285 However, 
the Proxy Access Rule was vacated by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in July 2011 on the grounds that the rule was ‘arbitrary and capricious’.286 The US 
Court ruled specifically that the SEC ‘inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs 
and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those 
costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted 
itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by commentators’287. Of interest, 
one of the criticisms leveled at the Proxy Access Rule was that it actually may have increased 
short-termism, as the short-term interests of certain shareholders who hold shares for three 
years or more would be given a stronger platform into a listed company.288   
Though the Proxy Access Rule was vacated by the US courts, the practice of granting 
board nomination rights based on duration of share ownership continued. Specifically, the 
constitutional documents of many US listed companies – e.g. bylaws –, typically contain a 
provision allowing shareholders to include their director nominees in the company’s proxy 
materials sent to all shareholders, provided that the nominating shareholder has held their 
shares for three years and holds at least 3% of the voting rights.289 The story of mandatory 
proxy access rules in the US demonstrates the complexity of imposing regulation intended to 
combat SMST concerns. The 3%/3-year thresholds continued use in practice also highlights 
the need for a deeper understanding of what is actually causing the alleged SMST problems, 
and how regulatory and financial industry measures can effectively deal with this issue.  
c. Dual Class Structures 
It is also worth mentioning dual class share structures, as a discussion of this structure 
has emerged in the context of SMST reform. For example, a recommendation by the 
Roosevelt Institute to end short-termism was to encourage alternative share structures such as 
loyalty shares, which recommendation specifically included furthering dual class 
structures.290 Dual class share structures are intended to preserve control by providing certain 
long-term shareholders – namely founders and other insiders – with increased voting rights 
                                                 
285  SEC Proposed Proxy Access Rule 2009, p. 50.  
286  Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v Securities and Exchange 
Commission 647 F.3d 1144 (2011). 
287  Ibid, paras 1148-1149. 
288  See Kastiel, 2015, which comprehensively summarizes the arguments for and against proxy access. 
289  Ibid.  
290  Konczal et al, 2015, p. 5.  
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over other shareholders who are not related to the business of the company. In a dual class 
share structure, two or more classes of shares are issued, one of which is issued to 
founders/executives and provides more voting rights than the public shares, and the other 
class is issued to the general public with significantly less voting rights than the founder 
shares.291 Using this method, Google insiders, for example, hold Class B shares which vote 
10:1 to the publicly held shares, giving insiders 64% of the voting power of Google.292  
Dual class structures have long been legally permitted on stock exchanges in some 
jurisdictions, including Canada and the US, and have been cited as a potential solution to the 
alleged SMST problem.293 Specifically, it is argued that ‘[a] dual-class share structure can 
allow a management team to ignore the short-termism often seen in financial markets’294. 
However, even in the jurisdictions where these dual class structures are permitted to be listed 
for trading, their value as a SMST corrective measure has been questioned on the basis that 
the founders may abuse their increased voting rights and act in their own interests rather than 
the interests of all shareholders.295 Despite this debate, Singapore recently made changes to 
its corporate law to permit dual class shares, and the SGX has allowed trading of such 
securities on its secondary market, citing correction to SMST concerns.296 Suggesting that 
this change may be more of a marketing move to attract business to reinvigorate the listless 
SGX rather than a genuine SMST-corrective measure, primary listings of dual class 
structures are still under consideration.297 Possibly as a result of the discussion on the merits 
of this structure as a remedy to SMST, other than the example of Singapore discussed above, 
listing restrictions on dual class shares with increased voting have not been amended outside 
of the jurisdictions where they are already in place in response to alleged SMST concerns.  
                                                 
291  ‘Dual Class Stock’ Investopedia <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dualclassstock.asp>.  
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294  Modesto, Ryan, ‘The case for investing in companies with dual-class shares’, Globe and Mail (18 April 
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2.  ‘Carrot and Stick’ - Taxation  
Proposals to change taxation policy to ameliorate issues of short-termism would 
necessitate ‘hard’ law reforms to applicable taxing legislation. Using taxation policy to 
discourage perceived ‘excessive’ share trading298 and encourage longer-term ownership is of 
considerable interest to SMST reformers, and the proposed reforms aimed at using taxation to 
correct the alleged SMST issue are discussed below. The ‘carrot’ is a reduction of the capital 
gains taxation rate meant to encourage longer-term shareholding, and the ‘stick’ is the 
introduction of a financial transaction tax (‘FTT’) – e.g. a Tobin tax299 – as is proposed in the 
EU300–, meant to discourage excessive trading. Admittedly, FTTs are directed at the parties 
trading shares, which are primarily intermediaries. However, as costs of FTTs flow through 
to asset owners, such SMST-driven reforms are considered here. Though ‘hard’ law taxation 
reforms have been considered, none have yet been implemented. 
a. Capital Gains Rate Changes 
Changes to the capital gains tax rates on distributions have been proposed as a remedy 
for SMST. In particular, reducing the capital gains rate on dividends paid to shareholders of 
listed companies who have held their shares for a significant period of time is seen as 
beneficial. The thinking is that asset owners – via their asset managers – should be 
encouraged to hold onto their shares as the pressure on company managers to prop up share 
prices in the short-term comes from a focus on short-term trading by asset managers and asset 
owners.301 Though not clearly articulated by the proponents of a capital gains tax change, the 
reasoning appears to be that asset owners – via asset managers – who are locked into their 
shareholdings for longer periods of time, may also be less likely to sell their shares based on 
negative short-term results of the listed company, thereby taking the pressure off company 
managers to engage in short-term earning manipulation to keep prices high. Long-term 
shareholders should, theoretically at least, be more concerned about ensuring that listed 
companies are focused on long term value generation rather than responding to short-term 
                                                 
298  What constitutes ‘excessive’ trading is not conclusively defined but appears to encompass HFT. 
299  Tax suggested in 1970s by economist and Nobel laureate, James Tobin, to impose a modest tax on all short-
term financial transactions.  
300  ‘EU Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax’, COM(2013) 71, Brussels (the ‘EU FTT Proposal’). 
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actions of management. A change to capital gains tax was considered in the Kay Review302, 
but the most developed discussion in this area has been in the US.  
US taxpayers are currently taxed on capital gains, namely net profits earned on the 
sale of shares. There is already an incentive in the US capital gains system encouraging 
longer-term shareholding. Particularly, capital gains on shares held for less than a year are 
taxed as ordinary income, and shares held for longer than a year are taxed at a lower rate.303 
There have been calls for capital gains policy in the US to be changed to further encourage 
longer-term shareholding. Specifically, the Aspen Report 2009 recommended revising US 
capital gains taxation and removing limitations on capital loss deductibility for very long-
term holdings, currently capped at US$3,000 per year.304 Short-termism driven reform to 
capital gains taxation was reiterated by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. 
Strine.305 Chief Justice Strine suggested the ‘oxymoronic definition of a long-term gain – 
which is now one year – should be changed to something more worthy of the term, such as 
four or five years’.306 Capital gains taxation policy change to correct the perceived SMST-
issue was also a policy position of former Democratic Presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton.  
Stating the need to encourage investors to focus on long-term growth and abandon a 
culture of short-term speculation, Senator Clinton proposed capital gains changes in her 2016 
Presidential campaign. These included taxing capital gains on a six-year sliding scale and 
doubling the period of time gains are taxed at the top rate of 39.6%.307 President Trump 
initiated a major overhaul of the US tax system, which was enacted effective for tax years 
after 31 December 2017.308 Capital gains proposals encouraging long-term shareholding may 
                                                 
302  Respondents in the Kay Review consultation process did suggest long-term investors receive taxation 
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re-emerge during further efforts at tax reform in the US. However, as noted in Chapter 3 (An 
Evolving Concern?), this is unlikely as President Trump’s focus appears to instead be on 
reducing corporate tax rates rather than providing tax incentives to reduce SMST. 
Consequently, despite this discussion, there has of yet been no capital gains taxation reforms 
post-GFC in the jurisdictions surveyed designed to correct the alleged SMST problem. 
b. Trading Taxes 
Variations of an FTT, essentially a modest tax on all short-term financial transactions 
including the purchase and sale of shares, as a SMST corrective measure have received 
attention post-GFC. However, no such reforms have yet been implemented. It has been 
suggested that an FTT on trades of securities may diminish the perceived harmful effects of 
SMST by reducing excessive trading309, and encouraging longer-term investing.310 
Theoretically, the cost of an FTT may make asset managers and asset owners think twice 
about selling shares, and instead focus on investments seeking long-term growth and 
sustainable earnings. The idea is that these longer-term shareholders will, indirectly by not 
selling their shares in response to negative short-term results, apply less pressure on company 
managers to keep the short-term share price high, as they are more concerned about long-
term cash generating potential. 
An FTT has been called for in the US for years311, and was recently taken up by the 
Aspen Institute312, and supported by Chief Justice Strine.313 Hillary Clinton also mentioned a 
US tax on HFT in her presidential campaign, although specifics were not provided.314 Despite 
this ongoing discussion there have not been any regulatory proposals for an FTT in the US. In 
the UK, an FTT was not addressed in the Kay Review, possibly as the UK already has a 
stamp duty on financial transactions – though most intermediaries are exempt.315 The UK 
Government considered an FTT in its response to the Kay Review, as there was some support 
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for such tax in the consultation process.316 However, the UK Government determined not to 
explore such a tax further, arguing that for an FTT to be meaningful it would need to be 
implemented globally or the entities taxed would just relocate to non-taxing jurisdictions.317  
An FTT has been proposed by the European Commission to, amongst other things, 
discourage financial transactions which do not contribute to the efficiency of financial 
markets or the real economy, or may contribute to a future crisis.318 Although short-termism 
reform has not been clearly articulated as a reason for the EU FTT, SMST concerns arguably 
can generally been seen in the rationale provided for the EU FTT, as the alleged short-
termism problem may be seen to impact market efficiency. The EU FFT proposal is to charge 
financial institutions a tax of 0.1% against the exchange of securities if one of the financial 
institutions in a transaction resides in an EU Member State. The EU FTT is currently stalled – 
and was strongly resisted by the UK319 – but received conceptual support from 10 EU 
Members320 and allegedly has the support of 64% of the EU citizens321. The imposition of the 
EU FTT may now gain some momentum given that the UK, a vocal opponent of an EU FTT, 
is in the process of leaving the EU. However, despite much discussion, a short-termism 
driven FTT has to date not been implemented in any of the jurisdictions surveyed. 
3. Disclosure Reforms – Less is More? 
Disclosure of information by market participants, particularly on the operations of  
listed companies and asset managers actions with respect to investment in such listed 
companies, plays a crucial role in the SMST discussion, and has seen some ‘hard’ law 
reform. These disclosure reforms impact asset owners, intermediaries and company 
managers, but are discussed below as the primary purpose of these reforms appears to be 
assisting asset owners – often via asset managers who may actually make the investment 
decisions based on the parameters set by asset owners – make prudent investment decisions. 
A concern raised is that stock markets are inundated with rapidly disseminated information, 
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much of which is ‘simply noise’322. The specific SMST issue raised is that this ‘noise’ 
allegedly makes it difficult for asset owners – often via asset managers – to discern the 
information needed to properly assess if a company is meeting its long-term objectives.323 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the timing of information dissemination may 
exacerbate alleged SMST concerns. Specifically, company managers may feel pressured to 
constantly generate short-term results in order to produce fresh ‘news’ to satisfy a perceived 
need in the market for corporate ‘progress’, which concept has been referred to as 
‘informational centricity’.324 Consequently, reforms discussed below are divided into two 
categories: (1) timing, and (2) quality. Timing of disclosure, mainly on mandatory quarterly 
reporting, is considered first as this is a significant area of discussion for SMST-reformers.   
a. Timing of Material Listed Company Disclosure  
A key touch point in the SMST discussion is the apparent obsession with quarterly 
reporting in certain markets, particularly the US.325 Mandatory quarterly reporting has long 
been a requirement of companies listed on US stock exchanges but is a more recent 
development in the UK and EU generally326. Similarly, other jurisdictions with developed 
equity markets – e.g. Singapore and Hong Kong – fairly recently introduced mandatory 
quarterly reporting.327 The concern with quarterly reporting is asset owners and 
intermediaries may be ‘impatient’. They may unduly focus on and react to the results of the 
most recent quarter – by selling shares and thereby negatively impacting the share price – 
without clearly understanding how such earnings fluctuations fit into a specific corporate 
long-term growth strategy. This response in turn increases pressure on company managers to 
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take corporate actions that produce positive short-term results at the expense of long-term 
success – e.g. deferring research and development investment opportunities.328 
To reduce the perceived pressures for short-term decision-making arising from 
excessive – e.g. quarterly – reporting of financial performance, Professor Kay recommended 
that UK mandatory quarterly reporting – i.e. interim management statements – be 
removed.329 The UK Government agreed, observing that rigid quarterly reporting may 
promote an excessive short-term focus and impose an unnecessary regulatory burden without 
providing useful or meaningful information for asset owners.330 Consequently, the UK 
Government was supportive of EU efforts to amend the EU Transparency Directive removing 
mandatory requirements for quarterly reporting331, which ‘hard’ law changes took effect in 
November 2013. This reform was adopted as UK ‘hard’ law effective as of November 2014, 
a year ahead of when such amendments would have applied to all EU Members.332  
The EU’s stated rationale for removal of the mandatory quarterly reporting 
requirement was to reduce short-term pressure on companies and give asset owners an 
incentive to adopt a longer-term vision.333 Agreeing with this rationale, Legal & General, a 
vocal financial industry advocate for the removal of quarterly reporting, dropped quarterly 
reporting in 2015 citing short-termism concerns. Instead, Legal & General stated that it 
would provide ‘timely and frequent updates’ as well as full-year and half-year reports.334 
Although the EU removal of mandatory quarterly reporting is a ‘hard’ law reform, the 
measures adopted by EU member states are optional and listed companies can elect to 
continue with quarterly reporting. As it is optional, the reform may have a diminished effect 
in practice as many EU companies are also listed in the US or have US shareholders who 
expect quarterly reporting. Therefore, such companies may be subject to legal  ̶  or in the case 
of non-SEC reporting companies with US shareholders  ̶  market pressures to report quarterly. 
Evidencing this issue, in the UK, the vast majority of listed companies have continued with 
quarterly reporting.335 There is indication that this market pressure may be changing as the 
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UK Investment Association (the ‘IA’)336, an influential representative body for UK fund 
managers, recently published an action plan which was very critical of quarterly reporting. 
Citing short-termism concerns the IA, said that it wishes ‘to see companies move away from 
such short-term reporting and guidance in favour of long-term metrics’337. EU/UK reforms 
have bolstered ongoing discussion in the US.338 Most recently, President Trump has called 
for the SEC to consider moving from a quarterly to a six-month reporting period.339 The SEC, 
however, continues to require quarterly reporting, and no changes are proposed though the 
SEC has acknowledged the discussion.340 EU reforms have also prompted further discussion 
globally, with the SGX recently revisiting the issue of mandatory quarterly reporting.341   
b. Quality and Content of Market Disclosure 
Reforms around timing and mandatory quarterly reporting cannot be viewed in 
isolation from calls for ‘better’ long-term focused disclosure. SMST reformers argue that it is 
not only timing creating the supposed SMST concern but also the content of disclosure, 
which they suggest is too short-term focused.342 Improvements to reporting propose to reduce 
alleged short-termism by focusing on two principal elements: (1) connecting corporate 
actions with long-term strategy and less on short-term – e.g. quarterly – earnings results; and 
(2) emphasizing CSR/ESG factors in addition to financial measures of performance of a 
listed company, which factors, theoretically at least, represent inherently longer-term interests 
than short-term earnings, although this connection to the SMST issue is tenuous.343  
Of the jurisdictions surveyed, ‘hard’ law disclosure SMST-driven reforms have only 
been made in the UK and the EU. In the UK, Professor Kay coupled his recommendation on 
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quarterly reporting in the Kay Review with a recommendation that high, quality, succinct 
narrative reporting should be encouraged.344 The UK Government supported this 
recommendation, and ‘hard’ law regulations to this effect were implemented on 1 October, 
2013.345 These regulations removed some disclosure requirements completely, and also 
required all UK listed companies – other than some small and medium-sized entities – to 
produce a separate strategic report as part of a restructured annual report. The strategic report 
must include not only financial performance indicators, but also key performance indicators 
including information relating to environmental and employee matters. The goal of such 
amendments was to make reporting clearer and more relevant, thereby encouraging more 
engagement with companies on the creation of long-term sustainable value.346 ‘Soft’ law 
guidance on the strategic report has also been offered in the UK by the FRC.347 
The EU has also implemented ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law SMST-motivated reforms around 
improved disclosure. Particularly, it made a ‘soft’ law recommendation on the quality of 
corporate governance reporting, noting that high quality disclosure facilitates better 
investment decisions and well run-companies are more likely to be competitive and 
sustainable in the long-run.348 This recommendation provided guidance to EU listed 
companies to assist them report on compliance with relevant governance codes or explain 
why they do not. The EU also adopted a ‘hard’ law directive aimed at improving non-
financial – i.e. CSR/ESG – disclosure by large companies, a stated purpose of which was to 
combine long-term profitability with social justice and environmental protection.349  
In the US, disclosure reforms based on SMST concerns were suggested in the Aspen 
Report, 2009. Though detailed proposals were not provided, the Aspen Report, 2009 called 
‘for greater transparency in investor disclosures’ [which] can also play an important role in 
helping corporations maintain a long-term orientation’.350 This was echoed by Chief Justice 
Strine when he asserted, though also no specifics were provided, that promoting long-term 
US competitiveness required first improving the quality of information provided to 
                                                 
344  Kay Review, p. 13. 
345  The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013.  
346  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 20. 
347  Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on the Strategic Report (June 2014).  
348  EU Recommendation 2014/208/EU. 
349  Directive 2014/95/EU, which was in place in EU Member States by December 2016. 
350  Aspen Report, 2009, p. 5. 
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investors.351 Despite these calls for reform, SMST driven-reforms to the quality of disclosure 
of US listed companies have not yet been proposed by the SEC. 
A non-jurisdiction specific short-termism disclosure-related reform has been proposed 
by the International Integrated Reporting Council (‘IIRC’). IIRC is a global coalition of 
regulators, investors, companies, standard setters, accounting professionals and NGOs, which 
is in the process of examining many aspects of global financial and non-financial corporate 
reporting. IIRC is developing an integrated reporting framework, the goal of which is to 
incorporate qualitative and quantitative factors into a concise report designed to encourage 
companies to better communicate their long-term value creation.352 This SMST reform by 
IIRC is a voluntary financial industry initiative. However, as set out above, reforms directed 
at quality of disclosure has seen some ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law short-termism driven reform. 
4. Direct Communication/Engagement 
SMST-reformers suggest that channels between asset owners and company managers 
should be strengthened and they should communicate and engage directly.353 This differs 
from the disclosure referred to in Subsection A(3) above, in which information is provided to 
the market as a whole. With communication – also termed engagement – individual asset 
owners or managers, or groups thereof – interact privately and directly with the listed 
company or companies in which they hold an investment. Theoretically, this facilitates 
engagement by long-term asset owners, who may have a greater interest in long-term growth 
than short-term shareholders, which premise is questionable as discussed further in Chapter 6 
(SMST Transmission Mechanisms) in the context of the relevance of investor timeframes. 
Most reform in this area is limited to UK financial industry initiatives. However, the EU has 
proposed a short-termism driven ‘hard’ law reform facilitating direct communication.  
The EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive attempts to reduce the role of 
intermediaries in the equity ownership chain by better connecting listed companies directly 
with asset owners, and in doing so encourage greater engagement with listed companies by 
asset owners. The argument made is that asset owner involvement is necessary as failure to 
engage has negative consequences for the long-term performance of both listed companies 
                                                 
351  Strine, 2015. 
352  Integrated Reporting <Online: http://integratedreporting.org>. 
353  For example, see the Kay Review, Recommendation 5. 
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and investors.354 Article 3a of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive provides that 
Member States shall ensure that listed companies have the right to identify their shareholders 
and requires that that EU Members must ensure that intermediaries provide listed companies 
with information on shareholder identity. Further, Article 3b of the EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive provides that listed companies, which do not communicate directly with 
their shareholders, must make available all information related to such shares on the listed 
company’s website or, if instructions are given by the shareholder, through an intermediary, 
which must transmit the information to the shareholder without undue delay.  
In the Kay Review, Professor Kay also advocated for greater communication between 
asset owners and company managers to counter the alleged SMST issue. Specifically, he 
recommended that companies should consult with their long-term asset owners over major 
board of director appointments in order to give such ‘serious’ investors an advantage over 
traders.355 Professor Kay’s recommendation assumed, potentially problematically, that such 
asset owners are interested in the long-term growth of the listed company. Assuming they are 
interested in long-term growth, the UK Government also noted significant market and 
regulatory impediments to such engagement, including competition among asset 
owners/intermediaries and insider trading restrictions. Insider trading regulation, for example 
the UK Market Abuse Regulation356, may act to limit engagement by asset owners. If an asset 
owner engages with a listed company and in doing receives ‘inside information’, the asset 
owner would be subject to sanctions if it trades its shares while in possession of such insider 
information. Consequently, asset owners may be reluctant to engage with company managers 
out of concerns about limitations on the asset owners’ ability to freely trade their investment.   
Given these serious impediments, rather than require engagement, the UK 
Government pointed to the financial industry initiative of the UK Investor Forum as an 
appropriate venue, and the ‘Good Practice Statement for Company’ Directors’ as the method 
to develop good practice. It also commissioned the FRC to investigate further as part of its 
general review of UK governance which is ongoing.357 Specific proposals on company 
engagement with ‘serious’ investors on general operations have not yet been recommended 
and were not included in the Green Paper on Corporate Governance Reform 2016.  
                                                 
354  EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, Whereas Clause (15). 
355  Kay Review, Recommendation 5. 
356   EU Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014).  
357  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 17.  
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Based on Professor Kay’s recommendation, the UK Investor Forum was established 
in 2014. The UK Investor Forum was meant to address concerns raised in the Kay Review. 
These concerns were that asset owner and company manager engagement focused 
disproportionately on corporate governance, causing a vacuum in respect of companies’ 
strategies for long-term, sustainable competitive advantage. Also, Professor Kay was 
concerned about impediments to engagement arising from increased international ownership 
and fragmented shareholding, and perceived regulatory barriers inhibiting collective 
engagement.358 The UK Investor Forum is a community interest company with a board of 
directors appointed to represent the interests of the entire investment chain.359 It is discussed 
here as its key objective is communication with asset owners. However, it has significance 
for intermediaries and company managers. With the aim of building partnerships between 
asset owners and intermediaries and companies in which they invest, the UK Investor Forum 
established forums to advise the financial industry and promote collective engagement. 
Membership is open to all investors in, and professional asset owners and managers of, UK-
listed companies, but participation is entirely voluntary. There has been some interest as 31 
investors participated in 2017, and 16 collective engagements were conducted during 2015-
2016 and 14 collective engagements were conducted during 2015-2016.360 However, other 
than this initiative and Articles 3a and 3b of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, 
there are no SMST reforms facilitating direct communication in the jurisdictions surveyed.  
5. Stock-Lending 
As discussed below, ‘stock-lending’ has been raised in the context of SMST-driven 
reform. With stock-lending, shares are ‘lent’ to a borrower. The ‘lent’ shares may then be 
used by the borrower in securities transactions, including short sales of such shares. The 
lending party, often an asset manager, receives consideration for the lending which may or 
may not be rebated to the asset owner. The precise SMST issue associated with stock-lending 
has not clearly been articulated by reformers, but the key concern appears to be that stock-
lending separates asset owners from effective control of their shares as ownership and voting 
                                                 
358  Kay Review, pp. 9-51. 
359  The Investor Forum <Online: www.investorforum.org.uk>. 
360  Investor Forum – Collective Engagement Review 2017-2015 <Online: 
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/review>. 
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control is transferred temporarily to the borrowers who, particularly if securities are borrowed 
to support a short-sale, are not interested in the long-term viability of the company.361  
Professor Kay accepted that the practice of stock-lending may serve a valid function 
in capital markets. He was, however, concerned about the transparency of stock-lending 
relationships.362 Specifically, Professor Kay argued that asset owners should know if their 
shares are being lent, and be able to exercise greater judgment over when or if it is 
appropriate to do so.363 Thus, Professor Kay recommended that all income from stock-
lending be disclosed and rebated to investors.364 The UK Government preferred disclosure 
over a strict requirement to rebate income to asset owners, meaning that asset managers may 
retain stock-lending fees if they disclose they are doing so to asset owners.365  
The UK Government noted disclosure of stock-lending is now part of asset manager 
guidance and referenced the UCITS Directive,366 a directive regulating EU collective 
investment schemes. Adopted in July 2014, the UCITS Directive has been transitioned into 
‘hard’ law in EU Member States.367 The UCITS Directive goes further than UK guidance 
and, as proposed by Professor Kay, makes a ‘hard’ law change requiring that investors in EU 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (‘EU UCITS’) receive all 
income from stock-lending net of operational costs. This is the only ‘hard’ law reform on 
stock-lending in the jurisdictions surveyed, which reform is motivated at least in part by 
short-termism concerns. However, it may be that the primary motivator with this reform was 
concerns over intermediaries taking advantage of asset owners. Further, this reform is limited 
to EU UCITS, which comprise a notable part but not all of EU capital markets.368  
                                                 
361  See the definition of ‘securities lending’ at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/securitieslending.asp and 
the discussion of this concept termed ‘empty voting’, in Ali, Paul, Ramsay, Ian, and Saunders, Benjamin, 
‘Securities Lending, Empty Voting and Corporate Governance’, CIFR Working Paper 023/2014 (May 
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362  Kay Review, p. 31. 
363  Ibid. 
364  Ibid, Recommendation 10. 
365  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 40. 
366  ESMA Guidelines for competent authorities and UCITS management companies on ETFs and other UCITS 
issues, ESMA/2012/832EN (‘UCITS Directive’).  
367  For example, the Financial Services (Collective Investment Schemes) Act 2011 Financial Services 
(Collective Investment Schemes) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 in the UK. 
368  Managing almost €6 trillion in assets, UCITS account for approximately 75% of collective investments by 
small investors in Europe (EC Statement, 15 April 2014). 
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6. LTVC Index  
SMST reformers assert that it is difficult for asset owners interested in longer-term 
investing to adequately assess if a listed company is effectively generating sustainable longer-
term corporate value.369 The LTVC Index is a recent financial industry initiative that claims 
to fill this void by signaling long-term focused listed companies to asset owners. Specifically, 
the listed companies selected to be on the LTVC Index are supposedly more likely to 
maintain a competitive advantage and, thus, sustain longer-term corporate value.  
The LTVC Index was developed by CPPIB and asset manager RobecoSAM and was 
launched on 21 January 2016.370 The LTVC comprises about 250 companies identified 
through a Dow Jones proprietary system to take a long-term view, which also have a 
sustained history of financial quality. To craft the LTVC Index, Dow Jones relied on both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative data was generated with an Economic 
Dimension Score compiled by RobecoSAM, which scored companies based on a wide-range 
of primarily corporate governance criteria. Quantitative data was largely derived from a 
firm’s return on equity, balance sheet accruals ratio and leverage ratio.371 The LTCV Index 
has received considerable attention and six global institutional investors have expressed 
support. Interestingly, three have not yet decided to invest funds in tracking the LTVC Index, 
stating they have in house strategies for investing.372 The LTCV Index merits further 
attention once it has an operating history to determine if in fact it is a useful tool to correct 
the alleged SMST issue or, instead, if it is merely a clever marketing gimmick. 
7. Hedge Funds 
 
As a means of addressing the alleged SMST of specific market participants, namely 
activist hedge funds, US Senators Tammy Baldwin and Jeff Merkley introduced draft 
bipartisan legislation in 2017 (the ‘Brokaw Act’)373. The term ‘hedge fund’ derives from 
trading techniques used by fund managers to hedge against market losses by going ‘long’ if 
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they foresee a market rise, and ‘short’ if they anticipate a drop.374 The term has been extended 
to mean a certain type of alternative investment structures only available to sophisticated 
investors that use pooled funds and often employs a hedging strategy and an aggressive 
approach to unlocking market opportunities. Examples of activist hedge funds include 
Peshing Square Capital Management, Third Point and ValueAct Capital Partners. Senators 
Baldwin and Merkley argue that activist hedge funds are ‘leading the short-termism 
charge’375 as ‘they abuse lax securities laws to gain large stakes in public companies’376. With 
these large stakes, the Senators argue, ‘they make demands to benefit themselves at the 
expense of the company’s long-term interests’377. Such demands commonly ‘are for more 
debt, stock buybacks, reduced R&D, cost-cutting, layoffs, and general reduction any 
investment in long-term growth’378. To address this issue, the Brokaw Act proposes to 
shorten disclosure times for the formation of associations by hedge funds – i.e. ‘wolf 
packs’379, amends the definition of ‘person or group’ to capture alleged ‘wolf packs’, and 
requires derivative disclosure to end any secretive shorting of a position by hedge funds.380 
The Brokaw Act has been introduced but not yet passed committee stage in the US Senate.381 
Further, it is not clear if hedge funds actually contribute to the alleged SMST issue, which is 
explored further in Section A of Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms).  
This Section A demonstrates that there have been some implemented reforms to 
correct the perceived issue of asset owner SMST, but reform has been modest given the level 
of discussion. Of the enacted ‘hard’ law reforms, the Florange Law and EU Transparency 
Directive have ‘opt-out’ mechanisms. The only ‘hard’ law reforms prescribing certain action 
are UK and EU reforms to disclosure reporting and the communication reforms in Articles 3a 
and 3b of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, and reforms to the UCITS 
Directive on stock-lending, which are limited to EU UCITS. The remaining asset owner 
SMST-driven reforms are ‘soft’ law or financial industry initiatives. 
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B. INTERMEDIARY SMST REFORMS – ‘OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY’ 
Given the complexity of the equity ownership chain and the corresponding disconnect 
created between asset owners and listed companies as discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the 
Issues), SMST reformers have scrutinized the role played by intermediaries.382 This scrutiny 
is warranted as intermediaries – specifically asset managers – have become the dominant 
players in the investment chain.383 Acting on behalf of institutional investors – by far the 
largest group of investors in many modern equity markets – asset managers ‘play a key role 
in exercising the attributes of share ownership most relevant to company decision making: 
the right to vote and the right to buy or sell a given share’.384 Similar to asset owner SMST 
reforms, intermediary SMST-driven reforms intend to replace a short-term approach with 
more prudent long-term investing. Specifically, intermediary reforms aim to: (1) better align 
the interests of intermediaries with the long-term interests of asset owners, thereby 
encouraging more responsible long-term management of investments; and/or (2) reduce the 
role of intermediaries, who allegedly may be overly focused on short-term returns. 
This Section B focuses first on reforms receiving the most attention, namely, (1) 
stewardship and disclosure, (2) duty to further long-term interests, and (3) asset manager 
remuneration. It then looks at reforms receiving less attention, which are reforms directed at 
reducing the influence of intermediaries such as voting restrictions and direct shareholding.385 
Finally, reforms for a special case of intermediaries – proxy advisors – are considered. 
Intermediary SMST reforms are summarized in Appendix ‘A’ (Table 2). As evidenced 
below, most implemented reform in this space is ‘soft’ law or financial industry initiatives. 
1. Stewardship and Disclosure  
An area garnering significant attention from reformers is setting guiding principles of 
desired behaviour for market participants, and publicly disclosing adherence to such 
guidelines and on long-term strategy generally. Guiding principles are specifically meant to 
encourage greater accountability, mainly by asset managers, on how investments should be 
responsibly managed to provide sustainable long-term returns for asset owners. Of note in 
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this respect are Professor Kay’s recommendations focusing on ‘stewardship’, a concept based 
primarily on respect for those persons whose funds are invested and managed, and trust in 
those persons by whom the funds are invested or managed.386  
To counter short-termism, Professor Kay recommended promoting stewardship. This 
was to be achieved by: (1) improving the UK Stewardship Code; (2) adopting good practice 
statements for intermediaries, as well as asset owners and company managers; and (3) 
creating the UK Investor Forum.387 Though Professor Kay advocated broadening the existing 
concept of stewardship, he did not offer much in the way of specifics. The UK Government 
endorsed the good practice statements in the Kay Review, however, and, as discussed in 
Subsection A(4) of this Chapter, encouraged the establishment of the UK Investor Forum to 
facilitate collective engagement in the equity ownership chain of UK listed companies. 
The UK Government further claimed that ‘soft’ law amendments to the UK 
Stewardship Code in 2012 remedied short-termism concerns that were raised in the Kay 
Review.388 The UK Stewardship Code was released by the FRC in 2010, and contained 
guidelines directed at institutional investors meant to improve the governance of UK listed 
companies. It was updated in 2012 to clarify that stewardship goes beyond merely monitoring 
compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code. The updated UK Stewardship Code 
provided for asset managers and asset owners, albeit on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, to 
engage with board of directors on the company’s strategy to deliver sustainable long-term 
returns.389 Only UK asset managers are legally required to comply with the UK Stewardship 
Code, or explain why they do not.390 As of May 2018, 77 asset managers have signed up to 
the UK Stewardship Code.391 Voluntary compliance has been significant and as at May 2018, 
94 asset owners and 12 service providers have also signed up to the UK Stewardship Code.392  
Many other jurisdictions have followed the UK’s lead with respect to stewardship, or 
independently developed similar codes for stewardship by asset managers and asset owners.  
For example, Japan adopted a non-binding, comply or explain stewardship code in 2014, 
modeled largely after the UK Stewardship Code, which code was revised in 2017. This 
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Japanese Stewardship Code included requirements for asset managers and asset owners to 
engage with board of directors on the company’s strategy to deliver sustainable long-term 
returns.393 As at 5 April 2018, 227 signatories – including 162 asset managers – had adopted 
the Japanese Stewardship Code.394 The concept of stewardship by asset owners and asset 
managers has gained traction worldwide. As at 31 March 2018, a total of 19 jurisdictions, 
including the UK and Japan as discussed above, have adopted stewardship codes, all of which 
have been adopted after 2010.395 The EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive also has 
provisions which contain elements found in stewardship codes. 
Similar to requirements contained in many stewardship codes, Article 3h of the EU 
Amended Shareholder Rights Directive provides that EU Member States must ensure that 
institutional investors publicly disclose how investment strategy is aligned to their liabilities 
and contributes to medium and long-term performance of their assets, and, if asset managers 
are engaged, they must publicly disclose the main elements of this arrangement. Additionally, 
Article 3i of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive provides that EU Member States 
must ensure that asset managers disclose, on an annual basis, to the institutional investor with 
which they have entered into the arrangements referred to in Article 3h how their investment 
strategy and implementation thereof complies with that arrangement and contributes to the 
medium to long-term performance of the assets of the institutional investor or of the fund. 
With Article 3i, the disclosing party must comply or explain why it did not. Though these 
reforms are ‘hard’ law changes, they employ a ‘comply or explain’ model, or in the case of 
Article 3h, a disclosure model, rather than providing prescriptive requirements to which asset 
owners and asset managers must comply. 
Despite the prevalence of stewardship codes and the accompanying disclosure of asset 
manager and asset owner investment strategy, many questions have been raised around the 
effectiveness of these stewardship codes in encouraging engagement focused on long-term 
performance, and on whether buy-in to these stewardship codes has been meaningful. When 
the UK Stewardship Code was first introduced, Professor Brian Cheffins argued that due to 
the sustained fragmentation of share ownership occurring over the past 20 years in the UK, 
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the UK Stewardship Code was unlikely to foster substantially greater shareholder 
involvement in UK corporate governance.396 Further, on the fifth anniversary of the 
implementation of the UK Stewardship Code, Simon Wong of the Northwestern University 
School of Law examined stewardship codes implemented globally and argued that ‘[t]hey are 
largely devoid of substance’397. Speaking directly to the UK Stewardship Code, Wong said 
that it ‘has generally failed to address the root causes of poor shareholder stewardship, opting 
instead to focus on process and mechanics’398. Demonstrating that compliance may be 
aesthetic rather than substantive, survey evidence in Japan suggests that although the 
stewardship concept is largely supported by signatories, little actually changed in practice in 
Japan.399 Buy-in from UK asset managers may also be questioned, as they arguably may just 
have adopted the long-term principles but do little different in practice.400  
In an attempt to address issues around compliance, the FRC implemented a tiering 
system for signatories to the UK Stewardship Code in 2016.401 Based on an assessment of 
their reporting in relation to the principles of the UK Stewardship Code, the FRC publicly 
ranked signatories into Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3, with a Tier 3 ranking indicating that 
substantive improvements were required.402 In August 2017 approximately 20 signatories to 
the UK Stewardship Code – half of those initially placed in Tier 3 – who had not improved 
their compliance and achieved Tier 2 status were removed from the list of signatories.403  
The UK Government also pointed to financial industry initiatives meant to correct 
short-termism through stewardship in response to Professor Kay’s recommendations in the 
Kay Review.404 These financial industry initiatives included a new Stewardship Disclosure 
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Framework developed by the National Association of Pension Funds (‘NAPF’), a trade 
organization for those involved with workplace pensions. This NAPF Stewardship Disclosure 
Framework encourages asset managers of pension funds to clearly articulate their 
stewardship approaches to clients.405 The NAPF Stewardship Disclosure Framework aims to 
provide greater transparency on stewardship policies and activities of asset managers who are 
signatories to the UK Stewardship Code in a centralized public format.406 
Financial industry initiatives outside of the UK have also attempted to guide the 
behaviour of market participants away from short-termism. For example, Dominic Barton, 
global head of McKinsey has been a prominent advocate for finance industry driven 
initiatives. He claims the financial industry must correct the issue or change will be legislated 
upon it.407 Together with the CPPIB, McKinsey founded the online platform ‘Focusing 
Capital on the Long Term’ (‘FCLT’) in 2013, meant to develop practical structures, metrics, 
and approaches for longer-term behaviour in the investment and business worlds.408  
FCLT brings together asset managers – e.g. State Street Global Advisors and 
Wellington Management –, asset owners – e.g. NZ Superannuation Fund, Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan, etc. –, and service providers, to help enhance long-term corporate value 
creation. As noted, the purpose of this platform is to develop practical structures, metrics, and 
approaches for longer-term behaviours in the investment and business worlds.409 FCLT aims 
to do so by bringing together financial industry participants to discuss reform and by 
increasing public awareness. It also summarizes other voluntary initiatives for reducing 
SMST on its website. These initiatives include the Principles for Responsible Investment 
(‘PRI’).410 PRI is a voluntary set of principles for intermediaries established in partnership 
with the United Nations Environmental Program (‘UNEP’) Financial Initiative and the 
United Nations (‘UN’) Global Compact meant to provide a standard for asset managers to act 
in the long-term interests of beneficiaries and incorporate environmental, social and 
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governance issues into investment practices. As of 2017, PRI had over 1,200 signatories from 
over 50 countries representing approximately US$59 trillion under management.411  
Although there has been a degree of financial industry-driven reform encouraging 
market participants – particularly asset managers – to take a longer-term perspective, as 
demonstrated above, reform in this space has been largely voluntary. Even regulatory 
reforms, such as the UK Stewardship Code application to UK asset managers, and Article 3h 
of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive regarding disclosure of investment strategy 
are on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Consequently, the ability of these initiatives to encourage 
company managers of listed companies to take a longer-term perspective depends largely on 
the interest and goodwill of the market participants, which to date has not been rigorously 
tested. However, more tangible ‘hard’ law reforms proposals have been suggested to target 
perceived intermediary SMST, including imposing a duty to further long-term interests.   
2. A Duty to Further Long-Term Interests?  
Citing SMST concerns, SMST-focused reformers have called for certain 
intermediaries, namely asset managers who manage shares on behalf of asset owners, to have 
a legal duty to further the long-term interests of asset owners.412 Currently, the standard of 
care and duties owed by asset managers to their asset owner clients varies greatly depending 
on the governing jurisdiction and contractual arrangements between the parties.413 SMST 
reformers assert that intermediaries, as holders of other people’s money, should have an 
obligation to make decisions furthering the long-term interest of the asset owners rather than 
maximizing short-term profit.414 The inherent difficulty in this proposition is that asset 
owners may also want short-term profits. Consequently, intermediaries may not be properly 
fulfilling their agency role if they instead focus on purported asset owner long-term interests. 
Further, asset managers could conceivably be in breach of their legal duties if a long-term 
investment was made and such investments simply performed poorly.  
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413  See Busch, D, and DeMott, D, ‘Liability of Asset Managers’ (Oxford University Press: 2012) summarizing 
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A large part of this conversation on short-termism and intermediaries has been around 
‘fiduciary’ duties. The meaning of this term varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but 
‘fiduciary’ relationships are generally presumed to have common characteristics and attract a 
core set of legal duties, most notably a duty of loyalty.415 In the Aspen Report, 2009, as 
echoed by Chief Justice Strine, there was a call for a ‘fiduciary’ duty to better align the 
interests of financial intermediaries and their clients.416 No specifics were provided in the 
Aspen Report 2009 on if this would be legal duty and how it would apply. The Dodd-Frank 
Act, however, went further and gave authority was given to the Investor Advisory Committee 
established pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act to consider a fiduciary duty for brokers and 
dealers, which duty would be more stringent than what was currently in place and parallel the 
high standard of conduct that was applicable to investment advisors.417 The Investment 
Advisory Committee reviewed and recommended that the fiduciary duties on investment 
advisors be applied to brokers and dealers when they provide personalized investment advice 
to retail investors.418 Despite this recommendation, the fiduciary standard has not yet been 
uniformly extended to the activities of brokers and dealers, and an exemption to the fiduciary 
standard continues to apply when the advice provided to retail clients is incidental to the 
conduct of their business and no special compensation is received. Consequently, in the US 
there has been no extension of fiduciary duties based on SMST-concerns.  
A discussion on ‘fiduciary’ duties was also incorporated into the Kay Review. A 
‘fiduciary’ is defined in UK law as ‘someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of 
another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence’419. In the Kay Review, Professor Kay concluded that some intermediaries serving 
as fiduciaries are interpreting their duties too narrowly, specifically as meaning that they must 
maximize short-term financial returns for their investors. This concern, coupled with a 
broader goal of extending fiduciary duties to all relationships in the investment chain, 
resulted in Professor Kay making two recommendations. He recommended that: (1) EU/UK 
regulators apply fiduciary standards to all relationships involving discretion over the 
                                                 
415  See discussion in Miller, P, ‘Justifying Fiduciary Duties’ (2013) 58:4 McGill Law Journal 969. 
416  Aspen Report, 2009, p. 5.  
417  Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX, Section 913 (g).  
418  Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee: Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Duty (November 2013), 
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Fiduciary Duty Governing Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors’ Morgan Lewis (11 December 2013) 
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419  Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co) v Bristol & West Building Society [1996] EWCA Civ 533. 
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investment of others, or advice on investments; and (2) the UK Law Commission review the 
legal concept of fiduciary duty as applied to investment.420 Based on these recommendations, 
the UK Government commissioned a report from the UK Law Commission. 
The UK Law Commission was asked to explain the nature of fiduciary and other 
duties to act in the best interests of savers, and to describe how these duties apply to 
investment intermediaries.421 Notably, it was not called on to address the practicality of 
imposing a legal fiduciary duty on all market intermediaries or to suggest legislative reform. 
Instead, the report presented by the UK Law Commission was explanatory, and primarily 
clarified the duties of trustees in the funded pension context. In its report, the UK Law 
Commission suggested tweaks to existing regulation and offered guidance on how fiduciary 
duties should be applied. Ultimately, it only concluded that pension fund trustees are not 
precluded from considering long-term interests and ESG factors. On fiduciary duties for non-
pension trustee intermediaries, the UK Law Commission did not recommend a formal review 
but shifted the issue to the EU/international level by recommending the UK Government 
‘review the current operation of the system of intermediated shareholding, with a view to 
taking the lead in negotiating solutions at a European or international level’422.  
Up until the recent UK referendum on leaving the EU, discussions with the EU were 
ongoing. However, the UK Government moved away from calling intermediary duties 
‘fiduciary’, observing the term has a specific meaning in law and equity. It instead described 
these as ‘minimum standards’. It articulated principles to guide such standards, namely that 
all market participants should act in good faith, in the best long-term interests of their clients 
and beneficiaries, and in line with generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour.423 
These principles have not been enacted in legislative form. However, the UK Government 
asked the Financial Services Authority424 and its successor organization, the FCA, to look 
into setting standards. The FCA claimed that these standards played into discussion at the EU 
level on amendments to the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (‘MiFID II’)425. 
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However, there is no evidence of amendments to MiFID II supporting this assertion, and the 
focus of reform was on market harmonization, international competition and investor 
protection.426 Consequently, despite much discussion, there have been no reforms to 
standards of care or duties owed by intermediaries based on SMST concerns. 
3. Asset Manager Remuneration 
SMST reformers have suggested the current structure of asset manager remuneration 
raises short-termism concerns. However, despite much discussion, the only ‘hard’ law reform 
to date has been with respect to EU UCITS. The concern raised by Professor Kay and also in 
the Aspen Report is that asset managers are not incentivized towards long-term investing as 
compensation is based on quarterly assessments of performance of assets under management. 
Specifically, the Aspen Report suggested that there should be regulation to base 
compensation of long-term oriented funds on the fund’s long-term performance.427 Professor 
Kay suggested that pay should not be related to short-term performance of the fund or asset 
management firm.428 Instead, a long-term performance incentive should be provided via an 
interest in the fund to be held at least until the manager is no longer responsible for that fund. 
Further, Professor Kay recommended that asset manager remuneration be structured to align 
the interests of asset managers with client interests and timescales.429  
The UK Government agreed in principle with Professor Kay, but its redress efforts 
focused on voluntary guidance rather than ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law. It endorsed Professor Kay’s 
‘Good Practice Statement for Asset Managers’, which included principles of remuneration. It 
also pointed to the NAPF Framework, as further discussed in Subsection B(1) above, and 
additional financial industry initiatives, including the Investment Management Association 
(‘IMA’) guidance on disclosure of fund charges, as steps in the right direction.430 The stated 
purpose of these initiatives was to increase transparency on remuneration thereby promoting 
long-term success of UK business.  
At the EU level, the UCITS Directive does take some ‘hard’ law steps towards better 
aligning incentives of asset managers with long-term interests of investors. However, these 
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rules only relate to EU UCITS, which cover a significant portion but not all of Europe’s asset 
management firms. Specifically, the EU UCITS rules provide that: (1) guaranteed variable 
remuneration – e.g., guaranteed bonus of x% of returns – is only to be paid in exceptional 
circumstances; (2) remuneration policies must be reviewed yearly and should be consistent 
with effective risk management; (3) a substantial portion of remuneration must be paid in EU 
UCITS units and deferred for a reasonable period of time; and (4) staff cannot use personal 
hedging strategies or insurance in remuneration.  
4. Voting Restrictions/Process  
SMST reformers have focused on intermediary voting  ̶ the process whereby 
intermediaries vote shares on behalf of asset owners at general meetings of listed companies   ̶ 
on behalf of asset owners as a means to correct short-termism. Specifically, they argue that 
shares should be voted, and if intermediaries exercise voting rights they should do so in 
accordance with the asset owner interests. Theoretically at least, this action results in the 
long-term interests of asset owners being advanced as asset owners, assuming they have a 
long-term focus to investments, supposedly should take a longer view of investment than 
intermediaries.431 In the UK, changes to the UK Stewardship Code placed a requirement on 
intermediaries to disclose voting policies and to make use of voting power, and explain why 
if they did not.432 Similarly, in the EU, Article 3c of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive includes provision meant to ensure intermediaries facilitate the exercise of asset 
owner rights, including voting rights, or explain why they do not.433 
Whereas UK/EU measures only attempt to facilitate the voting process to correct 
short-termism, Swiss reforms actually restrict voting by intermediaries, which reforms were 
based on the idea asset owners will, or should, be more vested in the long-term viability of a 
company than intermediaries. These reforms came out of a 2013 referendum on the proposals 
in the 2008 Minder Initiative434 to amend the Swiss Federal Constitution limiting excessive 
executive pay and intermediary voting, which passed by 67.9%. The stated aim of the Swiss 
law was to protect the economy, private property and shareholders and ensure sustainable 
management of businesses. Thomas Minder, the businessman-turned-politician behind the 
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campaign, also stated that the proposals were aimed at ending a culture of short-termism and 
rewards for company managers of badly-run companies rather than just capping salaries.435  
As a result of this referendum, the Swiss Constitution now prohibits all proxy voting 
by an intermediary or by a depositary in respect of any Swiss public companies listed on 
stock exchanges in Switzerland or abroad.436 Also, pension funds must vote in the interests of 
the beneficiaries and publicly disclose how they voted. These Swiss measures arguably are 
intended to counter short-termism by removing voting rights for intermediaries. This is 
supposedly meant to limit the rights of intermediaries and encourage voting by asset owners, 
which may motivate such shareholders – who may have a greater interest in the long-term 
viability of a listed company – to be involved in governance. This may have the opposite 
effect in practice; however, as the proxy voting process is intended to facilitate greater 
involvement in corporate governance by asset owners. Shareholders may opt out of the 
system if they are not able to use proxy voting. Violation of the law may result in 
imprisonment for up to three years and a fine of six years remuneration. However, no SMST-
driven reforms to voting other than as discussed above have been implemented. 
5. Direct Shareholding  
Direct shareholding has been raised in the context of SMST reform. Professor Kay 
recommended exploring a cost effective means for individuals to hold shares directly on an 
electronic register.437 The rationale for this recommendation was that individual asset owners, 
particularly retail shareholders, may be able to engage more effectively with a company if 
they hold listed shares directly rather than via intermediaries.438 The SMST concern was not 
clearly articulated by Professor Kay, but appears to be that asset owners who hold shares 
directly may retain their shares for longer, and therefore may be more interested in the long-
term value of the company. Currently, to be able to effectively trade on a market, listed 
shares are held in electronic book entry form through a central depositary – e.g. CREST in 
the UK and Cede & Co in the US. In the UK, electronic ownership is currently limited to 
members of the central system – i.e. to brokers – although for a cost nominee accounts may 
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be set up for asset owners and brokers may sponsor individual membership.439 The UK 
Government has stated it remains committed to facilitating individual holdings via EU 
initiatives in this area.440 As discussed further in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the 
SMST Reforms), a key issue with the argument that facilitating direct retail holding will 
reduce perceived SMST concerns, is that in practice brokers are mere market functionaries. 
Rather than making investment decisions, brokers follow instructions, and moving this 
function directly to retain investors or asset owners generally, would not correct the SMST 
issue, but could hurt market liquidity.   
As a result of discussions at the EU level, EU regulations441 were enacted 
in September 2014. Specifically, the CSD Regulation aims to increase safety and efficiency 
of securities settlement and settlement infrastructures in the EU by providing that the 
immobilization and dematerialization – i.e. how shares are taken off book entry and recorded 
directly on a register – should not imply any loss of rights for the holders of securities and 
should be achieved in a way that ensures security holders can verify their rights. Arguably, 
the CSD Regulation could combat short-termism by facilitating direct ownership, but short-
termism has not been cited as a reason for the reform. Also, the CSD Regulation does not 
take effect until 1 January 2023 for new securities, and 1 January 2025 for all securities, and 
it may also now not apply to the UK given the UK’s exit from the EU. Consequently, no 
short-termism reforms facilitating direct shareholding have been implemented.  
6. Metrics and Models 
A wide variety of metrics are used by financial analysts – often engaged by asset 
managers – to measure a listed company’s performance and populate valuation models. In the 
UK, the main factors used by financial analysts to develop a forecast or recommendation are 
cash flows, current share price relative to fundamental value, competitive advantage, balance 
sheet strength, and earnings outlook.442 Behind each of these factors are common measures of 
performance that include earnings per share (‘EPS’), free cash flow and net asset value, 
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which feed into related valuation models used by financial analysts.443 These models are 
ultimately used to measure the performance of investments and in deciding whether to buy or 
sell shares of a listed company.444 As discussed further below, the concern raised is that 
increased reliance on these metrics and models by asset managers and, consequently, by asset 
owners may raise SMST concerns as financial analysts tend to base results on short-term 
frames and specific criteria, which may not accurately account for long-term growth. 
Of the jurisdictions surveyed, only the UK has a developed discussion of models and 
metrics in the context of short-termism. The short-termism concerns raised by these complex 
metrics and models were discussed in the Kay Review. Particularly, Professor Kay observed 
that market complexity, and the corresponding growth of intermediation, have resulted in 
increased reliance on metrics and models developed by asset managers that tend to base 
results on short-term frames and specific criteria, which may not accurately account for long-
term growth.445 These types of structures may be unsuited to investors with a longer-term 
investment horizon, and could also be problematic if used as the basis for asset manager 
remuneration. Accordingly, Professor Kay recommended that the UK Government 
commission a review of how these metrics and models are used in the investment chain 
focusing on how they measure long-term investments,446 and also that regulators avoid the 
implicit or explicit prescription of a specific model in valuation or risk assessment and 
instead encourage the exercise of informed judgment by asset managers447.  
In response, the UK Government commissioned a research project on models and 
metrics in the investment chain, which made a number of recommendations largely mirroring 
the Kay Review conclusions.448 This research project concluded that metrics and models do 
rely heavily on qualitative, and not only quantitative factors, as inputs often rely on 
qualitative judgments. Thus trust-based relationships, informed dialogue and the exercise of 
judgment are crucial. For metrics and models to better facilitate effective long-term 
investment decision-making, the UK research project concluded that there needs to be less 
reliance on intermediaries – and specifically, advocated for: (1) improved dialogue between 
companies and investors about future earnings and dividends; (2) improved information 
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relayed to companies about changes in equity positions so as not to provoke a short-term 
reaction. 449 Speaking directly on accountability by asset managers to investors, the UK 
research project called for: (1) long-term objectives and stewardship to be embedded into the 
asset manager selection process; and (2) for asset manager reports accounting for investor 
time-lines.450 Each of these proposed corrections are not directly related to changes in the 
metrics and models currently used, but instead require reforms to corporate governance 
generally, which would then as a result improve the inputs into such metrics and models.  
7. Proxy Advisors 
Proxy advisors, also called proxy voting agencies and shareholder voting research 
providers, are not directly in the equity ownership chain. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 
(Defining the Issues), proxy advisors play an important role in the exercise of shareholder 
voting rights. Specifically, for a fee paid by users, proxy advisors such as ISS and Glass 
Lewis & Co., LLC conduct research and make voting suggestions on proposals – e.g. board 
appointments, ‘say on pay’, and ESG matters – put forward at listed company meetings.  
It is unclear exactly how the proxy advisory process contains issues relevant to short-
termism, as proxy advisors appear not to be a priori short-termist – and if proxy advisors do 
not have a short-term bias, adherence to their recommendations may counter the short-
termism of asset owners and asset managers. However, as there is considerable reliance on 
proxy advice by asset owners/managers,451 it has been argued that the proxy advisory process 
should be more transparent and freer from conflicts so that asset owners/managers can 
prudently manage investments. Further, asset managers and asset owners may use proxy 
advisors, but they should ensure that they monitor the validity of the voting recommendation 
and assess whether such recommendation accords with their own investment parameters. 
Specifically, Chief Justice Strine, has argued that proxy advisors do not have enough 
qualified persons to provide a genuine recommendation for every vote452, and consequently, 
Chief Justice Strine recommended that institutional investors should not rely upon proxy 
advisory recommendations that did not reflect the investment horizon and investing strategy 
of their investors, and in particular, index funds should not rely upon proxy advisory firms 
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that did not provide index fund specific voting recommendations.453 Despite these 
recommendations, the SEC has not proposed any short-termism reforms to the proxy 
advisory process. The SEC did, however, provide guidance generally confirming that the 
onus lies on asset managers to properly manage their proxy advice.454 In the UK, the Kay 
Review did not specifically address the role of proxy advisors in the context of SMST reform. 
However, the role of proxy advisors was considered by the EC.  
The EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive proposed ‘hard’ law changes to the 
regulation of proxy advisors. The aim of these reforms was to ensure the reliability and 
quality of proxy advisors advice, thereby contributing to a longer-term perspective of 
shareholders and ensuring better operating conditions for EU listed companies.455 The 
changes require proxy advisors to adopt and adhere to a code of conduct or explain why they 
do not.456 This code of conduct is meant to ensure that research and voting recommendations 
are accurate and reliable and are developed in the client’s sole interest. With more reliable 
voting recommendations, asset owners/managers should, at least theoretically, be able to 
more prudently manage investments for the long-term. Other than in the EU, however, there 
are no short-termism reforms to the proxy advisory process in the jurisdictions surveyed. 
This Section B demonstrates that there have been some implemented reform efforts 
meant to correct perceived intermediary SMST. However, most of such reform has been 
‘soft’ law – e.g. UK Stewardship Code – or voluntary measures setting guiding principles. Of 
the enacted ‘hard’ law reform, only the Minder Initiative limiting intermediary voting and the 
UCITS Directive regulating intermediary remuneration have prescriptive requirements. 
Articles 3h and 3i of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive relate instead to public 
disclosure of investment strategies and the other reforms in the EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive, namely Article 3c on the intermediary voting process and Article 3j on the 
proxy advisory process, are also ‘light’ touch as they are on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.  
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C. COMPANY MANAGER SMST REFORMS 
Short-termism reforms also address ‘managerial myopia’, or company manager bias 
towards immediate results, as reformers suggest that market pressures and individual interests 
in short-term financial returns may negatively influence company manager behaviour.457 
Consequently, this Section C looks at reforms to executive remuneration, which claim to be 
based, at least in part, on short-termism concerns. Best practice suggestions aimed at reducing 
company manager short-termism are then considered. Finally, short-termism in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions (‘M&A’) is reviewed, as company manager short-termism has been 
raised as a concern in M&A activity. Reforms are summarized in Appendix ‘A’ (Table 3). 
Although there are some implemented ‘hard’ law company manager reforms, as 
demonstrated in this Section C, reforms are limited to EU and UK remuneration reporting.   
1. Executive Remuneration 
As acknowledged by Professor Kay in the Kay Review, executive remuneration is a 
subject of much controversy and attention in its own right, and not only in the context of 
short-termism.458 The bigger questions asked are if high levels of executive pay in listed 
companies are just or appropriate, and whether executive pay levels adequately align with 
listed company performance. Professor Kay limited his analysis to whether the structure of 
executive remuneration in UK listed companies contributed to, or detracted from, good long-
term decision-making. Similarly, this Section C only considers efforts to reform executive 
remuneration based on SMST concerns. The main SMST concern raised by reformers is that 
executive remuneration resulting from short-term performance and unrestricted equity – i.e. 
equity with no ‘vesting’ restrictions’, specifically requirements that shares be held for a 
period of time before they may be sold459 – results in short-sighted decisions at the cost of 
longer-term economic performance.460 The UK response to such concerns is considered first 
given the detailed discussion in the Kay Review, and the resulting ‘hard’ law changes.  
In his review, Professor Kay focused on the main elements of long-term 
compensation plans set by remuneration committees of listed companies, namely executive 
                                                 
457  See Dallas, 2012, p. 270 and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 128 summarizing the biases and market pressures 
contributing to company manager short-termism. 
458  Kay Review, pp. 77-79.  
459  See the definition of ‘vesting’ at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vesting.asp. 
460  Bolton, P, Scheinkman, J and Xiong W, ‘Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behavior in 
Speculative Markets,’ (2006) 73:3 The Review of Economic Studies 577. 
 102 
 
incentive schemes and bonuses. His key concern was that the customary three-year timeframe 
of such long-term plans was too short given that the decision-making of UK CEO’s may have 
a much longer impact.461 Consequently, Professor Kay recommended that UK companies 
should structure executive remuneration to relate incentives to sustainable long-term business 
performance, and that share-based long-term incentives should only be provided in the form 
of shares held at least until after the executive has retired from the business.462 
The UK Government did not implement the specifics of Professor Kay’s 
recommendations. It did agree, however, with his general recommendation to better link 
executive pay with long-term performance, but observed that this connection was best 
achieved through promoting good corporate practice rather than mandated a specific 
remuneration structure.463 Particularly, the UK Government referred to reporting 
requirements aimed at correcting short-termism governance in regulations enacted in 
October 2013 applicable to UK listed company executive remuneration.464 These UK 
Remuneration Regulations also contain a ‘say on pay’ provision, giving shareholders a 
binding say on executive pay policy. This builds on the UK’s previous robust listed company 
remuneration regulatory regime, which included an advisory vote on pay.465 However, the 
change to a binding ‘say on pay’ does not appear to be motivated by short-termism concerns 
– arguably because if investors are short-term focused, a ‘say-on-pay’ could foster SMST – 
but rather are intended to address concerns about excessive remuneration and also more 
generally on better linking executive compensation to corporate performance.466  
The UK Remuneration Regulations did require a new form of remuneration report to 
be presented to shareholders annually setting out each director’s pay for the previous 
financial year, and how such pay is linked to performance.467 Such disclosure is not unique to 
the UK ‘say on pay’ structure. Detailed remuneration disclosure has long been a requirement 
for listed companies, and has been required under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
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since its inception in 1934.468 Changes to ‘say on pay’ regimes in other jurisdictions now 
routinely link remuneration disclosure with performance.469 However, the UK Remuneration 
Regulations go further than the reporting requirements in other jurisdictions470 and previous 
UK requirements.471 The UK Remuneration Regulations expressly provide that UK listed 
companies must disclose how each component of the remuneration package supports short 
and long-term strategic objectives of the listed company.472 Though it does not have 
mandatory ‘say on pay’ legislation, Singapore amended its ‘soft’ law Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2012 to require disclosure in the remuneration report on how remuneration is 
linked to the short-term and long-term performance of SGX listed companies.473  
In the EU, Article 9a of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive requires that 
EU Members ensure that listed companies in their jurisdictions establish a remuneration 
policy to be adhered to in the payment of executives and submitted to a shareholder vote at 
least once every three years.474 The remuneration policy must be in line with the company’s 
long-term interests, and management must explain how the policy contributes to long-term 
interests and sustainability.475 Article 9b of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive 
also requires that a remuneration report be produced and voted on by shareholders, which 
vote may be binding or advisory as set by the EU Member State. This remuneration report 
must also specify how remuneration is linked to the company’s long-term performance.476  
Prior to UK/EU initiatives, the Swiss considered executive pay. The Minder Initiative, 
discussed earlier on voting rights of intermediaries in Section B of this Chapter, also 
addressed the issue of perceived excessive executive compensation. Although the primary 
                                                 
468  Frydman, Carola and Raven E. Saks ‘Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term 
Perspective, 1936-2005’ (2010) 23:5 Review of Financial Studies 2099, at p. 2103.  
469  OECD, Corporate Governance Factbook (2015), pp. 96-97. 
470  A survey of jurisdictions with robust executive remuneration requirements as evidenced by the adoption of 
binding or advisory ‘say on pay’ requirements – including US, UK, EU, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Germany, France, Norway, and Australia – indicates disclosure is centered on reporting types of 
compensation and the relationship to performance generally. Although some ‘soft’ law governance codes –
e.g. Norway and Australia – provide executive compensation should not lead to ‘short-termism’, specific 
reporting on how pay links to short and long-term strategy to the extent contained in the Remuneration 
Regulations is not provided.  
471  UK Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008, the 
predecessor legislation to the Remuneration Regulations, did not require reporting on the link between pay 
and short and long-term strategy. 
472  2013 Regulations, Schedule 8, item 26(a). 
473  Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012, Principle 1, Guideline 5.2 and 8.1. 
474  EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 9a. 
475  Ibid, Article 9a(2) and (3). 
476  Ibid, Article 9b. 
 104 
 
motivation was curbing excessive executive pay, short-termism concerns appeared to have 
factored into the motivation for the proposed reforms.477 The Minder Initiative resulted in 
‘hard’ law changes to the Swiss Federal Constitution resulting in reforms to executive 
compensation of Swiss listed companies – both in Switzerland and abroad.478 Curbing 
excessive pay was undoubtedly a key driver, and the reforms went somewhat beyond a ‘say 
on pay’ as found in other jurisdictions by requiring separate voting by boards/committees on 
pay packages, and limiting certain types of payments. However, it is not at all clearly 
discernible how these reforms are meant to counter short-termism. Consequently, these Swiss 
reforms are not considered an implemented ‘hard’ law short-termism remuneration reform.  
Similarly, there have been discussions in the US on the issue of short-termism in 
executive compensation.479 The Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX, Subtitle E - Accountability and 
Executive Compensation, introduced changes into the US regime. These changes introduced 
a requirement into the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that shareholders have a ‘say-on-
pay’ vote at least every three years.480 There is no discussion by the SEC, or the newly 
established Investor Advisory Committee, linking these ‘say-on-pay’ requirements to SMST-
driven reform. On the contrary, as discussed further in Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness 
of the SMST Reforms), questions have been raised on if these measures exacerbate SMST 
concerns. However, in addition to a ‘say-on-pay’, Title IX, Subtitle E - Accountability and 
Executive Compensation of the Dodd-Frank Act also provided for the SEC to make 
amendments to the disclosure of executive compensation arrangements.  
The Aspen Institute also engaged in the discussion on SMST and executive 
remuneration, arguing that the focus of US reforms on narrow performance metrics and 
disclosure increases incentives for short-term behaviour.481 This position is consistent with 
earlier principles developed by the Aspen Institute urging companies to better align 
compensation of executives with long-term value creation.482 Building on this position, Chief 
Justice Strine observed that ‘[b]ecause executive compensation should be designed to provide 
top executives with appropriate incentives to manage well and create sustainable increases in 
                                                 
477  Thomas Minder initiative in English, ‘Maurice’s Musings’ (1 March 2013).  
478  Swiss Federal Constitution, Article 95, Paragraph 3. 
479  Thanassoulis, J, ‘Industry Structure, Executive Pay and Short-Termism’, (2012) 59:2 Management Science. 
480  Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX, Subtitle E, Section 951.   
481  The Aspen Institute, ‘Pay vs. Performance Disclosure – Comments on Proposed Regulations’ (2015) 
<Online: https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-15/s70715-54.pdf>. 
482  Aspen Report, 2009, p. 6. 
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corporate value, it seems counterintuitive and counterproductive that compensation 
arrangements should run on annual terms, with constant tinkering and changing of key 
provisions’483. He suggested it is more sensible to have compensation committees set 
employment contracts for a reasonable length of time to assess their contribution to 
management and ‘say on pay’ votes held every third/fourth year rather than annually.  
Building on this discussion, in implementing changes to executive disclosure in 2015, 
the SEC noted that some compensation plans may cause executives to focus overly on short-
term performance to the detriment of long-term performance. Consequently, in August 2015 
the SEC enhanced disclosure requirements, requiring US listed corporations to disclose in 
2018 registration statements and annual 10-K filings the relationship between executive 
compensation actually paid for five years and corporate financial performance, specifically 
the total shareholder return of the listed corporation and its peer group.484 As discussed, in 
Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms), there are questions as to 
whether these US executive compensation disclosure reforms, as with performance disclosure 
elsewhere, conceptually actually address SMST concerns. However, as demonstrated above, 
actual ‘hard’ law implemented short-termism driven reforms to executive compensation have 
been moderate, and are limited to UK, US and EU reforms related to remuneration reporting. 
2. Best Practices 
SMST reformers have advocated for company managers to be given improved 
direction on how best to manage listed companies for the long-term.485 Although there are 
various voluntary reforms addressing best practices for company managers to achieve long-
term objectives, no ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law SMST reforms have yet been implemented.  
In the UK, Professor Kay observed that company managers are stewards of company 
assets and business operations. In accordance with the UK Companies Act, Professor Kay 
asserted that the directors’ duties are to the company and not its share price, and companies 
should aim to develop relationships with investors rather than with ‘the market’. In 
furtherance, the Kay Review offered a ‘Good Practice Statement for Company Directors’ 
                                                 
483  Strine, 2015, p. 26. 
484  Implemented in August 2015 by an amendment to US securities regulation on executive compensation 
required as part of the Dodd-Frank reforms – SEC, ‘Pay Versus Performance’, Proposed Rule proposing 
amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K to implement Section 14(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 
485  See summary in Dallas, 2012, pp 355-357. 
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building on directors’ duties under the UK Companies Act and highlighting their role in long-
term value creation.486 This statement also asserted that company managers should not allow 
expectations of market reaction to particular short-term performance to influence company 
strategy. Endorsed by the UK Government487, this statement is meant to work in tandem with 
reforms to UK executive remuneration discussed above. However, the statement has not been 
legislatively enacted, and there is no indication the UK Government intends to do so.   
There is also a plethora of financial industry-driven initiatives on executive standard 
setting, and best practices for company managers also exist to voluntarily guide behaviour 
towards long-term sustainability.488 Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, has for three years 
running put out a call to action to company managers of S&P 500 and large EU companies. 
Mr. Fink has expressed concerns about stock market short-termism, and called for: (1) excess 
cash not to be returned to shareholders at the expense of value-creating investments; (2) 
CEOs to clearly lay out a strategic framework for long-term value creation to shareholders 
annually; and (3) ESG issues to be focused on by asset managers and handled well by 
companies.489 Governance and professional organizations are also avid supporters of 
initiatives promoting company manager long-termism.490 For example, see the Institute of 
Directors (‘IOD’), Submission to the Kay Review (18 November 2011), Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance, ‘Sustainability Guide for Companies’, Australian IOD, ‘Curbing 
excessive short-termism: A guide for boards of public companies’ (April 2013), New Zealand 
IOD, ‘The Four Pillars of Governance Best Practice’ (2012), and King Report on Governance 
for South Africa (2009). However, these are all voluntary initiatives, and, as stated above, 
there are no implemented ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law short-termism reforms in this area. 
                                                 
486  Kay Review, p. 58. 
487  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 42. 
488  For example, ‘Tomorrow’s Company, Future of Finance’ (long-term global effort led by CFA Institute 
focused on building long-term sustainable value), and ‘Generation Foundation’ (non-profit foundation 
focused on promoting sustainable capitalism). 
489  Turner, 2016, Oyedele, 2017 and 2018 Blackrock Letter. 
490  See Institute of Directors (UK), Submission to the Kay Review (18 November 2011), Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance, ‘Sustainability Guide for Companies’ (2008), Institute of Directors (Australia), 
‘Curbing excessive short-termism: A guide for boards of public companies’ (April 2013), Institute of 
Directors (New Zealand), ‘The Four Pillars of Governance Best Practice’ (2012), and King Report on 
Governance for South Africa (2009).  
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3. M&A  
As discussed in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), short-termism in the context of 
M&A activity featured prominently in the discussion in the US during the takeover boom of 
the 1970/1980s.491 Since the GFC, however, there has not been any significant SMST-driven 
reform or reform proposals to M&A regulation, other than in the UK. In the UK, the Kay 
Review identified hyper-activity by company managers focused on M&A activity at the 
expense of developing fundamental operational capabilities of the business as a characteristic 
of short-termism in capital markets. Professor Kay also observed that short-term incentives 
have led to some takeovers of listed companies which are not in the public interest or the 
long-term interests of investors.492 Consequently, Professor Kay recommended that the scale 
and effectiveness of UK merger activity be kept under careful review.493  
The UK Government accepted Professor Kay’s recommendation, and identified that 
changes to the Takeover Code enacted in 2011 to further protect targets, and subsequent 
revisions requiring offerors to disclose post-offer intentions, were a step-change towards 
ensuring that UK M&A activity was motivated by long-term considerations.494 It also 
reported that the Competition and Markets Authority, established in 2013 to promote 
competition for the benefit of consumers within and outside the UK, had a clear objective of 
long-termism built into its strategy. The UK Government stated that the UK approach to 
foreign takeovers was reviewed and deemed appropriate.495 No further notable M&A short-
termism reforms have been made or proposed by policymakers in the jurisdictions surveyed. 
Despite much discussion, Section C of this Chapter demonstrates that there has been 
minimal ‘hard’ law reform attempting to correct alleged managerial myopia. SMST-driven 
reform in this space has been limited to enhanced US, EU and UK reporting requirements on 
how executive compensation links to long-term strategy. All other implemented company 
manager short-termism reforms appear to be voluntary financial industry initiatives. 
As shown in this Chapter, SMST rhetoric appears to be weaving its way into the 
fabric of listed company corporate governance. As demonstrated by this analysis, 
                                                 
491  See discussion in Roe, 2013, p. 979. 
492  Kay Review, p. 10. 
493  Ibid, p. 13. 
494  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014, p. 47. 
495  Ibid, p. 49. 
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policymakers – particularly in the UK and EU – have framed some post-GFC stock market 
reforms around short-termism. Further, they have been actively sculpting long-term 
objectives into some – albeit minimal – substantive regulatory change. To date, however, the 
SEC has been a harder sell, although there are some strong voices pushing for SMST-driven 
reform in the US. Despite the significant level of discussion and numerous proposals, the 
actual output of short-termism reform in all jurisdictions surveyed has been relatively modest.  
Of the implemented ‘hard’ law reforms shown in Appendix ‘B’ (Table 4), most 
reforms are disclosure based or on a ‘comply or explain’ basis – e.g. Articles 3c, 3h, 3i and 3j 
of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive – or provide an ‘opt out’ – e.g. Florange 
Law and EU Transparency Directive. Voting restrictions in the Minder Initiative, the EU 
UCITS Directive – which only applies to EU UCITS –, and US/UK/EU reporting 
requirements on long-term strategy and remuneration in Articles 9a and 9b and the 
shareholder communication requirements in Articles 3a and 3b of the EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights Directive are the only ‘hard’ law reforms with non-optional requirements. 
Consequently, prescriptive ‘hard’ law reform mandating behaviour has been modest. There 
are some implemented ‘soft’ law reforms, particularly in UK and the EU, and voluntary 
financial industry initiatives than prescriptive ‘hard’ law reform. Regardless, the total output 
of SMST-driven reform has been modest contrasted with the short-termism discussion.  
As implemented reform to date has been minimal, the question remains what if 
anything should be done to correct SMST. The review in this Chapter provides a useful 
benchmark summarizing what has been done to date. This benchmark may be used to 
measure what further actions are required, if any, to address the perceived SMST issue. This 
analysis also demonstrates that SMST is on the radar of policymakers, and is driving some 
reform, albeit at a more moderate pace than the extensive reform proposals suggest. Recent 
empirical studies have bolstered the case for SMST reform.496 However, there continues to be 
a lively discussion in academia and the popular press on whether there is a SMST issue at all, 
and if so, what is causing SMST and if the alleged SMST problem is actually harmful. There 
is a strong possibility that those persons advocating that SMST is a real and harmful problem 
have not yet convincingly presented their case, which may explain why implemented 
regulatory and financial industry reform has been minimal and relatively ‘light’ touch to date. 
Consequently, the following Chapters consider in further detail if there is in fact a harmful 
                                                 
496  Cremers et al, 2017. 
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SMST problem, and if so what is causing it. This analysis cumulates in Chapter 8 
(Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) in an assessment of the conceptual 
effectiveness of the implemented reforms based on the most probable causes of SMST.  
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CHAPTER 5 – IS THERE A SMST PROBLEM?  
 
‘The first step in resisting the pressures of short-termism is to correctly identify their 
source’497 - ‘The roots of perceived corporate short-termism lie in common, human 
behavioral time biases. Specifically, individuals tend to be hyperbolic discounters, preferring 
short-term gains over longer term rewards.’498 
 
The previous Chapter concluded that despite extensive discussion, not many reforms 
have actually been implemented to correct the perceived SMST problem. Further, of the 
SMST-driven regulatory reforms that have been implemented, most are ‘light’ touch as the 
majority of these reforms are ‘comply or explain’ or disclosure based, or ‘soft’ law or 
voluntary non-legal initiatives rather than prescriptive ‘hard’ law reforms. In order to 
determine whether there is in fact a problem justifying even this limited public policy 
response to the SMST issue and if any further reforms are necessary, this Chapter wades into 
the debate – primarily happening within financial and legal scholarship – on if there is a 
SMST problem at all, and, if so, what may actually be causing the perceived SMST issue.  
 
This Chapter first considers the evidence presented supporting the argument that there 
is a SMST problem. After assessing the strength of this evidence and accepting that there is 
some basis for concern, this Chapter then considers how SMST may be evident in share 
pricing, as share prices are an important communication mechanism between listed 
companies and the market. In particular, this Chapter assesses how there can be a SMST 
problem at all if share prices, as mainstream economic theory suggests, are a decent measure 
of the risk-adjusted future returns of a listed company. To do so, the efficient capital market 
hypothesis (‘ECMH’) is considered, which hypothesis essentially holds that markets are 
informationally efficient meaning that share prices reflect all publicly available information.  
 
Accepting that capital markets are generally informationally efficient, this Chapter 
then examines whether capital markets are also fundamentally efficient – meaning that share 
prices are a decent measure of the underlying long-term value of the firm. In doing so, a 
complex part of share pricing is analyzed, specifically the discount rates applied to future 
returns by investors and the interaction with investor bias. The hypothesis that short-termism 
in share pricing is evident in excessive discount rates applied by investors is explored. 
Building on this intuitive concept that immediate rewards are worth more than uncertain 
                                                 
497  Denning, 2017. 
498  Sampson & Shi, 2016, p. 6. 
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long-term rewards using economic and financial research, this Chapter concludes – as 
summarized in the arguments set out in Figure 5 (SMST and Share Pricing) below – that the 
evidence is suggestive that SMST is occurring, and it is in large part due to the excessive 
discounting of future returns by investors. This apparent excessive discounting, and the 
resulting impact on share prices, is known to company managers and, accordingly, there is a 
strong incentive to prioritize short-term financial results. Consequently, this Chapter  
questions if share prices are a decent measure of the long-term value of listed companies. 
 
Figure 5. SMST and Share Pricing 
 
 
A. EVIDENCE OF THE SMST PROBLEM 
Before turning to an analysis of short-termism in share pricing, this Section A reviews 
and assesses the strength of the evidence presented around whether there is a short-termism 
problem. The depth of survey evidence conducted on market participants, which consistently 
indicates a SMST problem, is first considered. After acknowledging the weaknesses of the 
survey methodology as a precise tool to measure the SMST problem, analysis of a systemic 
short-termism bias in capital markets is considered. Quantitative evidence in support of the 
existence of a SMST problem is also then assessed. As quantitative evidence is thin on the 
ground, other forms of evidence which use proxies to extrapolate the existence of a SMST 
problem are considered. Though none of the evidence provided on its own conclusively 
confirms the existence of a SMST problem, the consistent survey results of market 
participants, analysis of investor bias, the evidence of increasing excessive discounting of 
long-term cash flows, and the proxies used to measure short-termism, present if not a 
compelling, at least a suggestive, picture that there is a SMST problem worth addressing.      
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1. Survey Evidence 
 
There is an abundance of survey evidence consistently confirming that company 
managers feel pressured to provide short-term returns and that they take positive actions to do 
so. Survey evidence has been summarized by Davies et al, 2014499, and notably includes 
detailed surveys of US listed company executives conducted by researchers Graham et al 
which found that: (1) managers would reject a positive-NPV project if that lowered earnings 
below quarterly consensus expectations, (2) over 75% of the sample would give up economic 
value in order to smooth earnings; and (3) managers said that this was driven by the desire to 
satisfy investors.500 These results have been repeatedly confirmed. For example, McKinsey 
and CPP conducted an international survey of over 1,000 corporate directors and CEOs in 
2013. In this survey 63% of the respondents indicated the pressure on their senior executives 
to demonstrate strong short-term financial performance had increased in the past five years, 
and 79% of the respondents said they felt the most pressure to demonstrate strong financial 
performance over a time period of less than two years501. More recently, in 2016, the National 
Association of Corporate Directors in the US found that of the more than 600 public 
company directors and governance professionals surveyed, 75 percent indicated that short-
term pressures were undermining management’s focus on long-term strategic objectives and 
value creation.502 However, survey evidence has three identifiable inherent issues.  
 
First, the responses to survey questions by company managers could be untruthful or 
self-serving – surveys are essentially human data and thus are fallible503. For example, 
company managers may attribute blame for their short-term actions unduly on asset owners 
or asset managers in order to encourage reforms that provide themselves with greater 
discretion to manage the affairs of listed companies. This criticism may be true, but there is 
no documented assessment that the survey evidence actually gathered on SMST is untruthful 
or self-serving – rather, much of this evidence has been done anonymously thereby reducing 
                                                 
499  Davies et al, 2014, p. 16.  
500  See Graham et al, 2005, updated in Graham at al, 2006. 
501  CPP & McKinsey, 2013, p. 6. and as referenced in Barton & Wiseman, 2014, p. 46. 
502  Results of the 2016/2017 NACD Public Company Governance Survey as referenced in ‘More than Half of 
Public Company Boards Recognize the Effects of Short-Termism’ (5 December 2016) NACD Press 
Release <Online https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/05/globe-newswire-more-than-half-of-public-company-
boards-recognize-the-effects-of-short-termism.html>.  
503  See Rapley, John, ‘How Economics Became a Religion’ The Guardian (11 July 2017), which criticizes 
economic research on the basis that it is not scientific and relies on human data. The author observes that 
‘[u]nlike people, subatomic particles don’t lie on opinion surveys or change their minds about things’.  
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the incentives to be untruthful or self-serving. A second issue with survey evidence is surveys 
indicate that managers feel pressured to produce short-term results, but this does not evidence 
that they are actually doing so. Consequently, survey evidence should ideally be supported by 
other – e.g. quantitative – evidence demonstrating that SMST is in reality occurring in the 
market. Quantitative evidence of SMST is considered in Subsection A(2) below.  
 
Finally, a third criticism may be that even if company managers are actually 
prioritizing short-term financial returns and engaging in real earnings management – as 
discussed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) –, such short-termist actions do 
not necessarily equate to societal harm. Evidence of the societal harms of SMST is 
considered further in Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?). However, even if the 
evidence does not yet definitively indicate a harmful SMST problem, as suggested by Roger 
Martin, Academic Director of the Martin Prosperity Institute, weight should be put on the 
negative behaviours of individuals rather than the outputs, as eventually short-termist 
behaviours will impact outputs.504 Thus, if company managers say they are behaving in a 
short-termist manner in response to perceived or actual pressure from investors for short-term 
financial results, this behaviour by company managers could eventually translate into societal 
harm. Thus, survey results are suggestive, if not compelling, evidence of a SMST problem.  
 
2. Short-Term Bias - A Systemic Issue? 
 
A popular assertion post-GFC is that short-termism is a systemic problem – i.e. the 
blame lies with the structure of the market itself, and a short-term bias of all market 
participants. For example, the Aspen Report, 2009 declared that short-termism is a ‘system-
wide’ problem505, and the Kay Review referred to the ‘systemic nature’506 of the short-
termism problems identified. Lynne Dallas also argued that the problem is caused by the 
‘short-term focus of corporate managers, asset managers, investors, and analysts’507. An 
explanation of how exactly short-termism is ‘systemic’ has not been offered by such 
claimants, but the assumption may be drawn that short-termism is a behaviour exhibited by 
all participants in equity capital markets. This idea of short-termism as a behavioural 
                                                 
504  Martin, 2015, p. 5. 
505  Aspen Report, 2009, p.3.  
506  Kay Review, p. 9. 
507  Dallas, 2012, p. 268. 
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characteristic508 or a social phenomenon509 has been explored further by academics. Defining 
the issue in such a broad manner has the effect of removing blame from any one set of market 
participants, which may be in line with the large philosophical questions on the purpose of 
capital markets emerging post-GFC510. A systemic bias may be a neat way of explaining the 
issue, and if such a bias is shown it could be useful in formulating policy responses.  
 
Although biases may be widespread, many commentators have focused instead on 
two central aspects to the alleged short-termism problem, namely asset owner short-termism 
and managerial short-termism, also termed managerial myopia.511 As will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) managerial myopia appears to be the 
flip side of asset owner short-termism – investor irrationality – rather than a standalone 
problematic behaviour. The rationality of investors has been challenged, most notably in the 
field of behavioural economics. Numerous factors have been identified which impact the 
rationality of investor behaviour, including over confidence, biased judgments, herd 
mentality and loss aversion.512 However, it has been argued that these irrationalities, in terms 
of individual equity buying and selling decisions, cancel each other out.513 Further, the 
argument has also been made that if there are investor irrationalities in the market these are 
dealt with by internal market corrective measures.514  
 
There are compelling arguments that counter the position that markets are self-
correcting. Most significantly, certain biases – for example, a tendency to undervalue long-
term returns and over-value short-term returns –, as discussed in the context of excessive 
discounting below, may be so pervasive that they do not cancel each other out.515 Further, 
                                                 
508  Ibid, pp. 310-316, in which Ms. Dallas reviews various cognitive biases she argues play a role in 
encouraging short-termism. 
509  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2015, in which the authors describe stock market short-termism at p. 418 as a 
‘very real and multi-faceted behavioral and cultural paradigm encompassing the attitudes and practices of 
investors, financial professionals, and investee company managers’.   
510  For example, Mazzucato, Mariana, ‘Why Economic Recovery Requires Rethinking Capitalism’, Institute 
for New Economic Thinking (15 November 2016) <Online: https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives 
/blog/why-economic-recovery-requires-rethinking-capitalism>. 
511  See the summary of investor short-termism and managerial short-termism provided in Moore & Walker-
Arnott, 2015, pp. 423-432 and in Moore & Petrin, 2017, pp 124-132. 
512  Malkiel 2016, p. 231. 
513  See Malkiel 2016, p. 230 where he claims that traditional economists can wriggle out of the challenge that 
investors are irrational by ‘declaring that the trades of irrational investors will be random and therefore 
cancel each other out without affecting prices’.  
514  Ibid, where Malkiel states that ‘even if investors are irrational in a similar way, efficient-market theory 
believers assert that smart rational traders will correct mispricings’. 
515  See the discussion in Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, pp. 420-421, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, pp. 121-123. 
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corrective measures such as price arbitrage opportunities may not be readily available in 
practice.516 Consequently, although some individual investor irrationality in terms of equity 
buying and selling may be effectively washed out in the market, and market mechanisms 
generally facilitate information efficiency, share prices may still be fundamentally inefficient 
if pervasive biases, such as excessive discounting of long-term returns, are present. However, 
the difficulty is empirically demonstrating the pervasiveness of this investor irrationality.  
 
3. Quantitative Evidence of SMST  
 
Although survey evidence and behavioral economics analysis of investor biases may 
be suggestive of a SMST problem, hard evidence demonstrating that there is a SMST 
problem is lacking, and, arguably may never be convincingly provided given the nature of the 
problem. Moore and Petrin compare the issue to global warming, stating that ‘for every 
commentator who regards it [short-termism] as one of the most serious and pressing 
problems facing the corporate and financial world today, there would appear to be another 
commentator equally keen to deny that there is even a material ‘problem’ as such at all’.517 
Roger Martin has suggested that the existence and consequences of short-termism are 
fundamentally unknowable because there is no control group.518 Although he comes down on 
the side of the debate saying that there is a SMST problem, demonstrating this inherent 
evidentiary issue, Martin said ‘we can’t compare the performance of America with short-
termism to that of America devoid of short-termism – or even prove beyond a doubt that 
short-termism exists in the first place’519. Perhaps for this reason, there have been relatively 
few attempts to capture the potential costs of SMST in quantitative terms.  
 
One area where there has been some quantitative analysis is around excessive 
discounting of future cash flows using company level equity price data. Further details on 
how excessive discounting actually evidences a SMST concern are discussed further in this 
Chapter in Subsection B(2)(a) below. In brief, a line of financial analysis originating with the 
work of David Miles in 1993 measures expected cash flows against equity prices and finds 
                                                 
516  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, pp. 421-423 where the authors argue that the arbitragers may themselves by 
susceptible to the bias, they may have rational motives to continue acting with the prevailing market trends, 
and it may be costly to assess and act on such opportunities which may negate any gains. 
517  Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 119.  
518  Martin, 2015, p. 3. 
519  Ibid.  
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some evidence of excessive discounting – meaning that investors are under-valuing the long-
term and prioritizing short-term financial returns.520 This analysis has been applied to a range 
of countries and time frames with broadly similar conclusions.521 Of note is the research by 
Ian Dobbs in 2009, where Dobbs focused on the ‘value loss’ that can occur as a result of 
company managers focusing on short-termism decision criteria in determining whether to 
proceed with an investment.522 Dobbs concluded that there is a value loss, but that this value 
loss is relatively minimal. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Richard Davies of 
the Economist and Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England and others. In 2011 Davies et al 
provided an analytical framework and generated empirical estimates of the potential costs of 
SMST in 2011. The results are summarized in Figure 6 (Davies et al Results) below.   
 
Figure 6. Davies et al Results 
 
Table 5: Short-termism estimates for the US and UK. 
Year x Standard error Evidence of short-termism? 
Full sample (1985-2004) 0.937 0.004 Yes 
1985-1994 1.001 0.008 No 
1995-2004 0.938 0.005 Yes 
Notes. The signiﬁcance column refers to a test of whether x is signiﬁcantly different 
from 1 at the 5% conﬁdence level. 
 
(Source: Davies et al, 2014, p. 21, Table 5) 
 
To provide evidence that excessive discounting by investors is happening in the real 
world, Davies et al tested a data set of 624 listed companies that were listed on the UK FTSE 
and US S&P indices over the period 1980–2009, which listed companies spanned a broad 
range of industries.523 Consistent with previous research, Davies et al’s results showed that 
the discount rates used by investors, i.e. the hurdle rates on whether an investment is worth 
making, are typically set higher than the firm’s cost of capital, with such rates often being 5% 
or more above conventional estimates of the cost of capital. The results showed a statistically 
significant incidence of short-termism in the 1995-2004 time period. Consistent with Dobbs 
earlier research, Davies et al’s research indicates that there is evidence of short-termism 
                                                 
520  Miles, D, ‘Testing for short termism in the UK stock market’ (1993) 104:421 The Economic Journal 1379. 
521  Cuthbertson, K, Hayes, S, and Nitzsche, D, ‘The behaviour of UK stock prices and returns: is the market 
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during this 1995-2004 time period. Although the short-termism measured in Figure 6 (Davies 
et al Results) during the 1995-2004 time period appears to be minimal, the results could be 
significant given how such short-termism works in the discounting of future returns as 
discussed further in Subsection B(2)(a). Specifically, using their results, Davies et al provided 
a rough estimate that ‘the elimination of short-termism would then result in a level of output 
around 20% higher than would otherwise be the case’524.  
 
Davies et al’s research does have some additional notable limitations. Specifically, the 
data set used by Davies et al is limited to US and the UK firms, and does not include other 
jurisdictions, notably firms in the EU. Also, the time period surveyed by Davies et al is prior 
to the GFC, and to show evidence of an ongoing problem the results should be updated to 
include data post-GFC. Further, the reason that there was evidence of excessive discounting 
during the 1995-2004 period may be a correction by investors from losses suffered during the 
1985-1994 time period. However, subsequent research demonstrates that 1995-2004 was not 
merely a correction to the previous time period, and that excessive discounting has continued.  
 
Davies et al’s research was corroborated in a more recent 2016 study by Rachelle 
Sampson and Yuan Shin of the University of Maryland. Sampson and Shi’s study was 
designed to measure market discounting at the firm level in order to capture how much stock 
markets discount future dividends and values of US public firms, using a data set from 1980 
to 2013.525 Using a similar methodology as Davies et al, Sampson and Shi produced results 
broadly consistent with Davies et al, and also showed that the trend of increasing SMST has 
continued in the 10-year period beyond the most recent sample considered in Davies et al.526 
These results suggest that the 1995-2004 period was not a temporary market correction, but 
instead that SMST is a substantive ongoing concern. Sampson and Shi’s research adds to the 
intuitive argument, bolstered by survey evidence and understanding of investor biases 
discussed above in Subsections A(1) and (2), respectively, that investors excessively discount 
future returns. This Subsection A(3) demonstrates that there is some quantitative evidence of 
a SMST problem. The empirical results may only have provided minimal evidence of short-
termism; however, the impacts of short-termism may be much greater. Nonetheless, this has 
yet to be empirically tested. Further, empirical testing that extends Davies et al’s results is 
                                                 
524  Davies et al, p. 25. 
525  Sampson & Shi, 2016, and Sampson & Shi, 2018.  
526  Ibid, p. 16. 
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currently only limited to Sampson and Shi’s study. Consequently, this quantitative evidence 
can be used to support the survey results and analysis of bias but may not be compelling 
enough on a standalone basis to justify ‘hard’ law SMST-driven industry reforms.   
 
4. Using Proxies to Measure SMST 
 
The lack of conclusive quantitative evidence on the existence of a SMST problem 
should not lead to the conclusion that there is no issue. As asserted above, it is probable that 
this research is inconclusive because it is difficult to compare the performance of an equity 
market with short-termism to that of an equity market without short-termism. Recognizing 
this difficulty, a number of proxies have been used to test for short-termism. Types of proxies 
used to evidence short-termism include the number of patent applications for listed and non-
listed companies demonstrating that listed companies are less innovative, 527 and evidence of 
cuts to research and development after a listed company fails to meet the previous year’s 
earnings expectations.528 More significantly, research by Asker et al529 tested a panel of US 
companies and found that ﬁrms whose share price – and by implication, the firm’s investors – 
was very sensitive to earnings announcements tended to forgo valuable investment 
opportunities. They concluded that firms that were held privately invested signiﬁcantly more 
in investment opportunities than similar public ﬁrms and were more responsive to investment 
opportunities, and their tests of periods when ﬁrms moved from private to public ownership 
conﬁrmed these results. Addressing these results, Davies et al argued that ‘[t]he inference is 
that private ﬁrms do not face the same earnings-driven pressure to scrimp on investment as 
publicly quoted ﬁrms’530. Davies et al also conducted their own analysis and concluded that 
‘UK private ﬁrms tend to plough back between 4 and 8 times more of their proﬁts into their 
business over time than publicly held ﬁrms’531. Admittedly, these conclusions are only 
inferences with respect to short-termism, and privately companies may just be better 
managed, or require more capital for investment. Using a proxy to measure short-termism is 
an imprecise science and could be argued to be comparing apples to oranges. 
 
                                                 
527  Bernstein, S, ‘Does Going Public Affect Innovation?’ (2012) Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
Working Paper. 
528  Bushee, B J, ‘The inﬂuence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior’ (1998) 73:3 
The Accounting Review 305. 
529 Asker et al, 2011 and Asker et al 2015. 
530  Davies et al, 2014, p. 17. 
531  Ibid, p. 25. 
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Nonetheless, when these proxy tests are layered onto the considerable survey 
evidence of market participants, the analysis of wide-spread investor bias, and the 
quantitative evidence of at least a minimal amount of ongoing excessive discounting of long-
term returns, there is an indication of a short-termism bias in equity markets. Ultimately, 
however, policymakers and the financial industry will need to reach their own conclusions on 
whether the plausible proposition that there is a SMST problem provides a sufficient basis for 
reform. Alternatively, they may want to consider whether there are issues meriting a public 
policy intervention that are currently couched in SMST rhetoric, but, instead may be best 
examined independently of SMST concerns. However, for the purpose of the analysis in this 
thesis, I accept that there is a viable basis to the claims that there is a SMST problem. 
B. SHARE PRICING AND SMST 
Accepting that there is at least some suggestive evidence of a SMST problem, further 
analysis of the share pricing of listed companies is required. The share price of a listed 
company, being the current price at which a share is bought or sold based on supply and 
demand, is an important communication mechanism among stock market participants.532 
Share prices are generally seen to equate to an estimate of the risk adjusted present value of 
future financial returns of a listed company.533 The question may then genuinely be asked, ‘if 
share prices fairly reflect expected future returns of a listed company how can there be a 
short-termism problem?’ Let us take the 2017 Snapchat initial public offering (‘IPO’) as an 
example to illustrate this point. Snapchat’s shares sold at US$17.00 per share in its 
March 2017 IPO, giving the company a total valuation of US$23.8 billion.534  
 
Snapchat has not yet booked a profit535, so the market was basing this share price 
entirely off of the future cash generating potential of the company. Consequently, if the 
market expected Snapchat to return future cash distributions to investors equal to the risk-
adjusted present value of such returns – e.g. US$23.8 billion pro-rated per share –, how can 
the market be short-termist – i.e. overvaluing short-term returns and undervaluing future 
                                                 
532  Little, K, ‘How Stock prices are set’ (10 August 2016) Financial Times.  
533  Articulations of this concept abound, but it is perhaps best summarized by noted U.S. economist Malkiel, 
Burton, in Malkiel, 2016, pp. 31-33, where he sets out the logic of this ‘firm-foundation theory’.  
534  Farrell, M, Driebusch, C and Krouse, S, ‘Snapchat Shares Surge 44% in Market Debut’, Wall Street Journal 
(2 March 2017).  
535  Berger, R, ‘Snapchat IPO – Don’t Confuse Popular with Profitable’ (7 March 2017) Forbes <Online: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertberger/2017/03/07/snapchat-ipo-dont-confuse-popular-with-
profitable/>. 
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returns? Rather, from the high prices in the Snapchat example, the market appears capable, if 
in fact not overly exuberant, of pricing long term returns.536 Therefore, any claims that stock 
markets are short-termist as discussed in Section A above need to first address whether share 
prices are an accurate measure of the future cash generating potential of a listed company.  
 
1. Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis  
 
Whether share prices accurately reflect a listed company’s long-term cash generating 
potential is usually considered in the context of economic and financial theory, most notably 
by means of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.537 The faith placed in the ECMH has 
been questioned. Specifically, it has been argued that the ECMH is ‘a poor basis for either 
regulation or investment’538, and that such faith in the ECMH contributed to, or caused, the 
GFC539. There may be merit to this argument, and analysis of the ECMH has come a long 
way since Harvard economist Michael Jensen wrote in 1978 that ‘there is no other 
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis’540. In the decades since the 1970s, the ECHM has been 
vigorously tested and critiqued.541 Although the ECMH has been questioned post-GFC, 
securities regulation and market practice, particularly in the US, the UK and the EU, 
continues to be influenced by ECMH-related principles of disclosure.542 The pervasiveness of 
                                                 
536  See Roe, 2013 at p. 980 where Professor Roe observes that ‘there is much evidence that stock market 
sectors are often enough overvaluing the long term, most obviously in the intermittent bubbles in 
technology and other new industries’. 
537  There has been extensive consideration of the ECMH. See the discussion in  Armour & Cheffins, 2016’), 
pp. 765-770. However, the ECMH was first clearly articulated and popularized by Eugene Fama in 1965. 
See Fama, 1965 at p. 55, where Professor Fama notes that previous discussion of random walk theory was 
limited to technical academic journals, and his intention was to briefly and simply describe the theory and 
the issues it raises concerning the work of market analysts.  
538  Kay Review, p. 10. 
539  See the summary in Malkiel, 2016, p. 284.  
540  Jensen, M, ‘Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency’ 6:2-3 Journal of Financial Economics 
(1978), p. 95. 
541  For example, see Business Insider, ‘What Warren Buffet Thinks of the Efficient Market Hypothesis’ 
(1 December 2010) <Online: http://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-on-efficient-market-
hypothesis-2010-12> and Schwager, J, ‘Market Sense and Nonsense: How the Markets Really Work (and 
How They Don’t)’ (2012). 
542  See Prüm, André, ‘The European Union Crisis Responses and the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis’ 
(2013) 20:1 Columbia Journal of European Law 1 and Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 573 U.S. 
-, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014), in which the US Supreme Court held affirmed that markets are generally 
efficient. 
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the ECMH, and its inherent conclusion that information is reflected in share pricing, 
necessitates consideration of SMST in this context.543  
  
The ECMH asserts that stock markets are ‘informationally efficient’ as share prices 
respond to information relevant to the future returns of the listed company, and competitive 
forces in stock markets rapidly digest this information. Consequently, according to ECMH 
theorists there is no way to earn excess profits by using this information – i.e. you cannot 
consistently beat the market.544 Strong, semi-strong and weak forms of the ECMH have been 
identified, as set out in Figure 7 (ECMH Forms) below, and each of these forms of the 
ECMH addresses the type of information included in share prices.545  
 
Figure 7. ECMH Forms 
 
ECMH Form 
 
Information in Share Price 
Weak 
 
Only information on past prices 
Semi-Strong 
 
All publicly available information 
Strong 
 
All information (including insider) 
 
The weak form of the ECMH says that all information on past prices is included in 
current share prices, and thus you cannot predict future share prices by analyzing past prices, 
commonly known as technical analysis – i.e. future share prices are a ‘random walk’ 
unrelated to past trends.546 The semi-strong form of the ECMH asserts that share prices 
reflect all publicly available information, which includes information on past prices, and all 
current information disclosed to the market by listed companies.547 There is considerable 
support for the semi-strong form of the ECMH being a reasonably accurate description of 
market structure.548 The strong-form of the ECMH goes a step further and asserts that share 
prices reflect all knowable information, which includes private or insider information.549 This 
                                                 
543  Commenting on the high-quality body of research in this area, Professor Shiller also observes that ‘whether 
or not we ultimately agree with it, we must take the efficient markets theory seriously’, Shiller, 2015, p. 195 
and also see Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 419. 
544  Fama, 1965, p. 56. 
545  Empirical work testing each of these forms was summarized in Fama, 1970. 
546  See the discussion in Armour & Cheffins, 2016, p. 766, Malkiel, 2016 p. 183, and Welch, 2014, p. 306. 
547  Ibid. 
548  For example, see Malkiel, 2016 at p. 184, where he notes the support for index investing. 
549  See the discussion in Armour & Cheffins, 2016, p. 766, Malkiel, 2016 pp. 182-3 and Welch, 2014, p. 306. 
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strong version of the ECMH is questioned, however, on the basis that it shown to be possible 
to gain from using inside information.550 Assuming for the sake of argument that the ECMH 
in its semi-strong form is the most accurate existing description of market conditions, share 
prices would then generally reflect all publicly available information.  
2. SMST, Fundamental Efficiency and Asset Pricing 
If share prices are by and large informationally efficient, then how can there be a 
short-termism problem? It is important to note here that the ECMH refers to ‘informational’ 
not ‘fundamental’ efficiency. In other words, the ECMH does not necessarily mean that share 
prices are an accurate assessment of the cash generating potential of a listed company. 
Rather, the ECMH only asserts that share prices are informationally efficient, i.e. that they 
reflect all available information.551 The theory is, however, that if share prices reflect all 
available information, then a listed company’s share price will ‘plausibly be the best available 
estimate of the value of the business as it is being run’552 or at least ‘a good estimate of its 
intrinsic value’553. In addition to the availability of information though, an assessment of the 
risk adjusted future returns of a listed company both on a firm specific and a market-wide 
basis is also required to be made by an investor based on such available information in order 
for the share price to be a measure of fundamental or intrinsic value of a listed company.554 
Further, the ECMH is based on a number of assumptions which merit further analysis, 
including most significantly that all market participants are acting rationally.555 
 
a. Testing for Excessive Discounting  
 
An assessment of such fundamental value of a listed company requires risk to be 
accurately measured by investors. This risk discounting by investors is largely intuitive – i.e. 
the promise of a dollar next year is worth less than a dollar now – as reflected in the old 
adage, ‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’. However, economic theory provides a 
                                                 
550  See Malkiel, 2016, p. 183, where he notes that the strong form of the ECMH is an ‘obvious overstatement’ 
as ‘[i[t does not admit the possibility of gaining from inside information’ and Fama 1991, p. 1575, where he 
states that ‘the extreme version of the market efficiency hypothesis [being the strong form] is surely false’.  
551  Armour & Cheffins, 2016, p. 766. 
552  Ibid, p. 767. 
553  Fama, 1965, p. 56. 
554  This follows logically from the discussion above that share prices are an assessment of the risk adjusted 
future returns of a listed company.   
555  Fama 1965, p. 56 where Professor Fama refers to ‘large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers’. 
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range of analytical tools that are used by investors to calculate risk via an appropriate 
discount rate.556 The most well-known of these mechanisms is the capital-asset pricing model 
(‘CAPM’) developed by Stanford professor William Sharpe and late financial specialists 
John Lintner and Fischer Black.557 The basic premise of the CAPM is that when making an 
investment, investors need to be compensated for the time value of their money as well as the 
specific risk related to such investment.558 Despite the use of often complex mechanisms such 
as the CAPM, it is not clear what an appropriate rate of return should be when assessing 
future returns of listed companies, and it is notoriously difficult to test asset pricing 
models.559 It is here that attention has been focused by economic and financial experts 
considering whether there is a SMST problem – or more particularly, a bias in assessing risk 
adjusted returns causing company managers to maximize short-term financial results.  
 
As discussed in Subsection A(3) above, in 2011 Davies et al provided an analytical 
framework demonstrating how if an investor increases the discount rate of future returns even 
modestly, the net present value (‘NPV’) of the investment is significantly impacted. This 
economic formula is set out in Figure 8 (Potential Costs of SMST) below.  
 
Figure 8. Potential Costs of SMST 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
$10𝑥
1 − 𝑟
+
$10𝑥2
(1 − 𝑟)2 
+ ⋯ +
$10𝑥10
(1 − 𝑟)10
−  $60 
 
NPV = Net Present Value 
r = discount rate 
x = excessive discounting by investor 
 
Source: Davies at al, 2014, p. 18 (Formula (6)) 
 
In this formula, the authors use a hypothetical scenario of an investment of $60, which 
is riskless and has a dividend rate of $10 each 10-year period, and a terminal value of $0. 
With a discount rate of 9%, the investment’s cash flows are $65 today, providing an NPV of 
$5, meaning the investment is worth making. If future dividends are discounted too heavily (x 
= 0.95, i.e. a 5% discount) dividends are now worth $52 and the NPV is -$8 rather than $5. 
With a negative NPV, the project is not a worthwhile investment.560 The formula developed 
                                                 
556  See the discussion in Malkiel, 2016, pp. 209-228. 
557  Ibid, pp. 209, 213-219, and Welch, 2014, pp, 218-236.  
558  Investopedia <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp>. 
559  Welch, 2014, p. 332. 
560  Ibid. p. 18. 
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by Davies et al brings vigor to our intuitive understanding that investors in many 
circumstances prefer to be paid dividends and see increases in share prices today and adds to 
this understanding that even small changes to the discount rates will significantly impact an 
investor’s assessment on whether a particular investment is worthwhile. To provide evidence 
that this discounting by investors is happening in the real world, Davies et al tested a data set 
of 624 listed companies that were listed on the UK FTSE and US S&P indices over the 
period 1980–2009, which listed companies spanned a broad range of industries.561 
 
The financial model developed by Davies et al to demonstrate SMST is complex, but 
the basic premise is that they have measured each firm’s returns against the expected rate of 
return using a CAPM model and generated a myopia coefficient of x for each firm – and 
industry sector. The null hypothesis – no short-termism – implied that x = 1, and any numbers 
under 1 indicated myopia. Davies et al’s primary research results were replicated in Figure 6 
(Davies et al Results) above. Their results showed overall evidence of myopia, and that 
myopia was most evident in the later period of the time sampled, namely 1995-2004. 
Extrapolating from these results, Davies et al also showed that in the UK and US at least, 
cash flows five years ahead are discounted at rates more appropriate for eight or more years 
ahead, 10-year cash flows are valued as if 16 or more years ahead and cash flows more than 
30 years ahead are scarcely valued at all.562 Consequently, market discount rates – i.e. hurdle 
rates – are generally too high meaning payback periods are too short.  
 
As discussed in Section A(1)(3) Davies et al’s conclusions build on earlier research in 
this area and the results were corroborated in a 2016 study by Sampson and Shin. Admittedly, 
this quantitative evidence of excessive discounting is minimal, and only indicates a slight 
short-termism issue. However, when combined with the total body of evidence discussed in 
Section A of this Chapter, the research of Davies et al and Sampson and Shi add to the 
intuitive argument that investors excessively discount future returns. As will be explored 
further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms) company managers are aware of this 
excessive discounting of future returns and given that company managers seek to maximize 
the value of the listed company – i.e. keep share prices high – managers prioritize near-term 
cash flows such as dividends and positive short-term earnings over longer-term returns.563  
                                                 
561  Ibid, p. 19. 
562  Haldane & Davies, 2011, p. 1. 
563  Davies et al, p. 16. 
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b. SMST as Rational Constraint on Management  
 
The perceived excessive discounting by asset owners and asset managers above what 
would reasonably be expected for future returns may just be ‘a crude way of adjusting for 
excessive optimism concerning project managers’ cash ﬂow forecasts, for scarcity of 
managerial talent, or because of ﬁnancing/liquidity constraints, whether market or self-
imposed’564. This line of analysis that SMST is a reasonable means whereby investors accept 
some loss of value of their investment in exchange for constraining the behaviour of company 
managers emerged in the 1980s in the response to the alleged short-termism of hostile 
takeovers. As discussed in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), Martin Lipton argued that the 
short-termism inherent in hostile takeovers was harmful565, and US law professors, Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel countered that such hostile takeovers were a necessary 
discipline tool on the excesses of management.566 Similar claims have been made more 
recently that SMST is by and large an acceptable check on management action. Specifically, 
Professor Richard Thakor has developed a theory that the owners of the firm pursue short-
termism in project choice in order to limit managerial rent-seeking behaviour. 567 
 
It is certainly reasonable that discount rates will be high given the myriad of 
uncertainties associated with the future operations of companies, which in addition to macro-
economic factors such as political instability, reflect the increased agency costs inherent in 
the complex modern equity ownership chain.568 Consequently, calling for measurable short-
term returns is certainly an option to reduce these agency costs. Undoubtedly, a higher degree 
of risk for investment in listed companies verses non-listed companies will always be 
prevalent in stock market investing. The evidence is suggestive that there is some value loss 
                                                 
564  See the summary of research in Dodd, 2009, p. 118. 
565  Lipton, 1979, p. 104. 
566  Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981, p. 1184.  
567  See Thakor, Richard, ‘A Theory of Efficient Short-Termism’, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Regulation (17 September 2016). Also, Professors Barzuza and Talley observe this long-
standing tension between the rational short-termism of asset owners and the long-termism of company 
managers (Barzuza and Talley, 2016, p. 1).  
568  As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), ‘agency problems’ are said to arise because of conflicts of 
interest among corporate constituencies, whereby the financial interest of one party – the ‘principal’– is 
dependent on the actions taken by another party – the ‘agent’. The core difficulty in the agency relationship 
is that the principal has handed control over to an agent, who often has better information than the principal 
about the relevant facts. The agent has an incentive to act opportunistically or he or she could be lazy or 
incompetent, and the principal must engage in costly monitoring to reduce the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviour. As described in Anatomy, 2009, pp. 35-36. 
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occurring given the uncertainties around future returns. However, the question then should be 
on what can be done to reduce these apparently excessively high discount rates, which 
arguably go beyond merely accurately accounting for future risks, to make longer-term 
investments of listed companies more palatable to asset owners and asset managers. In other 
words, how can policy makers and the financial industry improve share pricing, so that it 
better reflects long-term value? Before looking further at reform proposals in the context of 
this analysis, it is necessary to first address some questions raised by those critical of the 
existence of a SMST problem – in particular, how stock markets can be short-termist when 
investors also appear to be very capable of assessing the future value of listed companies?  
C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SMST IN SHARE PRICING 
Several noteworthy arguments have been raised to counter the assertion that there is a 
SMST bias evident in share pricing. The most compelling of these arguments is that rather 
than being short-termist, stock markets often appear very adept at assessing long-term value. 
Additionally, there are long periods of market booms suggesting market valuation 
fundamentals are strong. Each of these arguments is considered in further detail below.   
 
1. Markets Appear to Overvalue the Long-Term 
 
If we accept that there is a short-termism problem causing investors to under value 
long-term cash generating potential and, consequently, over-value short-term financial 
returns, how do we explain scenarios like Snapchat – with their high IPO share prices on 
largely uncertain future returns? Professor Mark Roe, critical of whether there is a SMST 
problem, explains this issue by saying that stock markets are obviously short-termist, but they 
are also long-termist – i.e. they under shoot and over shoot.569 Others counter this position by 
arguing that such unfounded high prices are the result of company managers overselling the 
value of future projects, or unduly and excessively investing in current research and 
development in projects with uncertain long-term returns, in order to increase current share 
prices.570 Based on this line of reasoning, management of SnapChat would be acting 
myopically if they inflated the value of future growth potential or over-invested resources 
pre-IPO in Snapchat’s research and development to unduly maximize current share prices. 
                                                 
569   Roe, 2013, p. 980, and also see Favaro, Ken, ‘Long-Termism is Just as Bad as Short-Termism’, (25 
September 2014) Harvard Business Review.  
570  Dallas & Barry, 2015, p. 559, and Bebchuk, & Stole, 1993, p. 720. 
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The merit to this argument in questionable. If overinvesting in R&D positively impacted 
share prices, more company managers would take advantages of this result. An alternative, 
and perhaps strong retort, is the impact of the ‘founder effect’, namely the presence of a 
founder as a significant shareholder or CEO, on the excessive discounting bias of investors.  
 
a. The ‘Founder Effect’  
 
It is possible that the stock of certain types of listed technology companies, such as 
Snapchat, are less susceptible to excessive discounting of future value due to their investor 
structure, which typically, but not always, includes a controlling founder shareholder571, or 
the market reputation of their founding management, such as Facebook. This ‘founder effect’ 
may mean that investors apply less of a discount when assessing future value, if the founder 
has a significant stake in the company, and/or continues in a CEO role. The discount rate 
could be reduced because the investors genuinely have faith in the founders’ vision or ability 
to deliver future results. Alternately, or perhaps in combination with such faith, the reduced 
discount rate may reflect that the founders with their large shareholdings or their CEO 
position have a much greater vested interest in the success of the listed company than would 
be the case otherwise. These founders could act to reduce the agency concerns associated 
with an investment in such listed company, thereby reducing the discounting of future 
returns. The existence of founders, and perhaps the resulting cult built around the 
management of certain listed companies such as Facebook, could go some way to 
ameliorating the effects of SMST in certain circumstances. The impacts of such control are 
considered further in Subsection A(1)(c) of Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the 
SMST Reforms). Also, connected to this ‘founder effect’ is the concept of ‘unicorns’. 
 
b. ‘Unicorns’ 
 
The idea of ‘unicorns’ was first articulated by Aileen Lee, founder of Cowboy 
Ventures. Lee analyzed US-based software companies backed by private or public market 
                                                 
571  For example, Evan Spiegal and Bobby Murphy, the co-founders of Snapchat, have retained a total of 43.6% 
of the voting shares post-IPO <Online: http://mashable.com/2017/03/02/snap-ipo-evan-
spiegel/#QSN7boWwh5qo>.  
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investors started since 2003.572 She determined that only 0.07% of start-ups ever reached a 
valuation of US$1 billion or greater – thus deeming them as rare as the mythical creatures, 
unicorns.573 Rather than being rare mythical creatures, such market ‘unicorns’ are now 
prevalent in many markets and include big names such as AirBnB and SpaceX. CB Insights 
has formed a Global Unicorn Club and identified 235 ‘unicorn’ companies that have made a 
venture capital backed exit since 2009 for a total valuation of US$812 billion.574 These 
‘unicorns’ tend to have high IPO prices when they are listed – perhaps based on investor fears 
of missing out on the next Facebook, together with the ‘founder effect’ discussed above. 
Supporting this analysis, Bill Gurley of Benchmark Capital observes that ‘late-stage 
investors, desperately afraid of missing out on acquiring shareholding positions in possible 
‘unicorn’ companies, have essentially abandoned their traditional risk analysis’575. This 
investor approach to ‘unicorns’ could help explain why even though SMST appears to be 
occurring, there are pockets of high valued share prices in certain sectors.  
 
c. Castles-in-the-Air 
 
Yet another hypothesis for high shares prices over uncertain future revenue streams 
could be that this over-valuing of future returns is a result of ‘castle-in-the-air’ investing. The 
‘castle-in-the-air’ theory, best articulated by noted economist John Maynard Keynes, holds 
that ‘professional investors prefer to devote their energies not to estimating intrinsic values, 
but rather to analyzing how the crowd of investors is likely to behave in the future and how 
during periods of optimism then tend to build their hopes into castles in the air’576. Rather 
than a realistic assessment of future value, the high IPO share prices of Snapchat, and other 
companies like it, may be the result of just such crowd optimism, which prices are driven 
higher as investors try to time the market and take advantage of the optimism of others. 
Perhaps accepting that a certain degree of crowd optimism in new offerings is to be expected 
and cannot be effectively tempered, the reforms efforts assessed in Chapter 4 (What Has 
                                                 
572  Lee, Aileen, ‘Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion Dollar Start-ups’ TechCrunch (2 
November 2013) <Online: https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-
club/?guccounter=1>. 
573  Ibid.  
574  The Global Unicorn Club, CB Insights, <Online: https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-
companies>.  
575  Gurley, Bill, ‘Investors Beware: Today’s $100M+ Late-stage Private Rounds Are Very Different From an 
IPO’ Above the Crowd (25 February 2015) <Online: http://abovethecrowd.com/2015/02/25/investors-
beware/>.   
576  Malkiel, 2016, p. 33. 
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Been Done?) and Chapter 8 (Conceptual Effectiveness of the SMST Reforms) primarily 
focus on SMST reform in the context of the ongoing operations of listed companies.  
 
2. SMST in a Market Boom 
 
A corollary question in this line of argument is how there can be short-termism, when 
the market as a whole is in a steady period of increasing prices – i.e. a market boom. Nobel-
prizing winning economist, Robert J. Shiller, considers investor behaviour against the 
backdrop of market-wide booms and busts in the US in his book ‘Irrational Exuberance’577. 
He observes that high stock market share price levels in boom periods do not ‘represent the 
consensus judgment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-term evidence’578. 
Rather, Shiller argues ‘the market was high [at the peaks in 2000, 2007 and 2014] because of 
the combined effect of indifferent thinking by millions of people, very few of whom have felt 
the need to perform careful research on long-term investment value, and who are motivated 
substantially by their own emotions, random attentions, and perceptions of conventional 
wisdom’579. Shiller attributes boom periods to indifference as well as investors’ personal 
motivations. It is outside the scope of this thesis to wade too much further into the debate on 
the causes of such stock market booms. However, based on the analysis in this Chapter of the 
excessive – albeit perhaps partially reasonable – discounting of future returns by investors in 
widely held listed companies, I assert that it is not just indifferent thinking by such investors 
that drives up share prices during boom periods. Rather it may also be active management on 
the part of listed companies to keep share prices high in response to the market’s preference 
for short-term returns that also impacts such stock market movements, which upswings are 
not based on fundamental value and eventually see a correction. How company managers 
respond to the short-term preferences of asset managers and asset owners and why company 
managers do so is explored further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms). 
 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to consider whether there is a SMST problem, 
and as a corollary to this analysis, whether share pricing is an accurate representation of the 
long-term value of listed companies. The research examined provides suggestive evidence of 
a SMST problem, and also a sufficient basis to question the merit of share prices as an 
                                                 
577  Shiller, 2015. 
578  Ibid, p. 225. 
579  Ibid. 
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indicator of long-term value of listed companies. Specifically, the evidence presented in this 
Chapter suggests that at least in the US and the UK there appears to be an actual or perceived 
excessive discounting of long-term returns by investors, and a corresponding undue focus on 
the short-term financial returns of listed companies by company managers. The conclusions 
reached in this Chapter suggest that SMST-driven reform efforts should focus on efforts to 
reduce this discounting so that share pricing better reflect long-term value or to completely 
cut off the SMST transmission mechanisms. However, before reviewing the SMST-driven 
reforms set out in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) on this basis, it is first necessary to look 
further at the transmission mechanisms which supposedly transfer this SMST from investors 
into listed companies, and also to assess whether such SMST is actually harmful. 
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CHAPTER 6 – SMST TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
 
‘The concept then is that stock market short-termism is transmitted inside the corporation, 
causing boards and senior management to forgo long-term value maximization for short-term 
results, often managing and sometimes manipulating earnings, all toward the end of pleasing 
the stock market.’580 
 
The previous Chapter concluded that there are legitimate questions around whether 
share prices accurately reflect the future value of listed companies given that asset owners 
and asset managers appear to excessively discount long-term returns. This apparent excessive 
discounting of long-term returns by asset owners and asset managers allegedly causes 
company managers to prioritize short-term financial returns and to take actions that improve 
share prices in the short-term. Before turning to an examination of whether this SMST is 
actually harmful, and if the SMST-driven reforms identified in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?) at least conceptually address SMST, it is first necessary to understand how such 
SMST is conveyed by the market into the board rooms of listed companies. Specifically, why 
do company managers care about share prices and keeping the market happy? 
 
As observed by Professor Roe, for SMST to be a real problem, a transmission 
mechanism from the stock market to the board room is required.581 Generally, the argument 
goes that the short-term interests of asset owners and asset managers are transmitted into 
listed companies primarily through concerns about negative impacts on share prices – which 
may result in shareholder activism and impact executive compensation – thus causing 
company managers to forgo longer-term value maximization in favour of shorter-term 
financial returns, which are more favourably received by asset owners and asset managers.582 
In order to develop effective regulatory and financial industry reform, however, the 
transmission mechanisms of SMST and the connection to share prices requires further 
unpacking. Analysis of such transmission is also required in the context of each element of 
the equity ownership chain: namely, asset owners, company managers, and intermediaries.  
 
Consequently, this Chapter identifies the types of asset owner and asset manager 
activity that appear to generate the greatest SMST concern, and then examines further how 
exactly such SMST is transmitted through the equity ownership chain to company managers. 
                                                 
580  Roe, 2013, p. 985. 
581  Ibid. 
582  For example, see Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, Moore & Petrin, 2017 and Dallas, 2014, where the authors 
consider investor short-termism and how this results in managerial short-termism. 
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Central to this analysis is a review of the growth of the shareholder value maximization 
(‘SVM’) concept, and the legal and corporate governance mechanisms that have developed 
alongside SVM, primarily in the UK and the US, over the last five decades. These legal and 
corporate governance mechanisms specifically include share-based executive compensation 
arrangements and shareholder capacity to make changes to the board of directors, and 
consequently, company management. Such mechanisms appear to have enhanced shareholder 
rights, and further aligned company manager and shareholder interests, which in turn may 
have furthered the transmission of the alleged SMST problem into listed companies.      
A. INVESTOR SHORT-TERMISM - ASSET OWNERS 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There a SMST Problem?) asset owners appear to exert 
pressure on intermediaries and company managers for short-term financial returns. But which 
asset owners apply this pressure? Claims have been made that not all asset owners are 
responsible for the pressure exerted on listed companies, rather it is hedge funds, i.e. activist 
investors583, or other asset owners who hold equity securities for very short-time periods who 
are accountable – i.e. there are short-termist and long-termist shareholders.584 The short-
termist asset owners – i.e. traders or speculative investors – have been seen as problematic, 
and calls have been made to rally against them to ‘fight the tyranny of the short-term’585. This 
trading argument – which, as demonstrated below, is questionable as a SMST cause as it 
lacks a transmission mechanism into the listed company  ̶  is premised on the idea that 
‘because securities traders hold their stock for such a short duration, they look for strong 
corporate results during the period they hold the corporation’s stock, so they can sell 
profitably’586. The trading argument has been expanded on to separate speculative trading 
from earnings-based investment.587 The alleged SMST problem in the context of both of 
these types of trading is considered below. However, as set out below, I argue that it is 
excessive discounting of long-term returns by a wide-range of investors rather than the 
timeframes of investors that is more plausibly transmitting SMST into listed companies.   
                                                 
583  For example, The Conference Board, 2015 at p. 1 lists activist hedge funds as a primary driver for short-
term behaviour noting that increasing payouts to shareholders is one of their most frequent demands.  
584  See Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2015, p. 422 and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 124 where the authors describe 
speculative trading.  
585  Barton, 2011, p. 86 and Dallas, 2012, p. 296. 
586  Roe, 2013, p. 985. 
587  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 423, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, pp. 124-128. 
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1. Speculative Trading and HFT 
Speculative trading – including HFT, which as discussed earlier involves using 
sophisticated technological tools and computer algorithms to rapidly trade securities – is 
argued to be based primarily on market opinion, rather than company-specific information, 
and it is viewed as the most extreme form of short-term investing.588 This type of trading may 
not be a significant cause of SMST, however, as it lacks a clear transmission mechanism into 
the firm.589 Quite logically, shareholders who hold their shares for a split second will have 
little impact on the behaviour of corporate managers. As observed by Professor Roe, ‘even if 
the short-term traders furiously moved a company’s stock every nanosecond, mangers would 
still be free to decide on corporate investments and time horizons, as the furious traders might 
simply pay no attention to the firm’s horizons and would be incapable of intervening in 
corporate governance decision making’590. Further, with respect to quantitative investors 
including HFT and other program traders, Charles Nathan of the US financial consulting 
firm, Finsbury, observes that ‘it is hard to see how such avowedly short-term traders have a 
meaningful effect on corporate behaviour and strategy’591. Consequently, for the purposes of 
this thesis, speculative trading is largely disregarded as a separate category of SMST-driven 
concern. The focus instead is on earnings-based investors, on the basis that a large part of 
speculative trading rides on the back of the actions of earnings-based investment. The 
following Subsection A(2), accordingly, considers how such earning-based investors may 
transmit the SMST problem into listed companies. 
 
2. Earnings-Based Investors 
 
Another approach used to consider how SMST is transmitted into the firm, is to look 
at the pressures exerted primarily indirectly by earnings-based investors via such investors 
reactions to information relevant to the listed company’s performance.592 Earnings-based 
investors are not clearly defined but may include a range of asset owners and asset managers, 
including professional fund managers, institutional investors and activist hedge funds. In this 
approach, the time frame of the investor is less of an issue than the significant weight placed 
                                                 
588  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 424, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 124. 
589  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 425, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 125. 
590  Roe, 2013, p. 985. 
591  Nathan, 2015. 
592  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 426, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 126. 
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by such investors on a listed company’s actual or anticipated periodic corporate earnings 
when deciding to buy, sell or hold shares.  
 
Expectations of earnings-based investors for steadily increasing earnings growth, 
often calculated on an earnings per share (‘EPS’) basis, are enforceable on company 
managers via an investor’s actual or threatened exit from the market if earnings – and thus 
share prices – decline.593 Also, actual or anticipated low earnings numbers, which would be 
reflected in share prices, could bring with it the threat of an activist campaign, either by 
hedge funds or in the form of defensive activism by existing investors. Earnings guidance 
provided by listed companies projecting what the EPS will be in the next reporting period 
may amplify this issue. However, earning guidance is mainly a US concept and is, for 
example, not as prevalent in the UK594, which has also identified a SMST issue in its markets. 
This analysis on earnings-based investment suggests it is not holding periods, but rather the 
emphasis on share price by a wide range of investors that transmits SMST into the firm. 
 
3. The Relevance of Investor Timeframes 
 
Simultaneously to the criticism of short-term investors, long-term asset owners – i.e. 
patient capital – have been elevated to the moral high ground.595 The argument has been 
made that institutional asset owners that hold their shares briefly monitor the actions of listed 
companies less than asset owners that hold shares for longer periods.596 However, ‘[t]he 
duration of any investor’s holding period in a company’s stock’, it is argued, ‘is simply not 
relevant to issues involving corporate value creation’597. Further, short-term traders are a ‘big 
red herring’ in the debate on how SMST is transmitted into listed companies.598 There is 
definite merit to this argument, particularly with regard to speculative traders, whose actions, 
as discussed above, lack a clear transmission mechanism into the firm. Also, the assumption 
that long-term asset owners are more interested in long-term value than short-term 
                                                 
593  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 427, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 127. 
594  Roach, Garnet, ‘Less than 10 percent of FTSE 100 forms provide quantitative EPS guidance’, (21 February 
2013) IR Magazine <Online: https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/earnings-calls-financial-
reporting/19328/ftse-100-shuns-us-style-earnings-guidance/>.  
595  See the summary in Garratt & Hamilton, 2016, p. 791, which sets out the many virtues of patient capital – 
i.e. long-term investors.  
596  See Dent, p. 132 referring to Chen, Xia et al, ‘Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter’ (2007) 86 Journal of 
Financial Economics, p. 283 and Gaspar, Jose Miguel et al, ‘Shareholder Investment Horizons and the 
Market for Corporate Control’ (2005) 76 Journal of Financial Economics 135, p. 137. 
597  Nathan, 2015.  
598  Martin, 2015. 
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shareholders might be problematic as evidence suggests long-term asset owners may 
knowingly pursue short-term returns at the expense of sustainable longer-term value.599 Also, 
there are a myriad of reasons why long-term investors may be reluctant to intervene in long-
term value generation.600 The short investment holding periods of offensive activist 
investors601 such as hedge funds are also often cited as a source of SMST602, but this too has 
been questioned.603 It follows, therefore, that investor timeframes alone do not provide a clear 
transmission mechanism of the perceived SMST problem into the listed company.  
 
How can we reconcile this conclusion that investor timeframes alone do not transmit 
SMST into listed companies with research showing that such investment timeframes 
investment does in fact matter? For example, a recent study by finance academics, Martijn 
Cremers, Ankur Pareek and Zacharias Sautner, built on earlier research in this area.604 This 
study used a wide-ranging data set of US common stocks from 1985 to 2011 with prices 
above US$1.00. Cremers et al concluded that an inflow of short-term investors  ̶  which in the 
study were limited to US institutional investors with more than US$100 million under 
management and thus required to report to the SEC on Form 13F  ̶  appeared to exert pressure 
on management to cut R&D investment in order to report higher earnings and generate 
positive earnings surprises, and also caused temporary boosts in firm valuations  ̶   i.e. higher 
stock prices.605 Evidencing that short-term institutional investors caused such boost, the study 
                                                 
599  See discussion in Fried, 2015, pp. 1554-1628, and Dent, 2010. 
600  See Pozen, 2015, where the author lists reasons why institutional investors do not engage, including that 
they often prefer to hold index funds, participation in proxy contests has high costs which are often not 
justified on a cost-benefit analysis, and there are concerns about free-riding from other investors.  
601  ‘Offensive’ activism generally refers to the actions of investors that actively seek out opportunities to invest 
and pursue strategies aimed at unlocking the value of perceived underperforming listed companies. In 
contrast, ‘defensive’ activism refers to the activities taken by existing shareholders to pressure management 
to address the perceived under performance of a listed company.   
602  For example, see Strine, 2015, pp 8–11, where Chief Justice Strine states that ‘[m]any activist investors 
hold their stock for a very short period of time . . . . What is even more disturbing than hedge fund turnover 
is the gerbil-like trading activity of the mutual fund industry....’. 
603  Ibid, Squire, Ken, ‘Are Activists Short-Term Investors: No More than Mutual Funds’ FA Magazine (28 
May 2014) <Online: http://www.fa-mag.com/news/are-activists-short-term-investors---no-more-so-than-
mutual-funds-18123.htmland> and Sorkin, Andrew Ross, ‘Activists may be less myopic that their 
reputation suggests’ New York Times (4 November 2015), in which the author refers to a studies showing 
the average hedge fund holds shares for more than three years, which is about the same as average mutual 
fund holdings.   
604  For example, a study by Matsumoto, D A ‘Management’s Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises’ 
(2002) 77 Acct Rev. 483  which concluded that firms with a large number of transient investors are more 
likely to manage earnings in order to meet analyst and investor expectations, and, a study by Francois 
Brochet, Maria Luomioti and George Serafeim (discussed in Brochet et al, 2012) that analyzed transcripts 
of earnings calls and found that firms that focus on the short term tend to have a more short-term oriented 
investor base and that these investors tended to reinforce a short-term focus within the firm. 
605  Cremers et al, 2016, p. 27.  
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indicated that the reductions in R&D were reversed when the inflow of short‐term investors 
also reversed, thereby confirming that the cuts were only transitory.606 However, their 
analysis may not generally be applicable as it was derived from firms on the Russell 2000 
Index, which is an index of domestically-focused US listed ‘small cap’ companies.607 Further, 
whether reducing R&D is problematic or a decent measure of SMST is considered further in 
Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?). However, though there may be valid questions 
on the connection between SMST and R&D generally, Cremers et al research on the impact 
of short-term investment suggests that shareholding duration is of some consequence.  
 
It is certainly logical that earnings-based investors with short-term investment time 
frames may exert more pressure on companies for short-term results measured by EPS, than 
longer-term shareholders. However, I argue that the bigger concern is not the trading 
argument, but rather how company managers are taking problematic short-term actions to 
boost earnings in response to a general perceived or actual excessive discounting of long-
term projects by a wide range of shareholders, perhaps amplified or initiated by short-term 
institutional investors, or the actions of activist hedge funds. The key point is that longer-term 
shareholding does not necessary remove the SMST issue. Logically then, the focus of SMST-
driven reform, therefore, should be less on investment durations, and more on addressing the 
underlying cause of such excessive discounting, or cutting off the transmission of SMST.  
 
As suggested above, the discussion around the perceived short-termism of activist 
investors, such as hedge funds, may be another ‘red herring’. Activist hedge funds could just 
be the loudest voice in a much wider problem of excessive discounting by investors. Hedge 
funds arguably bear the brunt of the negative attention given the very public – and often 
adversarial – nature of their campaigns. It is argued that activist hedge funds may perhaps 
instead be the natural champions of dispersed shareholders, who are not economically 
capable of collective action in their own interest – i.e. they may bridge the separation of 
ownership and control.608 Evidence of the long-term impact of offensive hedge fund activism 
is mixed. Using a data set of 2,000 activist interventions in the US from 1994 to 2007, 
Professors Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang claimed to have empirically shown that intervention by 
                                                 
606  Ibid, p. 28.  
607  ‘What is the Russell 2000 Index’ <Online: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/russell2000.asp>.  
608  As summarized in Coffee & Palia, 2015, p. 2, Note 2 where the authors refer to Gilson, Ronald J and 
Gordon, Jeffrey N, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights’, (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 863 and Bebchuk, 2015.  
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activist hedge funds does not have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of 
companies and their shareholders.609 To do so, Bebchuk et al looked at the three years’ prior 
and the three years’ post-intervention, and they concluded that such interventions showed an 
increase rather than decrease in longer-term company performance.610  
 
This study, and the earlier research upon which it is based, is the subject of 
considerable ongoing debate.611 Most notably, Columbia Law Professor John Coffee, Jr. 
together with Professor Darius Palia from Rutgers Business School rejected the empirical 
evidence that Bebchuk et al used to prove that activist attacks are beneficial on a number of 
grounds including that the time period is not reflective of the current wave of activism, and 
that more recent studies provide different results.612 It may also be asked whether Bebchuk 
and et al’s three-year time period is sufficient to test the long-term implications of activism. 
Regardless, activist hedge funds hold too few shares to act on their own to effect change613 – 
even if as suggested by Coffee and Palia they may now act in ‘wolf packs’614. Therefore, the 
bigger factor in the SMST discussion is not the measurable impact of activist interventions. 
Rather, the issue requiring further consideration is how the threat of hedge fund activism acts 
as a transmission mechanism contributing to the short-term actions taken by company 
managers, which is discussed the following Section B.  
B. MANAGERIAL MYOPIA – SHORT-TERMISM OF COMPANY MANAGERS 
Myopic behaviour by company managers is seen as the flip side of the investor short-
termism discussed above, as this managerial myopia ‘represents the internal response at the 
business enterprise level to the external financial-performance demands of the stock 
                                                 
609  Bebchuk, 2015. 
610  Ibid, p. 1154.  
611  See the summary in Lipton, Martin, ‘The Treat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge 
Funds’ Harvard Law Forum (14 January 2015). 
612  Coffee & Palia, 2015, pp 8-10 for a discussion of the limitations of previous research discounting the 
negative effects of hedge fund activism, and p, 6, Note 12 referring to the recent studies by Becht, Marco, 
Franks, Julian, Grant, Jeremy and Wagner, Hammes F, ‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study’ (Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 10507) (15 March, 2015) 
<Online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271>, and Allaire, Yvon and Dauphin, Francois, ‘Hedge Fund 
Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical Evidence’ Institute for Governance of Public and 
Private Corporations, (1 April, 2015).  
613  As noted in Pozen, 2015, ‘an activist with 1% or 2% of a company’s stock has no power to get its reform 
program adopted unless it can win the support of the institutional investors that own a majority of the 
company’s stock’.  
614  Coffee & Palia, 2015, p. 7, which refers to this recent development of US hedge funds to work in a group in 
compliance with US securities law to gather small holdings before the ‘wolf pack leader’ files its Schedule 
13D.  
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market’615. Essentially, SMST at the listed company level involves company managers, 
‘giving the market what it wants to hear’.616 The precise connection between investor short-
termism and managerial behaviour is, however, difficult to establish.617 Nonetheless, as 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), I conclude that this 
connection appears to be largely based on the share prices of listed companies, and the impact 
that excessive discounting of long-term returns has on such share prices. The main reasons 
why company managers care about share prices and how company managers respond to 
market preferences for high share prices are summarized in Figure 9 (Transmission of SMST 
into Listed Companies) below and are discussed in more detail in the following Subsections.  
 
Figure 9. Transmission of SMST into Listed Companies 
 
1. Why do Company Managers Care about Share Prices? 
 
SVM as a concept is the widespread academic and business view that the primary 
objective of a listed company  ̶  at least in US, UK and Anglo-American influenced corporate 
models   ̶ is to maximize value for its asset owners.618 As SVM and its interaction with SMST 
have been the subject of considerable discussion619, the starting point for the analysis in this 
Subsection is a consideration of SVM and how the pursuit of value for investors by company 
managers, including in the form of high share prices, may contribute to SMST. Adherence to 
alternative corporate purpose theories, such as stakeholder theory or the ‘enlightened’ SVM, 
have been proposed as a way of addressing the alleged SMST problem. The arguments 
discussed below that SVM is – or at least should be  ̶  about more than just short-term 
financial returns for investors are compelling. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Is 
                                                 
615  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 427, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p.128. 
616  Ibid.  
617  See Rieg, 2015, p. 197, where the author reviews the literature in this area and concludes that ‘the 
interaction of investor myopia and managerial myopia is not straightforward’. 
618  SVM was first comprehensively articulated and popularized by Alfred Rappaport in Rappaport, 1986 and 
refined by Professor Rappaport in Rappaport, 1998, where Professor Rappaport observed that SVM has 
gained widespread acceptance in the US and increasing significance in the UK, Europe, Australia and 
Japan, and is on its way to becoming the global standard for business performance (p. 1).  
619  See the summary of this discussion in Denning, 2017 and the literature review on SVM and SMST provided 
by Rieg, 2015, pp. 195-198.  
 139 
 
There A SMST Problem?), SMST is most probably getting inside listed companies through a 
focus on share prices which excessively discount future returns. Specifically, of interest is 
how SMST is transmitted into listed companies through corporate governance and legal 
mechanisms, i.e. executive compensation arrangements and the ability of asset owners to 
make change to the board. Better understanding these transmission mechanisms should assist 
policymakers and financial industry to develop conceptually effective SMST reform.  
  
a. SVM and the Importance of Share Prices 
 
 In listed companies, SVM has been interpreted in practice to mean keeping share 
prices high and returning profits to asset owners through dividends and buybacks.620 
Although the purpose of corporate entities has been discussed for centuries621, the genesis of 
the modern SVM movement may be attributed to Milton Friedman, former leader of the 
Chicago school of economics, and the winner of Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976.622 Mr. 
Friedman wrote an article for the New York Times in 1970 in which he said that the only 
social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits, and a manager’s primary 
responsibility is to the owners of the firm.623 SVM theory gained traction in the following 
decades primarily in US business and economics schools and with senior executives of US 
listed corporations, consequently becoming the highly influential doctrine that it is today.624  
 
According to the SVM concept, a company builds value through aligning the interests 
of asset owners and company managers, primarily through equity-based compensation 
arrangements for company managers.625 Asset owners may also encourage SVM by 
supporting governance structures that monitor the activities of management, such as 
independence requirements on the boards of listed companies.626 These measures attempt to 
                                                 
620  Rappaport, 2011, where Professor Rappaport discussed how US companies in particular have attempted to 
maximize shareholder value by various means which keep share prices and payments to shareholders high. 
621  See Jensen, 2010, p. 32 where Professor Jensen asserts that the modern value maximization proposition has 
its roots in 200 years of research in economics and finance.  
622  Denning, Steven, ‘The Origin of the ‘World’s Dumbest Idea’: Milton Friedman’ Forbes (26 June 2013) 
<Online: https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-origin-of-the-worlds-dumbest-idea-
milton-friedman/#6d58c973870e>. 
623  Friedman, Milton, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ New York Times (13 
September 1970) <Online: https://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-
business.html>.  
624  The Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance for the 21st Century, Statement on Management, <Online: 
https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com/management-and-msv/>. 
625  See Rieg, 2015 at p. 195 and Rappaport, 1986. 
626  Shapiro, Susan P, ‘Agency Theory’ (2005) 31 Annual Review of Sociology 275. 
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reduce managerial agency costs  ̶ specifically the costs associated with the separation of 
management and control  ̶  which if not addressed may result in corporate managers enriching 
themselves or pursuing other motivations at the expense of building shareholder value.627 
This alignment of interests of asset owners and company managers in order to maximize asset 
owner value is also at the heart of the ‘value based management’ (‘VBM’) method, a popular 
method of corporate management compelling listed companies to focus on value 
maximization at all levels of corporate decision-making.628 
 
There has been much discussion, particularly after the GFC, on whether SVM should 
continue to be the primary objective in the Anglo/American corporate model, and, as a 
corollary consideration, if adherence to SVM by managers causes or amplifies the perceived 
SMST problem.629 The provocative question asked is ‘should organizations operate as 
money-making machines solely for the benefit of managers and shareholders or as 
instruments that add value to society?’630. An argument has also been made that short-
termism and a short-term orientation seem to be outcomes caused by SVM when placed in a 
real-world context  ̶  e.g. where a firm has unrealistic expectations, there is uncertainty of 
future capabilities  ̶  with competitive rivalry and market disruptions.631  
 
Professor Rappaport, who is also credited with popularizing the SVM concept632, 
defends the SVM theory by arguing that there is no inherent flaw with SVM as a corporate 
objective.633 In the SVM model, he says, ‘[m]anagement’s responsibility is to pursue the 
maximization of long-term cash flows, regardless of the holding periods of shareholders’634. 
This focus on long-term cash flows, he argues, builds company value and is the best 
framework for balancing the interests of all of the company’s stakeholders. It is the market’s 
current obsession with short-term earnings, rather than managing for long-term cash flows 
that Professor Rappaport says is the real issue. ‘The shareholder value principle has not failed 
                                                 
627  See Rieg, 2015, p. 195.  
628  See the description provided in Koller, 1994.   
629  Reland, Jacques, ‘The Dangers of the Cult of Shareholder Value in Reforming the City: responses to the 
global financial crisis’ (2009) London Forum Press <Online: http 
http://www.academia.edu/923008/The_Dangers_of_the_Cult_of_Shareholder_Value >; Denning, 2014.  
630  Denning, 2014. 
631  Rieg, 2015, pp. 216-127. 
632  Ibid, p. 195. 
633  Rappaport, 2011, pp. 49-54.  
634  Ibid, p. 54. 
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management’, instead he says that ‘management has betrayed the principle’635. Far from 
being the ‘dumbest idea’636, Professor Rappaport’s argument suggests that when correctly 
applied, the SVM model is a key driver of long-term corporate value rather than a basis for 
SMST concerns. This may be so, but it raises the important question of why company 
managers care at all about SVM, and these links are explored further below.  
 
SVM is not the only approach to corporate purpose. Stakeholder theory has emerged 
as the main contender to the SVM concept. Stakeholder theory is essentially a theory of 
management and ethics that holds that society is best served if companies are run for the 
benefit of all stakeholders  ̶  e.g. employees, customers, creditors, communities, etc. ̶  rather 
than just asset owners.637 Instead of focusing on returns to shareholders, the argument goes 
that SMST could be addressed by listed companies if they instead prioritized the interests of a 
broader group of constituents. Stakeholder theory has been criticized, however, on the basis 
that it creates considerable uncertainty in the management of the firm, and, therefore, 
adherence to a stakeholder approach does provide a socially efficient outcome.638  
 
In an attempt to address these criticisms and marry SVM with stakeholder theory, the 
theory of ‘enlightened shareholder value maximization’639 has been put forward as a means 
of ameliorating the perceived SMST problem. For example, in his critique of the short-term 
focus of modern listed companies, Barton argued that it is essential for a listed company to 
serve the interests of all stakeholders to achieve value for shareholders. Barton asserts that 
companies should build corporate value by focusing on their main constituencies. 
Particularly, Barton stated that choosing between shareholders and stakeholders is a false 
choice640, and expanded on this point saying that ‘executives must infuse their organizations 
with the perspective that serving the interests of all major stakeholders – employees, 
                                                 
635  Ibid. 
636  A criticism levied against SVM by Jack Welch, former-Chairman and CEO of General Electric  ̶  see 
Guerrara, Francesco, ‘Welch Condemns Share Price Focus’ Financial Times (12 March 2009). 
637  Phillips, Robert A and Freeman, R Edward, and Wicks, Andrew, ‘What Stakeholder Theory is Not’ (2003) 
13:4 Business Ethics Quarterly 479, where the authors outline what stakeholder theory encompasses, and 
elaborates on a number of common misconceptions of the theory.    
638  For example, see Jensen, 2010, where he argues that stakeholder theory is not a complete theory for the 
objective of a firm as it does not provide a clear purpose thereby requiring the firm to serve many masters, 
and when there are many masters all end up being short-changed (pp. 32-33). 
639  Professor Jensen proposed enlightened shareholder value as the objective of a firm, which he says ‘uses 
much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as 
the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders’ (Jenson, 2010, p. 33). 
640  Barton, 2011, p. 88. 
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suppliers, customers, creditors, communities, the environment – is not at odds with the goal 
of maximizing corporate value; on the contrary, it’s essential to achieving that goal’641. There 
does appear to be significant convergence around the concept that company managers should 
consider more than just short-term returns to asset owners in the exercise of their duties. 
 
As discussed above, the basis of the SMST concern is that listed companies are 
principally focused on maximizing shareholder value, which is purportedly manifested as 
short-term financial returns for asset owners. Although company managers should consider 
more than just short-term returns to asset owners in the exercise of their duties, this 
discussion is largely theoretical if corporate law and governance measures continue to 
facilitate the use of share prices – which as demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?) are a questionable measure of long-term value – as the primary measure of the 
value of a listed company. However, as a realistic alternative to share prices is not readily 
apparent, the only feasible option remaining is to improve share pricing as a measure of long-
term value. The corporate governance and legal mechanisms by which such investor short-
termism is transmitted into listed companies are, consequently, particularly important to 
understand in order to develop effective SMST reform. The fiduciary duties of directors are 
briefly considered first as these could be seen as a legal means of transmitting SMST into the 
firm. However, fiduciary duties are rejected as a transmission mechanism given the broad 
deference generally given to boards of directors in applying such duties. A stronger 
transmission mechanism is arguably more evident in two main categories: (1) executive 
compensation, and (2) the asset owner/asset manager ability to change the board of directors, 
thereby facilitating a change of control of senior management of the listed company.  
 
b. Fiduciary Duties – An Inefficient Transmission Mechanism 
It may be argued that the undue focus on maximizing short-term shareholder value is 
transmitted into listed companies through the exercise of fiduciary duties by directors. These 
duties are codified in company law in the UK642 and have been developed in case law in 
Delaware643. Such fiduciary duties require directors to consider the best interests of the 
                                                 
641  Ibid, p. 86. 
642  UK Companies Act 2006, Section 172(1). 
643  In Delaware which is the domicile for over 50% of US listed companies 
(http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml), Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code) provides that the business and affairs of Delaware 
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company, and such duties have been expanded in UK company law to state that directors 
should consider stakeholder interests.644 There is significant deference by courts – 
particularly in the US and UK645 – to the business judgment of directors. It is very possible, 
therefore, that directors could pursue a business strategy that does not prioritize short-term 
returns to shareholders without breaching their duties as directors. Fiduciary duties are, 
consequently, a tenuous basis for the transmission of SMST into listed companies. More 
likely transmission mechanisms are the structure of executive compensation arrangements, 
and the corporate law and governance mechanisms that give shareholders the ability to make 
changes to boards of directors and thereby senior executives, which are discussed below.   
 
c. Equity-Based Executive Compensation 
A question that may be asked in the short-termism discussion, is why don’t company 
mangers just accept share price fluctuations and manage to build long-term value for listed 
companies regardless of such fluctuations. The simple answer is company managers may 
want to do so, but they are predominantly focused on maximizing share prices as low share 
prices cause a host of problems. Such problems include personal financial implications for as 
a significant portion of management compensation is often tied to share prices.646  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), the use of equity-based 
compensation, which is meant to reduce managerial agency costs by aligning the interests of 
company managers and investors, grew exponentially in the 1990s, predominantly in the 
US647 and UK648. The rationale was that if company managers held shares in the listed 
company they managed, they would be incentivized to run the company to maximize share 
prices. The equity-based compensation of choice during this time period was stock options. 
                                                                                                                                                        
corporations shall be managed under the direction of a board of directors, and the duties of such board of 
directors have been developed in case law and require each of the directors to act in good faith to advance 
the best interests of the corporation (Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)). 
644  The UK Companies Act introduced in 2006 clarified in Section 172(1) that a director has a duty to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and then enumerated further 
considerations for directors in exercising this duty, including the likely consequences of any long-term 
decision in the long-term (Section 172(1)(a)), the interests of the company’s employees (Section 172(1)(b)), 
the need to foster the company’s business relationships (Section 172(1)(c)), and the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment (Section 172(1)(d)). 
645  See the US decision in Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974) and the UK Companies 
Act 2006, Section 172 and Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304. 
646  Dallas & Barry, 2015, p. 558. 
647  Bachelder, 2014. 
648  Kay Review, p. 77. 
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For a variety of reasons – largely attributable to accounting and taxation rule changes – stock 
options have diminished in importance in the US649 and also went out of favour earlier in the 
UK, due to the criticisms levied in number of influential reports.650 However, as discussed 
below, other forms of equity-based compensation – such as performance and restricted shares 
– continue to make up a significant portion of executive pay packages in listed companies.  
 
In the US, the long-term incentive (‘LTI’) awards  ̶  stock awards and options   ̶ 
valued at the date of grant constituted 57.2 percent of the total CEO compensation reported in 
2014 in the S&P 500, compared to 55.8 percent in 2010.651 Research also shows that the 
usage of performance-vesting equity awards, meaning vesting based on achieving certain 
performance objectives, rather than time-based vesting to top executives in large US 
companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012.652 In the UK, while the 
salary component of FTSE 100 executive compensation has been relatively steady over the 
years, additional compensation in the form of share-based compensation has risen 
dramatically.653 Of particular note are Long-Term Incentive Plans (‘LTIPs’). These LTIPS 
are equity-based plans that are typically three years in length and usually constitute the 
largest element of UK executive pay in listed companies.654 Approximately 90% of UK FTSE 
100 companies used LTIPs in 2013, which is an increase of 30% from the mid-1990s.655  
 
Payments to executives of listed companies in the EU also appear to be following a 
similar US/UK trend of greater reliance on equity-based plans. As examined by the Hay 
Group in 2014, the trend of long-term compensation of EU executives ‘is more akin to the 
US practice of making senior executives retain vested option and stock awards, thereby tying 
a significant part of their wealth to the company’s fortunes’656. The Hay Group’s research 
with respect to equity-based pay observes that, ‘[f]or European CEOs such requirements now 
                                                 
649  Bachelder, 2014.  
650  Kay Review, p. 78.  
651  Tonello, Matteo, ‘CEO and Executive Compensation Practices: 2015 Edition’ Harvard Law Forum, (15 
September 2015) referring to the findings in The CEO and Executive Compensation Practices: 2015 
Edition, by the Conference Board Inc. and Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.  
652  Bettis, J Carr, Bizjak, John M, Coles, Jeffrey L and Kalpathy, Swaminathan L, ‘Performance-Vesting 
Provisions in Executive Compensation’ (April 25, 2018) <Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2289566>.  
653  Barty, James and Jones, Ben, ‘Executive Compensation: Rewards for Success not Failure’, Policy 
Exchange (2012)  , p. 16. 
654  Dawson, 2017.  
655  Ibid.  
656  Hay Group Report 2014. 
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tend to be between 200 and 300 per cent of base salary and the shareholding is typically built 
up from vested deferred bonus and long-term incentive awards’657.  
 
The US executive compensation model – which includes a growing portion of equity-
based compensation – is gaining momentum worldwide.658 In Asia, the Mercer Report, 2014 
observed that the fixed pay portions of executive salaries in listed companies have fallen 
significantly.659 The Mercer Report, 2014, also stated that the use of LTI plans in Asia has 
been increasing, however, they are still not provided in the same frequency or percentages of 
overall compensation as their Western counterparts.660 Further, when LTIs are used to 
compensate executives, Asian listed companies are less likely to use share-based 
compensation than cash.661 As noted in the Mercer Report, 2014, ‘this is a trend that should 
wane as Asian companies become global’662. Consequently, equity-based compensation may 
not be as large of a contributor to the alleged SMST problem outside of the US and the UK. 
However, as the US model equity-based compensation model appears to be gaining ground in 
the EU and to a lesser degree in Asia, equity-based pay as a possible SMST transmission 
mechanism into listed companies should be considered seriously in all major markets.  
 
Demonstrating the importance of the connection of share prices to executive 
compensation, it has been stated that ‘[t]oday, equity accounts for about 60 percent of the 
remuneration of executives at companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index…[w]ith 
so much money tied up in stock options and the like, it is not surprising that executives will 
do almost anything to give their share price a boost regardless of what costs this might incur 
after their options have vested’663. This statement would only be accurate if the timeframes of 
the vesting provisions in the equity-based compensation plan were too short to properly align 
the interests of company managers with the long-term performance of a listed company.  The 
average vesting period for CEO equity-based compensation long-S&P 1500 and UK FTSE 
500 companies appears to be three-years.664 The question then is whether three years is long 
enough. Arguably, this time period is not adequate for company management to be 
                                                 
657  Ibid.  
658  See the Hay Group Report, 2014 and the Mercer Report, 2014.  
659  Mercer Report, 2014, p. 4. 
660  Ibid, pp. 4-5. 
661  Ibid. 
662  Ibid, p. 5. 
663  Denning, 2014.  
664  ‘Equity Vesting Schedules for S&P 1500 CEOs’, Equilar (26 April 2013) <Online: 
http://www.equilar.com/reports/3-equity-vesting-schedules.html> and Dawson, 2017. 
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sufficiently invested in the long-term performance of the listed company.665 However, even if 
the time frames of current equity-based compensation arrangements are sufficient, such 
compensation structures are not the only transmission mechanism of SMST into listed 
companies. Further analysis is also required on the implications of low share prices on 
company manager job security and the market for corporate control.  
 
d. Job Security  ̶  Ability to Change the Board/Senior Management 
Both boards of directors and senior management of listed companies may be 
concerned about job security as a result of negative impacts to share prices. Boards of 
directors – either via pressure from shareholders through proxy contests to change directors 
or on their own initiative through concerns about such proxy contests, or perhaps their 
incentive structures – may exercise their authority to remove senior management if the share 
price is not performing as desired. Shareholder delegation of the power to fire the CEO to the 
board of directors is central to corporate governance, particularly in US listed companies.666 
Research by Dirk Jenter, London School of Economics & Political Science – Department of 
Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research and  Katharina Lewellen, Dartmouth College 
– Tuck School of Business shows that CEO turnover is closely linked to performance – 
which includes a listed company’s share price performance –, and performance-induced 
turnovers are significantly more frequent than forced turnovers.667 Using data compiled on 
S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap companies from 1993 to 2011, Jenter and 
Lewellen estimate that between 38% and 55% of all CEO turnovers are performance induced, 
with an even higher percentage in the first years of tenure.668 This research confirms the 
assumption that boards change senior management of listed companies if share prices are 
negatively impacted. In addition to the board’s ability to fire CEOs for poor performance, 
shareholders may exert pressure on the board itself, and by extension company management.  
 
                                                 
665  Professor Kay recommended that ‘[l]ong-term performance incentives should be provided only in the form 
of company shares to be held at least until after the executive has retired from the business’ – Kay Review, 
p. 13. 
666  Fisman, Raymond J, Khurana, Rakesh and Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, ‘Governance and CEO Turnover: Do 
Something or Do the Right Thing?’ (January 2005) EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper <Online: SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=656085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.656085>.  
667  Jenter, Dirk and Lewellen, Katharina ‘Performance-Induced CEO Turnover’ (July 27, 2017) <Online:  
SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1570635>, p. 1.  
668  Ibid.  
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The mechanisms by which shareholders are able to call a general shareholder meeting 
to make changes to the boards of directors of a listed company   ̶  thereby also facilitating a 
change to senior management – differ jurisdiction by jurisdiction. In the UK, for example, 
shareholders have considerable scope to instigate such changes. Particularly, only 5% of the 
voting rights of a listed company are needed to require the directors to call an extraordinary 
general meeting, at which meeting a resolution can be put forward make changes to the board 
of directors.669 There is also a statutory process whereby shareholders may propose an 
ordinary resolution at the next annual general meeting of the listed company for the removal 
or addition of a director.670 Further, the UK Companies Act also provides a process whereby 
shareholders holding at least 5% of the voting rights or 100 shareholders may put forward 
any resolution at scheduled annual general meetings of a listed company.671  
 
In contrast, Delaware corporate law is more limited, and the Delaware General 
Corporation Law does not mandate that shareholders have the ability to call a special general 
meeting. Rather, the Delaware General Corporation Law leaves it to the corporation’s 
discretion to decide whether its shareholders will have this ability. If the corporation decides 
to provide this process, the relevant thresholds to call special general meetings  ̶  at which 
changes may be made to the board  ̶  are set in the constitutional documents.672 As shown in 
Figure 10 (S&P 500 Delaware Company Special Meetings Rights) below, only just over half 
of S&P 500 companies surveyed included the ability for shareholders to call a special general 
meeting in their constitutional documents, and when such right was included, the ownership 
threshold required to call the meetings were much higher than in the UK.  
                                                 
669  UK Companies Act, section 303, as amended by The UK Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 
2009. 
670  UK Companies Act, sections 168 and 312.  
671  Ibid, section 338(3). 
672  See §221(d) of the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that a special meeting ‘may be 
called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of 
incorporation or by the bylaws.’   
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Figure 10. S&P 500 Delaware Company Special Meetings Rights 
Ownership Threshold for Calling Meeting Number of Companies 
No special meeting right 153 
50% more 30 
30-40% 10 
25% 70 
20% 15 
15% 11 
Source: Brown, J Robert, ‘Delaware Law and the Right of Shareholders to Call Special Meetings’ 
TheRacetotheBottom.org (13 August 2014) <Online: http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/ 
delaware-law-and-the-right-of-shareholders-to-call-special-m.html>. 
With a few exceptions, including where the director is part of a staggered or classified 
board, a majority of the shareholders of a Delaware corporation entitled to vote may decline 
to re-elect directors at an annual general meeting.673 Attempts by corporations to entrench 
boards and increase this threshold above a majority vote have been found by the Delaware 
courts to contravene this provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law.674 However, a 
majority vote, as in the UK, is still a high threshold for listed companies given that many 
listed companies are widely held and obtaining a majority vote at a meeting may be 
challenging. Consequently, given this high threshold and the inconsistency around 
shareholder’s ability to requisition meetings, attempts to make changes to the board of 
directors and thus make changes to senior management, particularly in the US, have 
increasingly centered on proxy battles at annual general meetings.675 
 
A proxy battle occurs when an activist shareholder   ̶  either offensively as part of a 
strategy to acquire shares and unlock value or defensively to protect the interests of existing 
shareholders  ̶  attempts to convince existing shareholders to use their proxy votes to install 
new directors or an entire new board, which may result in changes to management.676 As an 
example, activist hedge fund Starboard Value LP (‘Starboard’), entered into a proxy battle for 
full control of the board at Yahoo Inc. (‘Yahoo’). Starboard’s stated intent was to change 
control of the board, and push for an auction of Yahoo’s core internet business in order to 
address flagging financial performance.677 Starboard was partially successful, but a proxy 
                                                 
673  Delaware General Corporation Law, §141(k). 
674  See Fretcher v. Zier, No. CV 12038-VCG, 2017 WL 345142 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017). 
675  See Frankl, J and Balet, S, ‘The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights’, Harvard Law Forum (22 March 2017), where 
the authors observe that there were 110 proxy fights in the US in 2016, up 43% from 2012.   
676  Investopedia <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/how-do-proxy-fights-work.asp>. 
677  Flaherty, Michael, ‘Starboard launches proxy fight to remove entire Yahoo board’ Reuters (29 March 2016) 
<Online: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-starboard-proxy-idUSKCN0WQ0D7> .  
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battle was avoided and Starboard instead negotiated directly with management and obtained 
four of the nine board seats sought.678 Activists such as Starboard generally hold a minority 
share position and, consequently, even if they act in wolf packs as discussed above,679 they 
cannot effect changes to the board without convincing other shareholders to vote with them. 
Consequently, proxy campaigns are certainly not always successful.  
 
For example, Greenlight Capital, Inc. (‘Greenlight’), a US activist hedge fund led by 
David Einhorn, proposed four nominees to be elected to the board of directors at the 2017 
annual general meeting of General Motors (‘GM’), which nominees were overwhelming 
rejected by GM shareholders in favor of GM’s incumbent nominees.680 Greenlight’s stated 
intent for proposing the board changes was to address GM’s lagging share prices by 
attempting to get GM to split its shares, one class of which would focus on steady dividends 
and the other on share buybacks.681 Although proxy campaigns are undoubtedly not always 
successful, shareholder activism is on the rise, and not just in the US. A 2015 global survey 
by FTI Consulting revealed that US-style activism is no longer confined to US listed 
companies. Notable increases of activism are shown in the UK, Canada, continental Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific region – with board changes being a key focus by activists.682 The 
research of FTI Consulting also shows that US activists, e.g. ValueAct Capital, Elliot 
Management Corporation and Starboard, are becoming increasingly global.683  
 
It is clear that declining share prices of listed companies attract activists. In particular, 
if the shares of a listed company are perceived to be trading at less than the perceived 
fundamental value of the listed company, it makes the listed company a prime target for 
intervention by activist shareholders in the form of a proxy battle. Although proxy campaigns 
to change the board are not always successful, they do pose a real threat to the job security of 
incumbent directors and therefore senior management. The threat alone of such an activist 
campaign may be enough to impact company manager behaviour.  
                                                 
678  Lee, Wendy, ‘Yahoo settles with Starboard, avoiding messy proxy fight’ San Francisco Gate (27 April 
2016) <Online: http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Yahoo-settles-with-Starboard-7378599.php>.  
679  Coffee & Palia, 2015, p. 7. 
680  Ferris, Robert ‘GM shareholders overwhelmingly defeat Greenlight’ proposal’ CNBC (6 June 2017) 
<Online:  http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/general-motors-defeats-greenlight-capitals-board-nominations-
and-stock-plan-proposal.html>.   
681  Foley, Stephen, ‘Einhorn drives proxy battle for 4 seats on GM board’ (28 March 2017) Financial Times 
<Online: https://www.ft.com/content/c74171d5-698d-37a7-a6b4-2019ae30054a?mhq5j=e1>. 
682  ‘Global Activism on the Rise’, FTI Consulting (4 October 2016) <Online: 
http://fticommunications.com/2016/10/global-activism-rise/>.  
683  Ibid.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), when hostile takeovers became 
prominent in the 1980s the argument was made that just the threat of such a takeover had a 
negative impact on the stock market as a whole. Company managers supposedly endeavored 
to pre-empt hostile takeovers by foregoing long-term planning and engaging in short-termism 
in order to boost share prices684, although others contested this assertion saying that such 
companies were just inefficiently run.685 However, this market impact reasoning could still be 
relevant as the mere threat of an activist campaign, and the support such campaign may 
generate from existing shareholders and concerns by the board, may act as a mechanism to 
transmit short-termist into listed companies. Specifically, company managers may take short-
term actions that keep share prices high, knowing that the market overvalues these actions 
and excessively discounts future profits, and fearing that low prices may make them 
susceptible to activism or dismissal by the board. Consequently, shareholder activism, and 
even the threat of activism, together with the negative personal compensation implications of 
low share prices686  ̶  and the benefits of higher share prices  ̶  to company managers, appear 
to be the main transmission mechanisms by which SMST gets into listed companies. How 
exactly company managers respond to this SMST is considered below. 
 
2. Response of Company Managers to SMST of Asset Owners and Asset Managers 
 
As demonstrated above, share prices are an important communication tool among 
market participants, and share prices are particularly important as they impact company 
manager compensation and job security. The mechanisms by which company managers give 
the market what it wants to hear and thereby keep share prices high are arguably through ‘a 
consistently positive rate of periodic EPS growth, preferably coupled with a corresponding 
rise in declared rate of dividend’687. Consistently positive EPS which meets earnings 
expectations are a key part of this equation, as are stable dividends. This steady rate is 
important as, ‘profits are observable and boost the investor’s impression of managerial 
                                                 
684  Lipton, 1979, pp. 109-110, expanded on subsequently in Schnitzer, M, ‘Short-Termism and the Market for 
Corporate Control’ (1997), in Picot A, and Schlicht E (eds), ‘Firms, Markets, and Contracts: Contributions 
to Economics’ Physica-Verlag HD. 
685  Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981, p. 1184. 
686  A summary of the reasons that company managers are concerned about share prices are set out at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/020703.asp. See also Rieg, 2015 referencing a study by 
Mergenthaler et al. 2011, which study provides evidence of the career penalties to company managers for 
not meeting analyst forecasts (p. 197).  
687  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 428. 
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ability’688. The response of company managers to the short-termism of asset owners and asset 
managers in respect of dividends and earnings management is considered below.    
 
a. SMST and Dividends 
 
Based on 2016 numbers, dividends were paid by 82.6% of S&P 500 companies, 
69.3% of the companies on the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index MID, and 51.6% of companies 
included on S&P Small Cap 600 Index SML.689 It is widely documented that company 
managers strive to maintain smooth dividends, and in particular institutional investors place 
considerable value on dividend-smoothing.690 The concern raised is that share prices will be 
negatively impacted if dividend rates are not maintained. Demonstrating this concern, a 
survey of US executives focused on dividend policy, showed that concerns about strong 
market reactions drove executives to avoid cutting dividends at all costs, even if it meant by-
passing NPV projects.691 This concern was echoed by, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink in a letter 
addressed to CEOs of S&P 500 and large EU companies.  
 
Fink declared, that ‘in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied 
away from investing in the future growth of their companies…[t]o many have cut capital 
expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks’. Fink 
concluded that, [w]hen done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, 
[returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable 
long-term returns’. The harms caused by declaring dividends and making share buy-backs at 
the expense of capital investment are considered further in Chapter 7 (What Harm Does 
SMST Cause?). The point made in this Subsection B(2)(a) is that short-termism of asset 
owners and asset managers transmitted to company managers via negative impacts on share 
prices may cause company managers to prioritize consistent dividend payments to 
shareholders. However, not all listed companies pay dividends – perhaps for the reason that 
short-termism may cause them to have to prioritize dividend payments over capital 
                                                 
688  Davies et at, 2014, p. 17. 
689  Vlastelica, Ryan, ‘S&P 500 dividend payouts hit a record in the third quarter’, MarketWatch (3 October 
2017) <Online: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-dividend-payouts-hit-a-record-in-the-third-
quarter-2017-10-03>.  
690  See the discussion in Larkin, Yelena, Leary, Mark T, and Michealy, Roni, ‘Do Investors Value Dividend-
Smoothing Differently’ 63:12 Management Science (2017) 4114, at p. 4114.   
691  Brav, Alon, Harvey, Campbell R, Graham, John R, and Michaely, Roni, ‘Payout Policy in the 21st Century’ 
(November 2005), Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference Paper <Online: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=571046>.  
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expenditure. In addition to this pressure for consistent dividend payments, such short-termism 
may also lead to earnings management. 
 
b. SMST and Earnings Management 
 
EPS may be increased via ‘earnings management’, a practice involving creative 
manipulation of the numbers presented in a company’s accounts by company managers.692 
Earnings management may be divided into two basic forms: (1) accounting earnings 
management – which essentially involves a fraud on the market (‘fraudulent earnings 
management’), and (2) real earnings management – which uses legitimate means to present 
income stability (‘non-fraudulent earnings management’).693 Fraudulent earnings 
management involves the direct manipulation of financial information or the use of off-
balance sheet transactions to obscure a listed company’s fundamental value.694 This kind of 
activity is outright fraud or certainly verges on fraudulent behaviour, and it was associated 
with the high-profile corporate scandals of the early 2000s – such as Enron Corporation and 
WorldCom, which were discussed further in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?).695 As noted 
by Dallas, this type of clearly objectionable earnings management appears to have decreased 
in the US since the passage of legislation meant to specifically prohibit such activity.696 Such 
fraudulent earnings management is undoubtedly objectionable as it blatantly obscures the real 
value of a listed company from the market, and should be legislated against regardless of any 
SMST reform motivations. The line between such fraudulent earnings management and non-
fraudulent earnings management is admittedly blurred.697 Non-fraudulent earnings 
management, however, is more nuanced, and involves legitimate company manager actions 
that ‘present to the market an effective façade of corporate income-stability’698.  
 
Non-fraudulent earnings management has caught the attention of those concerned 
about the alleged SMST issue. As stated by Rappaport, ‘[s]hort-termism continues to be the 
disease, and earnings obsession the carrier’699. Such non-fraudulent earnings management 
                                                 
692  Davies et at, 2014, p. 428, and see Dallas, 2012, pp. 278-281. 
693  Dallas, 2012, p. 278. 
694  Ibid.  
695  Ibid. 
696  Ibid, where Professor Dallas refers to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
697  Millstein, Ira, ‘When earnings management becomes cooking the books’ Financial Times (26 May 2005).  
698  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 428. 
699  Rappaport, 2011, p. 55.  
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involves a range of activities by company managers of listed companies all of which are 
designed to ‘smooth’ periodic earnings – and thus EPS numbers – results on a continuing 
basis, and meet market earnings expectations.700 These activities include offering price 
discounts to temporarily increase sales, engaging in overproduction to lower costs of goods 
sold, reducing discretionary expenses aggressively to improve margins, deferring incurred 
costs or losses to future accounting periods, managing the timing of major business 
announcements, effecting stock buy-backs, and even in certain circumstances creating 
illusory growth through corporate acquisitions.701 The intent with all of these actions by 
company managers is to create an increasing EPS growth curve so as to avoid punishment 
from the stock market in the form of an end-of-period share price fall – which fall is 
inevitable if the listed company entirely relies on such non-fraudulent earnings management 
to build value.702 This is particularly significant where earnings expectations are 
communicated to the market by company management and analysts.  
 
These earnings expectations generally consist of guidance by company managers or 
analysts setting out an estimate of future revenue as well as capital spending estimates and an 
estimated EPS for a specific period, e.g. a quarter.703 Listed companies are not required to 
disclose earnings expectations, but there is considerable market pressure from asset owners to 
do so for US listed corporations, and, regardless of whether the company managers provide 
such guidance, financial industry analysts may do so independently of the listed company.704 
The concern raised is that a failure to meet these earnings expectations results in increased 
selling of the listed companies shares, causing a downward pressure in share prices.705 There 
are questions on the actual impact of earnings guidance, with some analysis suggesting that it 
does not impact share price volatility, but just trading volumes.706 Regardless of the actual 
impact of a failure to meet earnings guidance on share prices, there is considerable survey 
evidence suggesting that the threat of a negative market reaction of a failure to meet earnings 
guidance or demonstrate steadily increasing EPS and smooth dividends is sufficient to cause 
company managers to undertake non-fraudulent earnings management.   
 
                                                 
700  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 428. 
701  See Dallas, 2012, p. 279 and Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, pp. 429-431.  
702  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 428. 
703  Investopedia <Online: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/guidance.asp>.  
704  Hsieh et al, 2016.  
705  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 427.  
706  Hsieh et al, 2016.  
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There is a considerable body of research evidencing that non-fraudulent earnings 
management is occurring.707 Most notably, a detailed survey of 401 senior executives of US 
companies built on earlier survey evidence and found that: (1) managers would reject a 
positive-NPV project if it lowered earnings below quarterly consensus expectations, and (2) 
over 75% of the sample would give up economic value in order to smooth earnings.708 When 
asked why earnings manipulation occurs, a large majority of CFOs have indicated that it is 
most often an attempt to influence stock price, because of outside and inside pressure to hit 
earnings benchmarks, and to avoid adverse compensation and career consequences for senior 
executives.709 A more recent survey of 375 CFOs of US companies in 2015 confirmed that at 
least 20% of companies surveyed intentionally distorted earnings, even while adhering to 
GAAP standards – which admittedly may indicate an issue with GAAP disclosure 
requirements rather than specific SMST-driven concerns.710 
 
Survey evidence also undoubtedly has its limitations as company managers may not 
be truthful in their responses. Further, survey evidence outside of the US is also limited. 
However, there is some empirical evidence from the UK demonstrating a quantitative 
connection between share-based compensation and non-fraudulent earnings management. 
Research on UK companies on the FTSE All Share Index showed that non-fraudulent 
earnings management increased when company managers owned between 5% and 10% of the 
equity of a listed company.711 Though the evidence on non-fraudulent earnings management 
is largely US/UK centric and lacking in quantitative rigor, the depth of US survey evidence 
that has been conducted on this issue is compelling. The growing global influence of US 
investors and US-style management also means that non-fraudulent earnings management 
should be treated as a valid concern outside of just the US and UK capital markets.   
 
Such non-fraudulent earnings management would not be a problem if it actually 
increased the fundamental value of the listed company, which was in turn reflected in share 
prices. However, the concern raised is that these actions do not generate real value, and once 
known eventually negatively impact share prices – or cause listed companies to miss out on 
                                                 
707  See the evidence presented in Dallas, 2012, p. 279 at Note 80. 
708  Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005, updated in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2006. 
709  Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005, updated in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2006, and Dichev et al, 
2016, p. 29. 
710  Dichev et al, 2016. 
711  Bos et al, 2013.  
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projects that may produce greater financial returns in the long run. The evidence on the 
impact of SMST and non-fraudulent earnings management is considered further in Chapter 7 
(What Harm Does SMST Cause?). It is sufficient for the purposes of this Section, however, 
to state that SMST appears to be transmitted to company managers by the importance of 
share prices in executive compensation and job security, which in turn appears to result in 
company managers taking actions to smooth earnings and meet market earnings expectations 
and, consequently, avoid any negative pricing impacts on share prices.  
C. INTERMEDIARIES 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), intermediaries – meaning all of the 
entities in the equity ownership chain between the asset owner and the listed company, and 
also auxiliary intermediaries such as proxy advisers – play an important role in how the 
interests of asset owners are transmitted to listed companies. The most significant of these 
intermediaries are asset managers, given their scope and the level of control they have over 
investments – including as relevant to this thesis, the equity securities of listed companies.712 
It has been suggested that SMST is transmitted into listed companies from asset owners via 
asset managers. Asset managers, as agents for asset owners, act on their client’s expressed 
preference for short-term returns interests, and in doing so pressure listed companies to 
deliver results by selling shares if the listed company does not meet expectations.713 This is 
similar to the transmission mechanisms discussed above in the context of asset owners. If this 
is the case, then SMST-driven reform efforts should focus primarily on addressing the short-
termism of asset owners, of which institutional investors are the most significant group. 
However, the contribution of asset managers to the SMST problem requires further analysis.  
 
1. Asset Managers 
 
Rather than just being a flow-through for asset owner interests, it has been suggested 
that asset managers themselves could be causing, or at least adding to, the alleged SMST 
                                                 
712  Kay Review, p. 11, where Professor Kay asserts that at least in the UK asset managers are the dominant 
players in the investment chain and in the US, US-registered investment companies managed $13 trillion in 
assets for more than 92 million US investors at year-end 2012 (Investment Company Institute, 2012 
Investment Company Fact Book). 
713  Dallas & Barry, 2015, p. 562.  
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problem.714 Key to this analysis is the assertion that ‘the agency relationship between 
institutional investors  ̶  asset owners  ̶  and their managers contributes to capital markets’ 
increasing short-termism and to mispricing’715. Particularly, as investors have imperfect 
knowledge of an asset manager’s ability, they may conclude that any reduction in asset value 
is due to an asset manager’s incompetence and may react by switching their asset manager   ̶
provided that such asset management function is not in house.716 The short reporting time 
periods for the assessment of asset managers are seen to be part of this problem.  
 
Obviously, investors should not be locked into funds if such funds do not provide 
financial returns or if the investment is in consistent decline. However, the concern is that the 
timeframe for assessing whether an investment is viable is too short to meaningfully assess 
long-term value. Specifically, the argument is that ‘[a]n active investment manager to be 
successful in the current environment must pay heed to its performance on a quarterly 
basis’717. Asset managers ‘may be biased in favor of short-term initiatives than longer-term 
ones, even if the latter are likely to produce higher net value in the long-run’ because ‘the 
search for ‘alpha’ by active asset managers is not just constant, but because of the pressure of 
being measured quarterly, immediate’718. This need to constantly produce positive reports 
could be why asset managers disregard long-term interests and instead pressure companies 
for short-term returns. Asset managers also often facilitate quick redemption by asset owners 
of their investments on request.719 Professors Dallas and Barry state that ‘[a] loyal asset 
manager who expects her clients to cash out soon, or who anticipates that short-term losses 
will cause clients to redeem their interests (at a loss), should focus on short-term stock 
prices’720. This pressure for liquidity from asset owners may be an amplifying factor in how 
SMST is transmitted into listed companies, as it could also motivate asset managers to 
pressure listed companies to provide short-term returns by selling shares of listed companies 
that do not have steadily increasing share prices. Given these concerns, it has been said that 
the way forward is to ‘stop treating the finance sector as a pass-through that has no impact on 
asset pricing and risk’721. While accepting the assertion that the asset manager/asset owner 
                                                 
714  Ibid, and see also Dallas, 2012, p. 295, Pozen, 2015, and Aspen Report, 2009, p. 2.  
715  EU Governance Green Paper, 2011, p. 12 referencing Woolley, 2010.  
716  Woolley, 2010, p. 126. 
717  Nathan, 2015.  
718  Ibid.  
719  Dallas & Barry, 2015, p. 562. 
720  Ibid.  
721  Woolley, 2010, p. 127.  
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relationship may amplify the alleged SMST concerns, the flaw in attributing the alleged 
SMST problem primarily to asset managers is that they do not operate in a vacuum.  
As noted by Professors Dallas and Barry, asset managers may apply pressure for 
short-term results while acting as ‘loyal asset managers’. Accordingly, much of the impetus 
for such short-termist behaviour may be traced back to asset owners as they set the 
compensation and investment parameters in their contractual relationships with asset 
managers. Undeniably, the compensation structure of the asset management industry is 
varied. As observed by Professor Kay, ‘[e]ach intermediary has its own remuneration 
structure and business model’722. However, many asset managers are by and large 
compensated on a percentage of the assets under management (‘AUM’), which consists of a 
performance and/or a fixed fee component.723 The fixed fee portion generally ranges from 
0.01% to 2.0% of the value of the AUM, with fees on the higher end being paid for more 
actively managed funds.724 Asset manager compensation may also include performance fees, 
which are calculated as a percentage of the investment profits of the AUM. This method of 
compensation is typical of the hedge fund industry, which often has a ‘2 and 20’ model, 
meaning that the hedge fund receives a 2% fixed fee, and performance fee of 20% of the 
profits generated on AUM.725 These compensation structures reward returns to the asset 
owners, and may cause asset managers to forgo longer term investments in favour of 
identifying listed companies with short-term profitability.  Specifically, this may manifest as 
short-term trading and asset re-allocation by asset managers meant to maximize short-term 
performance numbers, which has the added benefit of generating fees.726  
Such short-termist behaviour by asset managers may not be well aligned with the 
long-term interests of asset owners, and the ultimate investors that asset managers are 
supposed to serve. Therefore, the possible amplifying impact of asset managers and the 
agency implications should be considered in SMST reform efforts, particularly around 
ensuring that asset manager compensation and investment parameters matches the investment 
                                                 
722  Kay Review, p. 34. 
723  Standard asset management fees are generally a small percentage (e.g. 2%) on the asset value, and a larger 
percentage (e.g. 20%) on the annual performance of the assets (Garratt & Hamilton, 2016, p. 799). 
724  Investopedia <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/managementfee.asp>; and Maton, Brendan, 
‘Asset Management Fees: What is the Going Rate?’ IPE (March 2016) <Online: 
https://www.ipe.com/investment/asset-management-fees-whats-the-going-rate/10012128.fullarticle>. 
725  Investopedia <Online: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/performance-fee.asp>. 
726  Garratt & Hamilton, 2016, p. 794, where the authors discuss the self-interest of asset managers and their 
payment structures which incentivize short-term trading and asset re-allocation activity. 
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objectives of their asset owner clients. However, such SMST-driven reforms directed at asset 
managers will need to be implemented in conjunction with reform efforts meant to nudge 
asset owners away from their current preference for short-term returns.  
2. Other Intermediaries 
 
It is also worth briefly considering possible transmission mechanisms of SMST 
concerns into listed companies by other intermediaries in the equity ownership chain, namely 
depositaries and proxy advisors. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), the 
argument has been raised that the complexity of this intermediary heavy ownership structure, 
where shares are not held directly by investors, raises SMST concerns. Further concerns have 
also been raised about proxy advisors not fully considering the long-term interests of 
investors. However, as argued in further details below, although regulatory and financial 
industry reforms may be justified to the depository and proxy advisory process generally, the 
links to a SMST issue are tenuous and such reform is not justified on this basis alone.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), listed companies shares are usually 
registered in the name of a central depositary – CREST in the UK, Euroclear in the EU, and 
Cede & Co in the US – and held in nominee accounts rather than directly in the name of an 
asset manager or asset owner. Theoretically, this type of intermediary should be neutral in the 
relationship between asset owners, asset managers and listed companies and they should just 
act as a flow-through mechanism. Further, in the digital age, company disclosure and voting 
information may be provided directly or made accessible to asset owners, although there will 
still need to be a reconciliation of beneficial shareholdings with the depositary.  
 
The precise SMST concern related to central depositaries is unclear but centers on 
how the complexity of share ownership impedes engagement with listed companies by asset 
owners interested in long-term value. In particular, asset owners may have difficulty 
accessing or receiving information about the long-term projects of listed companies given 
that such information needs to flow through complex equity ownership chains.727 These 
difficulties in communication could also be related to the causes of SMST originating from 
asset owners and asset managers discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), as the 
disconnection between asset owners and listed companies may increase the excessive 
                                                 
727  Kay Review, p. 84.  
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discounting of future returns of such listed companies by asset owners. As they are unable to 
determine the value of long-term projects and effectively monitor such projects, in part due to 
this complexity of share ownership, asset owners may apply large discounts to future returns 
and instead prioritize shorter-term financial returns. However, these links are theoretical and 
tenuous at best. Further, the argument could be made that such complexity may have the 
opposite effect and could mute short-term pressures placed on company managers by asset 
owners. Consequently, the focus of financial industry and regulatory reform to the depository 
process should arguably be guided by improving and simplifying information flows generally 
in order to increase market efficiency rather than any specific SMST concerns. Given this 
conclusion, depositaries, although certainly an important part of the equity ownership chain, 
are not considered further in this thesis in the context of SMST-related reforms.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), proxy advisors are also argued to be 
part of the alleged SMST problem. The main concern raised is that investment decisions are 
often essentially outsourced to third party proxy advisory firms, such as ISS and Glass Lewis 
& Co in the US. Asset owners and asset managers, particularly with investments outside of 
their home markets, tend to rely heavily on the recommendations of these proxy advisors.728 
There are without a doubt concerns about the proxy advisory process, including around 
transparency on how recommendations are made and how conflicts of interest are disclosed 
given that proxy advisors may also act for listed companies and advise on specific proposed 
shareholder resolutions.729 Chief Justice Strine has also argued that the proxy advisory 
process needs to be more transparent so that investors can determine if the recommendation 
made takes into account an investor’s longer-term interests, and there should be significantly 
less reliance by investors generally on proxy advisor recommendations.730 These concerns 
surely should be addressed given the importance of the role of proxy advisors, as there is 
considerable reliance on proxy advice by asset owners/managers.731 However, it is not at all 
clear to see how the voting recommendations of proxy advisors contribute to the SMST 
concerns discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?). Without such a link, SMST 
arguably should not be used as a driver for reforms to the proxy advisory process.     
 
                                                 
728  EU Governance Green Paper, 2011, p. 14, and Nathan, 2015.  
729  EU Governance Green Paper, 2011, p. 14.  
730  Strine, 2015, p.24. 
731  Tonello, 2012.  
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As set out in this Chapter, the alleged SMST issue appears to be transmitted into listed 
companies primarily via share pricing, and more particularly through company manager 
concerns around the implications of reductions to share prices. Although activist investors 
have been a lightning rod for SMST concerns, it seems most probable that the preferences for 
the certainty of short-term financial returns exhibited by a wide range of asset owners are the 
driving cause of the alleged SMST problem. The short-term interests of such asset owners, 
arguably intensified by asset managers who act in their clients’ interests, are then transmitted 
inside the listed company by the equity-based compensation packages of company managers, 
and certain corporate governance and legal mechanisms which give the board the ability to 
change senior management and asset owners the ability to change the board, which in turn 
may facilitate change in senior management of listed companies. The response of company 
managers to this short-term preference is to prioritize short-term financial returns and/or 
engage in non-fraudulent earnings management in an effort to keep share prices consistent or 
on an upward trend temporarily. Consequently, any remedy to the SMST issue requires either 
addressing issues around share pricing or cutting off transmission mechanisms. However, 
before considering the conceptual effectiveness of SMST reforms on this basis, Chapter 7 
(What Harm Does SMST Cause?) first assesses if the preference for short-term financial 
returns and/or non-fraudulent earnings management has had a harmful effect.   
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CHAPTER 7 – IS SMST HARMFUL? 
 
‘The valuation of the markets is an important national – indeed international – issue. All of 
our plans for the future, as individuals and as a society, hinge on our perceived wealth, and 
plans can be thrown into disarray if that wealth evaporates tomorrow.’732  
 
But where is the harm? – so what if a listed company’s shares are unduly high, or if 
there is pressure on management of listed companies to keep share prices up or pay-back cash 
rather than re-investing in the business? Similarly, why does it matter if company managers 
are consistently saying that they prioritize short-term returns? As observed by Harvard Law 
School professor Jesse Fried, ‘[t]he question … is not whether short-termism can exist, but 
rather: how bad is it?’733 ‘Bad’ is obviously a relative term. Academics Gregory Jackson and 
Anastasia Petraki – after concluding, rather optimistically, that researchers agree generally 
that short-termism is a preference for strategies that add less value but have an earlier payoff 
– add specificity to this question by observing ‘[i]t is hard to establish whether short-term 
decisions are actually detrimental to long-term value creation’734. Given the nature of short-
termism as a social process where short-term behaviour is reinforced by the actions of others 
through a complex system of incentives, they say, it is very hard to measure the effects of 
short-termism.735 Consequently, Jackson and Petraki suggest that short-termism will be 
difficult to address through simple policy instruments aimed at one group of stakeholders.736  
 
The stock market is also a complex adaptive system, and we may fall afoul of the 
‘micro-macro’ problem by attempting to understand the issue by only looking at one part.737 
Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, financial strategists with Credit Suisse, noted that 
this concept is best encapsulated by Phil Anderson, a physicist who won the Nobel Prize and 
claimed quite simply that ‘more is different’738. Specifically, the micro-macro problem holds 
that ‘[co]mplex adaptive systems generally have properties and features that are difficult to 
predict by examining the individual agents’739. The argument can be made, therefore, that 
SMST may produce negative consequences for individual firms or company managers, but 
this is not indicative of a broader market failure. Conversely, SMST may ‘not necessarily be 
                                                 
732  Shiller, 2015, p. 227. 
733  Fried, 2015, p. 1569.  
734  Jackson & Petraki, 2011, p. 5. 
735  Ibid. 
736  Ibid. 
737  Mauboussin & Callahan, 2014, p. 3.  
738  Ibid, referencing Anderson, P W, ‘More Is Different’ Science, 177: 4047, August 4, 1972, 393-396. 
739  Ibid.  
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negative for a single investor or manager, since an individual can gain from it in the short run 
while transferring the burden to others in the short or long run’740. Mauboussin and Callahan 
went on to argue that ‘if you want to assess and evaluate the impact of short-termism, the 
right level of analysis is not what individuals say but rather what the stock market does’741. 
Thus, it may be difficult to measure the harms of SMST, but there should at least be some 
broad demonstrable harm connected to the alleged SMST problem in order to justify reform.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 11 (Alleged Harms of SMST) below, numerous potential 
harms caused by the SMST issue have been articulated. This Chapter summarizes the 
research that has been conducted to demonstrate the harms of SMST into four salient – albeit 
potentially overlapping – categories. These four core categories are: (1) reduced firm 
productivity, (2) reduced trust in the stock market, (3) societal costs742, and (4) wealth 
transfer from future to current asset owners. In considering this research on the harms of 
SMST, this Chapter assesses the strength of the arguments made and the evidence provided 
in support of each of these four categories. Based on an assessment of the research in each 
category, in this Chapter I have rejected each of the arguments of (1) reduced firm 
productivity, and (3) societal costs, as a sufficiently viable basis justifying SMST-driven 
reform. Although significant questions remain around the evidence presented in support of 
the arguments (2) reduced trust in the stock market, and (4) wealth transfer from future to 
current asset owners, I conclude that these two arguments are the more probable – although 
definitely still unproven – areas of potential harm from SMST.  
 
  
                                                 
740  Rieg, 2015, p. 212. 
741  Ibid.   
742  Admittedly, any of the four categories could validly be defined as ‘societal costs’. However, the term 
‘societal costs’ is used here to mean the implications of certain negative behaviours of company managers 
allegedly connected to SMST and the impacts of SMST on sustainability generally. These negative 
behaviours of corporate managers include excessive risk-taking, corporate greed, fraud and disregard for or 
harm to the interests of other stakeholders of the listed company including environmental interests.   
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Figure 11. Alleged Harms of Short-Termism 
 
 
A. REDUCED FIRM PRODUCTIVITY  
A frequent allegation made by those arguing that short-termism is problematic, is that 
SMST reduces listed company productivity, and thus industry and national productivity.743 If 
the allegation that SMST is contributing to under-investment in R&D, and thus reducing 
corporate productivity, is accurate it would certainly be a strong basis for regulatory action. 
Accordingly, this allegation is considered first in this Chapter. The impact of SMST is 
generally considered through an analysis of spending on research and development (‘R&D’). 
However, as demonstrated by the analysis below, using R&D statistics alone as an 
evidentiary basis for SMST-driven reform does not seem justified, as R&D appears irrelevant 
to the SMST discussion. Even if R&D is relevant, the results of the impact of SMST, as 
considered below, are ambiguous. Consequently, overall productivity measures may be a 
more useful indicator of a SMST problem. However, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to 
even roughly isolate how SMST impacts overall firm, industry or national productivity.744  
 
R&D spending is a particular focus for SMST analysis as R&D projects commonly 
have upfront costs, and returns are more heavily concentrated at the end of their life cycle.745 
                                                 
743  See the Mason, 2015 and Lazonick, 2014, discussing the impact of short-termism on economy activity in 
the US, and the Hughes Report, 2014 for similar analysis in the UK.   
744  Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005, p. 4. 
745  Hughes Report, 2014, p. 11. 
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The problem, it was asserted in the Aspen Report, 2010, for example, is that ‘[t]o show short-
term profits, public companies increasingly defer investments in market research, product 
design, or prototype development’746. To back up this assertion, the Aspen Report, 2010 
referred to a survey of CEOs, the results of which indicated that ‘80 percent will cut 
discretionary spending – for R&D, maintenance, advertising, etcetera – to avoid missing a 
quarterly forecast’747. The Aspen Report, 2010 went on to say that ‘potential systemic 
underinvestment in R&D will lead to long-term challenges to U.S. competitiveness’. 
 
But is this short-termist perspective of company managers actually impacting long-
term investment by listed companies? Some evidence has been presented that it is. For 
example, in the UK, the UK Government commissioned a report from Professor Alan 
Hughes, which report built on the conclusions of the Kay Review and was designed to assess 
the extent to which business decision making in the UK was affected by ‘short-termism’748. 
The Hughes Report concluded that for the period from 1999 to 2010 there was a fall in the 
ratio of business expenditures on R&D relative to GDP, and that the UK was at the lower end 
of the international spectrum in the ratio of overall gross expenditure R&D to GDP.749 It also 
observed that the UK had a relatively high dependence on overseas funding, and, therefore, 
the UK was characterized by a very high reliance on the performance of R&D in the UK by 
foreign owned businesses750. Accordingly, the Hughes Report concluded that ‘[i]f US 
businesses and investors are subject to similar short-term pressures as UK investors and 
boards, this will reinforce any such tendencies which exist in the UK and vice versa if stock 
market strength enhances radical long-term innovation’751. Thus, the R&D numbers in the 
UK may be concerning.752 However, the situation is much murkier in the US.   
 
In the US, general statements have been made on the negative state of the economy, 
in particular as it relates to national productivity growth. Recently, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan 
                                                 
746  Aspen Report, 2010, p.1.  
747  Ibid, p. 2, referring to a survey conducted by Graham et al, 2005, which was updated and enhanced in 
Graham et al, 2006, of 401 senior financial executives and in-depth interviews with an additional 22 
executives which concluded that the destruction of shareholder value through legal means is a persuasive, if 
not routine way of doing business. 
748  Hughes Report, 2014.  
749  Ibid, p. 8. 
750  Ibid, pp. 8-9.  
751  Ibid, p. 9.  
752  See, Tovey, Allan, ‘British R&D spending rises to £19.9bn but worries persist over Government cuts’, 
Telegraph, (20 November 2015) which notes that R&D in 2014 was up 5% from the prior year, but 
remained constant at 1.1% of GDP, considerably lower than other nations.  
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Chase Chairman and CEO, noted in his 2017 annual report to shareholders that ‘it is clear 
something is wrong – and it is holding us back’753. In support of this claim, Mr. Dixon 
observed that the US ‘economy has been growing much more slowly in the last decade or two 
than in the 50 years before then…[f]rom 1948 to 2000, real per capita GDP grew 2.3%; from 
2000 to 2016, it grew 1%754. However, the main proxy used to measure the alleged SMST 
problem, R&D expenditures, does not appear to match this assertion.   
 
As adeptly pointed out by James Surowiecki in The New Yorker, it has been shown 
that as a whole in the US, ‘corporate spending on R&D has risen steadily over the years and 
has stayed relatively constant as a share of GDP and as a share of sales’755. A pertinent 
question has been raised; if SMST is a real problem, ‘what explains the fact that businesses 
are investing so much in research and development?’756 It could be that R&D has just not 
been measured correctly in the US. Other measures show that the real growth of business 
investment in the US has actually slowed since 2000, which is perplexing as corporate profits 
having been rising during this period and borrowing costs are at historic lows.757  
 
 However, even if R&D expenditures are falling in the UK, and productivity measures 
in the US raise concerns, the link to the SMST issue as a cause or contributing factor has not 
been convincingly demonstrated. It is possible that today’s economy just does not have the 
capacity for growth as was seen in earlier times. Professor Kay raised this point in the Kay 
Review with regards to the UK’s perceived declining competitiveness, in commenting that 
‘[p]erhaps there were few good opportunities for British companies to invest – fewer 
opportunities than those available to their industry competitors based in other countries758. 
However, as a counter to this argument, it has been argued by some authors that ‘[w]hile 
R&D is a useful proxy of long-term orientation, this measure is incomplete’759.  
 
 Specifically, the argument has been made that in many businesses R&D is the focal 
point of their ongoing operation, and therefore ‘it is unlikely that managers would choose to 
                                                 
753  CEO Letter to Shareholders, JP Morgan Chase (4 April 2017), p. 32 <Online: 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/ar2016-ceolettershareholders.pdf>.  
754  Ibid.  
755  Surowiecki, 2015. 
756  Zandi, 2015. 
757  Jarsulic et al, 2015. 
758  Kay Review, p. 15.  
759  Jackson & Petraki, 2011, p. 19. 
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reduce it in favour of other investments with faster and more certain payoff’760. They may 
instead make other negative short-term decisions. Such ‘[o]ther long-term drivers of value 
may not be picked up (e.g. employee skills, corporate reputation, etc.), and these investments 
may be at least equally relevant’761. Further, it is argued that, ‘…the salience of R&D as a key 
measure may differ across different types of firms and industries’762. Therefore, using R&D 
statistics alone as an evidentiary basis for SMST-driven reform does not seem justified. 
Overall productivity measures may be a more useful indicator of a SMST problem. However, 
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to directly isolate how SMST impacts overall firm, 
industry or national productivity. Consequently, neither R&D nor productivity numbers alone 
convincingly evidence a macro problem necessitating SMST-driven reform. 
 
B. REDUCED TRUST IN THE STOCK MARKET 
 
A central theme in the Kay Review was on restoring trust and confidence in UK 
financial markets.763 Although certainly not the only cause, Kay suggested that SMST was 
contributing to the erosion of trust and confidence in the UK stock markets.764 Kay alleged 
that this was because ‘companies’ expectations of the quantum of future earnings they will 
have to allocate to meet the needs of prospective new shareholders – their view of the cost of 
capital – differed substantially from the perceptions of these prospective shareholders of the 
likely value of these earnings to them – their view of the return on capital’765. Kay went on to 
attribute this divergence to the ‘increased distance between companies and savers which 
results from the lengthening of the chain of intermediation, and the growth in complexity of 
the modern corporation’766. The basic argument is that this wide divergence on capital costs 
caused in part by SMST – i.e. excessive discounting by investors of longer-term investments 
by listed companies  ̶ contributes to stock markets being an unattractive option for many 
businesses. This Section B considers the evidence presented showing that SMST is 
contributing to reduced trust in the stock market primarily evidenced by a reduction in IPOs 
and an increase in companies opting out of public market structures. Counter-arguments to 
this interpretation are also considered. The conclusion reached is that although the evidence is 
                                                 
760  Ibid. 
761  Ibid. 
762  Ibid. 
763  Kay Review, p. 5.  
764  Ibid.  
765  Ibid, p. 26.  
766  Ibid.  
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not definitive, there is sufficient substance to conclude that SMST is – or has the potential to 
– undermine confidence in the stock market, and such perception is worth addressing.      
 
1. Reduced IPOs 
 
Professor Kay offered supporting evidence that primary equity issuances in the UK 
have declined.767 Similar figures have been offered in the US. US IPOs have declined 
generally followed a downward trend from 486 IPOs per year in 1999 to 160 IPOs per year in 
2017.768 Concerns about SMST – along with costs, market volatility and litigation risks – 
have been expressly cited as a reason European, Asian and North American companies have 
reservations about undertaking an IPO.769 Anecdotal evidence indicates that that public 
markets are not desirable. A technology analyst said ‘every other software CEO I speak with 
has little or no interest in the capital markets…the way markets operate are of little value to a 
company that has a strong customer base, cash flow and even in some cases, profitability’770. 
 
The problem with the allegation that SMST is contributing to fewer IPOs is that 
global market launches appear to be flourishing.771 However, this abundance does not 
necessarily equate to quality, and also is questionable given that the overall the number of US 
public companies has declined – from a peak of about 8,000 in 1999 to approximately 4,000 
in 2017.772 Foreign companies listed on the US stock exchanges have increased slightly 
during this period – from approximately 800 in 2000 to 873 in 2017, although this increase is 
not significant enough to offset the reduction in domestic listings. It does not appear that this 
gap is taken up elsewhere in the world, as total figures for listed companies globally have 
                                                 
767  Kay Review, p. 24. 
768  ‘Number of IPOs in the United States from 1999 to 2017’ Statista <Online: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/270290/number-of-ipos-in-the-us-since-1999/>.  
769  See Reid Smith & Merger Market Report, ‘Taking Stock: Going Public in Uncertain Times’ (2016), where 
a survey of market participants indicated that short-termism of investors was a major reservation in going 
public. 
770  McNevin, Ambrose, ‘Keeping it private or making it public – the CEO’s of Tibco, Informatica and Zscaler 
answer if and why software companies need capital markets?’ (15 February 2016) Computer Business 
Review <Online: https://www.cbronline.com/enterprise-it/keeping-it-private-or-making-it-public-the-ceos-
of-tibco-informatica-and-zscaler-answer-if-and-why-software-companies-need-capital-markets-4811289/>.  
771  Wasik, Zosia, ‘Number of UK IPOs at 4-year low’, (28 March 2017) Financial Times <Online: 
https://www.ft.com/content/4bdd4888-a20a-3cc4-b683-6d0c2d0d606f>, in which it is observed that 
although UK IPOs are down – likely largely due to Brexit uncertainty – ‘[t]here have been more fresh stock 
market listings globally than any other similar period since 2000, while the value of global IPOs for the 
same period has more than doubled compared to last year’. 
772  Ritholtz, Barry, ‘Where have all the public companies gone?’ Bloomberg View (24 June 2015) <Online: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone>; 
and Brorsen, 2017.   
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also declined during this period, albeit calculated on a number of listed companies per million 
people basis.773 This global decline in number of companies is broadly supported by declines 
in numbers of domestically listed companies in the 35 countries that have signed the 
Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (the ‘OECD’) 
– which went from approximately 26,000 in 2005 to approximately 22,000 in 2016.774 
Although the number of companies and IPOs may be declining, the quantity of listed 
companies may not be the only relevant measure of a declining interest in capital markets. 
The increasing market value of listed companies in the US and globally is also significant.    
 
The remaining public companies have grown in size. In the US, market value of listed 
companies relative to US GDP grew from 40% in the 1990s to almost 160% in 2016.775 
These numbers are reflected in OECD domestic listed companies with market value relative 
to GDP moving from approximately 60% in 1990 to 110% in 2015.776 In total dollar terms, in 
the US for example, this means that the market value of 4,000 domestic listed companies is 
now in excess of US$30 trillion.777 This increased value does not mean that there are more 
investment options or demonstrate investor confidence in the market. Rather, wealth appears 
to have just consolidated in fewer listed companies. The largest 1% of US public companies 
now represent 29% of the total market capitalization.778 Further, about 140 companies now 
each exceed US$50 billion in market value, representing more than half of the total US 
market capitalization.779 There may be issues around industry consolidation as a result of this 
trend, although these concerns could be offset by robust competition laws. Other reasons for 
concern due to this consolidation could include issues around stock dispersion and the quality 
of the remaining stocks, which are considered in greater detail in Subsection B(3) below.    
                                                 
773  Number of Listed Companies for the World (1975-2015) FRED Economic Data Economic Research, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis <Online: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOM011WA644NWDB>.  
774  Listed domestic companies, total (OECD countries), The World Bank <Online: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=OE>.  
775  Brorsen, 2017. 
776  Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP) (OECD countries), The World Bank 
<Online: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS>. 
777  Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current US$) (United States), The World Bank 
<Online: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=US>. 
778  Brorsen, 2017. 
779  Ibid.  
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2. Increased Going-Private Transactions and Use of Private Equity 
 
It could be argued that public-to-private buyouts, also known as ‘leveraged buy-outs’ 
or ‘going-private transactions’   ̶  an acquisition strategy where private equity is used to 
acquire and de-list a company780  ̶  should be occurring at an increased rate if SMST is 
driving public companies from public markets. There is some evidence that going-private 
transactions have  ̶  with various notable dips including in 2009 as a result of the GFC  ̶  
significantly increased in number and dollar value since the 1990s. In the US, for example, 
going-private transactions have gone from six deals valued at less than US$1 billion in 1995 
to 328 deals valued at over US$300 billion in 2016.781 Also, in the EU generally, Bain 
Capital observed that the value of going-private M&A transactions part way through 2017 
was nearly €12bn, its highest level since 2007 and more than double each of the previous 
three years.782 There is some anecdotal evidence that SMST is to blame for this increase.  
 
Notable going-private transactions include Del and Tibco Software. Speaking on the 
decision to take Del private in 2013, Michael Dell stated, ‘I’d say we got it 
right…[p]rivatization has unleashed the passion of our team members who have the freedom 
to focus first on innovating for customers in a way that was not always possible when striving 
to meet the quarterly demands of Wall Street’783. Echoing these sentiments, Tibco Software 
CEO Vivek Ranadive when speaking about the decision to go private said, ‘[t]he whole 
philosophy is not to think about the short term and focus on having a highly profitable long-
term business’.  Ranadive speculated that ‘I think there will be a large number of companies 
who will think answering to the Street is too much of a hassle and will decide to go private... 
I see this as an increasing trend’784. This could just be rhetoric, but when viewed together 
with the survey evidence, it is suggestive that SMST is a contributing factor to less use of 
public market structures. It also appears that many companies are electing not to enter public 
                                                 
780  Renneboog, Luc and Vansteenkiste, Cara, ‘Leveraged Buyouts: A Survey of the Literature’ ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No 492/2017 (January 2017), p. 3. 
781  Global Private Equity Report, Bain & Company, Inc. p. 2 <Online: https://psik.org.pl/images/publikacje-i-
raporty---publikacje/BAIN_REPORT_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2017.pdf?>.  
782  Bower, Max, ‘LBOs to Fly as Activists Poised to Bring More M&A Activity to Europe’ GlobalCapital (22 
June 2017).  
783  Dell, Michael, ‘Going Private is Paying Off for Dell’ The Wall Street Journal (24 November 2014).  
784  Qualtrough, Edward, ‘Tibco CEO says more companies will follow Dell and go private’ (5 November 
2014) <Online: https://www.cio.co.uk/it-strategy/tibco-ceo-says-more-companies-will-go-private-
3584225/>.  
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markets at all due to SMST concerns, but rather pursuing financing through private equity 
routes.785 Although the upward trend of private equity has not been consistent, 2017 looked to 
be a record high year since the GFC for private equity buy-outs generally in both the US786 
and the UK787. Evidence of going private activity and the increasing use of private equity 
ownership structures coupled with survey and anecdotal evidence may be indicative that 
SMST is contributing to a preference for non-public structures. If we accept that SMST is a 
contributing factor, the question remains as to if this trend is problematic.  
 
3. Are Less IPOs and More Going-Private Transactions/Private Equity a Problem? 
 
Even if IPOs are declining and there is an increase in non-public structures, the 
argument has been made that the slack this has caused in the public markets may be taken up 
elsewhere in the financial market as a whole. Roe posited that ‘[i]f the public markets are 
inducing a publicly held ﬁrm to be excessively short-term oriented…then private equity 
holders…could buy the company, take it off the public market, and reorient its business 
model toward the longer term’788. Showing that this rebalancing occurs, Professor Kay 
observed, ‘[t]he diminished importance of public equity markets as a source of new funds for 
business investment has been paralleled by a rise in private equity and in the use of corporate 
debt’789. This may be so, and stock markets may no longer be as important a source of capital 
for business investments as they once were.790 It could be argued that stock markets are only 
a by-product of a healthy economy and may no longer be relevant if sufficient capital can be 
raised privately. However, public markets continue to be important for many reasons. 
 
As considered in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), well-functioning stock markets may 
reduce investing risk by providing liquidity for asset owners and asset managers791, be viable 
                                                 
785  See the discussion by Colvin, Geoff, ‘Take this market and shove it’ Fortune (16 May 2017) <Online: 
http://fortune.com/going-private/>.  
786  Espinoza, Javier, ‘Private Equity Buyouts Hit Highest Level in Decade’ Financial Times (29 June 2017) 
<Online: https://www.ft.com/content/7e99c000-5c1e-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220>. 
787  Wastell, Kenny, ‘UK Buyout Activity Reaches Post-Crisis Peak in 2017’ Unquote (21 December 2017) 
<Online: http://www.unquote.com/uk/analysis/3007966/uk-buyout-activity-reaches-post-crisis-peak-in-
2017>.  
788  Roe, 2013, pp. 987-988. 
789  Kay Review, p. 25. 
790  Ibid, p. 22, where Professor Kay observes that ‘[e]quity markets have not been an important source of 
capital for new investment in British business for many years…[l]arge UK companies are self-financing – 
the cash flow they obtain from operations through profits and depreciation is more than sufficient for their 
investment needs’. 
791  Arestis et al, 2001, p. 18. 
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exit options for founders, and also serve as important bench marks for valuations of 
businesses in the private sector792. More research is required to explore the impact of the 
stock market on non-public companies, but the interconnectedness of public and non-public 
entities is considerable. Robust stock markets are arguably an important part of a healthy 
financial system. Consequently, SMST should not be discounted just because some of its 
effects may be ameliorated in the capital markets as a whole. But what exactly are the 
problems created by fewer IPOs and an increase in going-private transactions and use of 
private equity caused perhaps in part by SMST? Rather than being harmful, is this 
consolidation indicative of market efficiency and maturity? The main harms hypothesized are 
concerns about access and quality in the remaining listings, including a ‘lemons problem’.   
 
a. Access Issues  
 
The argument made is that the reliance on private capital has made it harder for 
investors to get exposure to younger companies that would have otherwise listed on a stock 
exchange more quickly.793 For example, in 1997, Amazon went public as a small-cap stock 
and has since ballooned into a US$566 billion company, providing early investors with a 
significant fortune.794 In contrast, in the current, market companies like Facebook Inc. wait 
until they are multibillion-dollar businesses before publicly listing and Uber Technologies 
Inc. and Airbnb Inc. have so far resisted going public.795 In order for investors to gain 
exposure to faster-growing industry segments and companies, they must rely on ‘various 
forms of private equity’796  ̶  which are not available to all investors. Supporting the position 
that if companies list at all, they are listing larger and later, US academics Paul Rose and 
Steven Davidoff Solomon argued that ‘[t]he small company IPO is dead’797. Rose and 
Davidoff attribute the cause of such ‘death’ not to regulatory increases in the US – i.e. 
Sarbanes-Oxley – but rather primarily to a lack of investor appetite for riskier small-cap 
                                                 
792  ‘Valuing Private Companies’ Investopedia (16 November 2016), <Online: 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/11/valuing-private-companies.asp>, and see the 
discussion in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues).  
793  Wursthorn, Michael and Zuckerman, Gregory, ‘Fewer Listed Companies: Is That Good or Bad for Stock 
Markets?’ Dow Jones Newswires (5 January 2018). 
794  Ibid. 
795  Ibid. 
796  LaCroix, Kevin, ‘Fewer U.S. Listed Companies – Is That A Problem?’ The D&O Diary (9 April 2018) 
<Online: https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/04/articles/ipos/fewer-u-s-listed-companies-problem/>.  
797  Rose, Paul and Solomon, Steven Davidoff, ‘Where Have All the IPOs Gone: The Hard Life of the Small 
IPO’ (2016) 6 Harvard Business Law Review 83.  
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companies.798 It may just be that these types of companies are not suited to the public space. 
However, it is equally possible that SMST concerns are driving these entities out of public 
markets. ‘If a fix is to come’, Rose and Davidoff argued, ‘it will require creating a patient 
market environment that fosters growth in small companies both before and after a small 
company’s IPO’799. These arguments are certainly not conclusive that there is a harmful 
SMST problem limiting access to investment at least in the US stock market, but if we accept 
that diversity of investment options in stock markets is beneficial, claims of a SMST problem 
reducing the attractiveness of public markets should be addressed, otherwise further 
consolidation of the stock market into a few large-cap companies appears probable.   
 
b. Quality Issues 
 
Another concern raised about the consequences of the impact of SMST on the quality 
of public equity markets is the ‘lemons problem’. Dallas summarizes this lemons problem as 
occurring ‘when a firm is unable to differentiate itself from other firms with poorer 
prospects’800. Also, in a report for the Centre for American Progress, Jarsulic et al link SMST 
to this lemons problem.801 Specifically, they say that ‘[s]ince higher short-term earnings 
signal higher long-run value, some managers may attempt to fool investors by engaging in 
short-termism to raise current earnings’802. As discussed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission 
Mechanisms), there is some plausible evidence suggesting that this results in real earnings 
management by company managers – which is subtler than fraud, and involves management 
acting to smooth short-term earnings thereby not causing any undue decline to stock prices. 
This behaviour, Jarsulic et al go on to say, ‘poses the danger that investors will believe the 
stock market is a lemons market, forcing even long-termist managers into short-termism in 
order to appear as profitable as short-termist firms’803. The end result, Jarsulic et al argue is 
that ‘this dynamic could cause growing firms to forgo or even exit public markets entirely’804. 
Coupled with the anecdotal examples provided above, and the actual reduction in IPOs and 
the number of listed companies generally, the SMST issue – either real or perceived – may 
appears to be leading to the degradation of the quality of public markets meaning that there 
                                                 
798  Ibid, p. 87. 
799  Ibid. 
800  Dallas, 2012, p. 313. 
801  Jarsulic et al, 2015. 
802  Ibid.  
803  Ibid.  
804  Ibid.  
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will continue to be fewer and fewer IPOs and that stock markets will be consolidated into 
fewer and fewer – albeit potentially higher dollar value – listed companies. 
 
C. SOCIETAL COSTS OF SMST 
 
The point has also been raised that ‘[i]f one is worried about the sustainability of 
corporations from an environmental, social, or political perspective, the problem of ‘short-
termism’ has to be a central worry’805. The well-known collapses of corporate giants, Enron, 
Worldcom and Nortel, have all been cited to show how unrealistically high expectations from 
the market can lead to short-term thinking, and behavior by a listed company’s management 
in order to fulfill these expectations encourages a culture of greed and promotes excessive 
risk taking.806 It has been argued that this encouragement of excessive short-term behaviour 
leads to a ‘culture of greed’, providing a fertile breeding ground for excessive executive pay 
and corruption, which can then have impacts that go far beyond the scandalized corporate 
managers.807 It has also been argued that the alleged SMST issue could actually cause 
harmful environmental impacts as company managers would take environmentally harmful 
actions in order to see short-term financial benefits.808 Although these arguments may be 
intuitively compelling, it is difficult to viably demonstrate the connection between the actual 
or perceived excessive discounting by asset owners and the alleged societal costs of SMST, 
and convincing arguments or evidence establishing this connection have not been presented. 
 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that ‘markets that are focused primarily on the 
short term will almost certainly excessively discount even price-relevant ESG information 
limiting further the role that markets are able to play in driving sustainable 
behaviour…[t]hus, markets that focus only on the short run cannot be said to be sustainable 
in any form’809. The UNEP referred to an expert poll of business, NGO, academia and 
government respondents conducted by GlobeScan and SustainAbility in 2011, which survey 
indicated that a large majority (88%) of the 642 experts polled saw pressure for short-term 
                                                 
805  Greenfield, 2011, p. 628. 
806  See the discussion in Dallas, 2012, p. 268 at Note 7, and the Aspen Report, 2010, p. 2. 
807  Salter, 2012, where the author explains using the example of Citigroup and its settlement with the SEC on 
fraud charges, how the firms focus on short-term profit invited corruption.   
808  See the Aspen Report, 2010, p. 4, which cites a survey of corporate directors of Fortune 200 boards, 31 of 
34 of which state that they would ‘cut down a mature forest or release a dangerous, unregulated toxin into 
the environment in order to increase profits’.   
809  Stock Exchanges and Sustainability, 2015, p. 23. 
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financial results as a barrier to businesses becoming more sustainable.810 Details of exactly 
how SMST prevented sustainability were not provided by respondents, but presumably this 
would be because company managers feel pressure from investors to provide short-term 
financial returns at the expense of funding longer-term sustainable business initiatives. 
Sustainable initiatives, the UNEP has suggested, often have long investment horizons, and 
therefore may be particularly impacted by SMST.811 Although longer-term thinking is 
certainly a component of sustainability initiatives, the UNEP in its report on Stock Exchanges 
and Sustainability, has acknowledged that there may be a disconnection between longer-term 
company management and sustainable business. Particularly, a longer-term approach does 
not necessarily mean a focus on ESG factors. Consequently, the UNEP argued, ‘lengthening 
time horizons is a necessary but insufficient condition for ensuring a transition to a more 
sustainable economy’812. There may be numerous factors, and not just SMST, which 
jeopardize corporation’s becoming more sustainable, including for example climate change 
and geo-political instability. Consequently, regulatory and financial industry solutions should 
tailor solutions addressing all factors impeding sustainability and addressing sustainability 
collaterally though SMST reforms alone does not appear to be a viable approach.  
D. TRANSFER OF WEALTH FROM FUTURE TO CURRENT ASSET OWNERS 
It has also been argued that on a market-wide basis, SMST issue elicits ‘a direct and 
uncompensated transfer of wealth from future to current shareholders’813. This 
uncompensated wealth transfer effect is more than just an issue of asset distribution between 
sophisticated financial professionals that can protect themselves. Rather, according to this 
theory, current asset owners and asset managers apply pressure to unduly extract short-term 
lesser value returns from a listed company in the form of cash distributions, buybacks and/or 
high share prices, which causes a resulting net loss to the investing public. As discussed 
below, this wealth transfer appears to manifest in two main ways: (1) when future 
shareholders suffer a loss in share price; or (2) if short-term expenditures result in company 
managers ‘missing long-term investment opportunities’ that would be more profitable.  
                                                 
810  ‘Financial Short-Termism a Major Obstacle to Sustainable Change in Business: Expert Poll’, Press Release 
of the UNEP (26 January 2012). 
811  Stock Exchanges and Sustainability, 2015, p. 11. 
812  Ibid. 
813  Moore & Walker-Arnott, 2014, p. 423, and Moore & Petrin, 2017, p. 124, which discussed and referenced 
Greenfield, 2011, p. 636.  
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1. Loss in Share Price 
It has been argued that if the shares of listed companies are over-priced in the market 
and are not reflective of actual long-term value of the firm, ‘the future investors holding the 
relevant shares at the point in time when the overpricing is widely detected will suffer a 
resulting loss in value’814. The wealth transfer from high share prices occurs as a listed 
company’s existing asset owners may exit their investment prior to the over-valuation being 
detected, thereby leaving future shareholders to suffer a loss in value as the share price 
declines.815 The question may be asked as to why regulators and the financial industry should 
intervene in the absence of fraud: why should the financial returns of future investors be 
protected? Accepting that there is at least some evidence of a SMST problem, as discussed in 
Chapter 5 (What is the SMST Problem?), the difficulty lies in the ability of asset owners and 
asset managers to adequately assess such losses and their ability – or individual interest – to 
act to recoup losses. Individual losses to asset owners may not be significant enough – or the 
causation of such loss sufficiently clear – to compel the impacted parties to seek a remedy at 
the time they suffer the loss, but collectively the lost value could be considerable. This 
scenario raises questions on how investor pressure and company manager responses to such 
investor pressure impacts whether share prices accurately represent long-term value.   
2. Missed Opportunities  
It has also been argued that SMST involves management ‘taking steps that boost the 
short-term stock but reduce the size of the pie’816. The theory is that the excessive discounting 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) may cause company managers to favour 
short-term cash returns to shareholders rather than pursuing longer-term and more beneficial 
projects. Davies et al have articulated this concept as opportunity costs, which include 
investment projects and hence future output.817 These ‘missed opportunities’ mean current 
shareholders may receive lesser value at the expense of revenues which could have greater 
benefit to future shareholders. It may be that if listed company shareholders are not properly 
valuing these types of long-term projects, then the company should be taken private, where 
such investments could be more acurately valued. This may be occurring in some 
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circumstances, and the increasing role of public-to-private buyouts suggests that companies 
believe longer-term returns may be more accurately valued in the private sector. However, as 
noted above and in Chapter 2 (Defining the Issues), there is value in these opportunities being 
available in a robust widely held public market. The harms caused by such short-term 
approach and the resulting ‘missed opportunities’ may not be readily apparent to the market. 
As observed by Davies at al ‘[unlike] crises, these opportunity costs are neither violent nor 
visible…[r]ather they are silent and invisible’818. This suggests that these missed 
opportunities for longer-term investment are not just relevant for a limited number of listed 
companies but could apply across the market. The survey evidence discussed in 
Subsection A(1) of Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) backs this up, as a significant 
portion of company managers consistently indicate that due to shareholder pressure for short-
term financial returns they forgo longer-term projects.819 As discussed in Subsection A(1) of 
Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) survey evidence, although compelling, has inherent 
weaknesses, and, therefore, the specific analysis on the evidence of wealth transfer and 
potential losses to future shareholders allegedly caused by SMST is considered below. 
 
3. Evidence of this Wealth Transfer/Loss  
 
As noted in Section A of Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), it is practically 
very difficult – if not impossible – to quantitatively measure the wealth transfer or loss 
caused by the supposed SMST issue because there is no readily available control group 
against which to measure a market without SMST. However, attempts have been made to 
measure this wealth transfer or loss through an analysis of the impacts of stock buybacks – 
which are cash purchases by the company of its own outstanding shares on the open 
market820, and by various other measures including using the private/public company 
comparison and attempting to measure the benefits of a longer-term investing approach by 
asset owners and asset managers. Each of these evidentiary measures is considered below.  
 
                                                 
818  Ibid. 
819  See the surveys summarized in Graham et al, 2005, updated in Graham et al, 2006. 
820  Definition of ‘buyback’, Investopedia <Online: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/buyback.asp>.  
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a. Stock Buybacks 
 
The substantial surge in US stock buybacks over the last decade – allegedly caused in 
part by SMST via an interest by company managers to boost EPS and satisfy shareholder 
desires for short-term financial returns – has been offered as evidence of a loss of wealth and 
a problematic wealth transfer from future to current shareholders.821 Though US stock 
buybacks may have declined in the last few years, they are still well above where they were a 
decade ago.822 Recent figures also put such stock buybacks at record highs for 2018.823  
 
It appears possible that such stock buybacks are not occurring for valid business 
reasons, but instead are driven by SMST and are harmful to long-term value. Three main 
arguments raised by company managers to justify open market purchases of their shares are: 
(1) buybacks are necessary to offset the dilution of employee stock options; (2) the company 
is mature and has run out of investment opportunities; and (3) buybacks are investments in 
undervalued shares meant to signal confidence in the company’s future824. The first point 
used to justify buybacks – i.e. that such buybacks are necessary to offset the dilution caused 
by employee stock option plans – is arguably not a viable justification for the high level of 
buybacks, as research shows that buybacks are often in excess of a multiple of exercised 
employee options.825 The second point used to justify buybacks – i.e. that the company is 
mature and has run out of investment opportunities – is more difficult to assess.    
 
It is possible that such companies do not have viable investment options and that the 
capital is best deployed elsewhere. Although the increasing percentage of S&P 500 listed 
company earnings dedicated to buybacks rather than reinvestment is considerable, it is 
possible that these buybacks free up capital and allow investors to reinvest in more profitable 
opportunities. With respect to buybacks, economist Tyler Cowen noted that funds transfer to 
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Has Doubled In The Last Decade’ (Business Insider) (5 April 2014) <Online: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/sp-500-stock-buyback-history-2014-4?IR=T>. 
822  Samson, Adam, Platt, Eric and Wigglesworth, Robin, ‘US share buyback plan approvals plunge’ (Financial 
Times) (1 May 2017) <Online: https://www.ft.com/content/694fa0b0-2e84-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a>. 
823  Cowen, 2018.  
824  Lazonick, 2014, pp. 51-52 and Yallapragada, 2014, which sets out a range of reasons why stock buybacks 
are carried out by listed companies. 
825  Lazonick, 2014, p. 51. 
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shareholders and real resources are not destroyed – the money from buybacks could still go to 
a venture capital fund, or into private equity or a real estate investment trust, in addition to 
numerous other undertakings, all of which might boost investment and real wages.826 This 
may be true, but it is also likely that these funds may not be valuably invested and they could 
be squandered by the recipients, or reinvested in capital raises by similar listed companies 
and thus used as fodder for further buybacks – thereby contributing to an ongoing cycle of 
cash transfers without building any underlying value. A study on this point indicated that US 
corporate investment has fallen below levels indicated by Tobin’s Q, a measure of the 
prospective profitability of investment projects, and concluded that this underperformance in 
part owes to ‘changes in governance that encourage shares buyback instead of investment’827. 
 
Further, it has been argued that existing listed companies have significant 
organizational and financial advantages when they expand and enter new markets.828 They 
may be giving this up in exchange for a short-term positive bump to their share prices caused 
by the buyback. In addition to pressure from shareholders to provide short-term financial 
returns, a reason that company managers may pursue buybacks is because such buybacks 
increase EPS numbers by reducing the total number of issued shares.829 Buybacks, therefore, 
facilitate company managers meeting EPS targets and keeping shareholders happy.830 In 
support that this is occurring, a study of US listed companies from 1988 to 2010 evidenced 
that a considerable amount of buybacks occur when a company would otherwise miss its EPS 
target if not for the resulting lift provided by a stock buyback.831 It is important to note that 
such EPS-driven buyback actions do not increase the total earnings for the period. 
Consequently, in the long-term, these share buy-backs would only have a temporary positive 
impact on share price, and a correction would result in a decline in share price for the 
shareholders who did not have their shares bought back. The argument is also made that stock 
buybacks may undermine income equality, job stability and growth – i.e. the interests of 
future shareholders –, because the capital used to implement the stock buyback is not 
invested in longer-term more profitable investments of the listed company.832  
                                                 
826  Cowen, 2018. 
827  Gutierrez, German and Thomas Philippon, ‘Investment-Less Growth: An Empirical Investigation,’ NBER 
Working Paper 22897, (December 2016). 
828  Lazonick, 2014, p. 52. 
829  Lazonick, 2014, p. 48 and Yallapragada, 2014, p. 193. 
830  Ibid. 
831  Almeida et al, 2016. 
832  Ibid, p. 48. 
 179 
 
 
As discussed in Section A above, productivity levels, particularly with regard to UK 
and US listed companies, are arguably not optimal as compared to what they could be. The 
point raised by Lazonick and others833 is that a listed company’s productivity, and by 
extension national productivity, will not improve unless firms retain earnings and fund 
investment, rather than returning cash to shareholders, in part through stock buybacks. 
Professor Yallapragada observes ‘[m]any analysts attribute this phenomenon [buybacks] to 
weakening economy, falling prices of financial stocks and the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe’834. However, as discussed in Section A above in the context of corporate 
competitiveness, the leap to national productivity is problematic as it is difficult to evidence 
that buybacks are a contributing factor impacting productivity at a national level.  
 
More significant, however, are concerns about the impact of buybacks on the listed 
company that buys its own shares. As noted above, stock buy-backs would only have a 
temporarily positive impact on share price, and a correction would result in a decline in share 
price for the shareholders who did not have their shares bought back. On the third point – i.e. 
buybacks are investments in undervalued shares meant to signal confidence in the company’s 
future – buybacks may be beneficial to listed companies if the shares purchased are in fact 
undervalued. However, the evidence suggests that rather than picking up undervalued shares, 
listed companies tend to buy back shares when the market is high, which penalizes 
continuing shareholders when the share price drops.835 GE has been cited as an example of a 
listed company with a poor buyback policy, as it has spent more than US$50 billion on 
buybacks since 2015, and yet the share price has collapsed over that period.836 Consequently, 
there is evidence suggesting that buybacks are occurring when shares are undervalued 
therefore negatively impacting remaining shareholders. There is no evidence to suggest that 
the funds from share buybacks are being more valuably invested by recipients of the buyback 
funds. Consequently, the current level of buybacks provides some indication of SMST harm.  
 
                                                 
833  Ibid, p. 53, which also references Gary P Pisano and Willy C Shih of Harvard Business School, in their 
2009 Harvard Business Review article ‘Restoring American Competitiveness’ and their book ‘Producing 
Prosperity.   
834  Yallapragada, 2014, p. 193. 
835  Lazonick, 2014, p. 51. 
836  Lazonick, 2014, p. 51, and Trainer, Davis, ‘Bad Buybacks Can Destroy Shareholder Value’ Forbes (26 
December 2017) <Online: https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/12/26/bad-buybacks-can-
destroy-shareholder-value/#71a740ef294a>. 
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b. Research on Long-Term Focused Companies 
 
As a rough proxy for a control group to evidence the harms of SMST, private 
companies have been used. As discussed in Subsection A(4) of Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST 
Problem?), matched samples of private and public companies provide some evidence that 
private companies invest more in a firm’s long-term operations than public companies.837 
Although intuitively compelling, the evidence does not on its own convincingly demonstrate 
that short-termism is a significant contributor to this public/private investment gap. It could 
just be that businesses with longer-term interests are self-selecting into the private sector – so 
the method is, therefore, arguably comparing apples to oranges. To address this lacuna in the 
research, attempts have also been made to divide listed companies into companies that have a 
long-term focus and those that do not have such a focus, in as a means of determining if the 
longer-term focused companies exhibit superior financial performance.  
 
Particularly, McKinsey has set out to measure the purported wealth transfer by 
isolating short-term and long-term focused sample groups of listed companies. If a company 
with a long-term focus does better than a short-term focused company, this should indicate 
that long-termism creates more value and firms that fail to have this orientation are 
transferring wealth to their current shareholders at the expense of greater value for future 
investors. To do so, McKinsey developed a corporate horizons index (the ‘CHI’) based on a 
set of variables that McKinsey claimed indicate how long-term oriented companies behave 
differently from short-term focused firms838 These variables include investment, earnings 
quality, margin growth, quarterly management and earnings-per-share growth.839  
 
Using a data set of 615 large- and mid-cap US publicly listed companies from 2001-
2015, the McKinsey Report, 2017 provided evidence that based on the CHI, the listed 
companies classed by McKinsey as ‘long-term’ significantly outperformed their ‘short-term’ 
classed peers in terms of revenue, R&D spending, market capitalization and job creation.840 
This out-performance by the long-term companies suggests that a longer-term focus creates 
more value for investors than that of short-term oriented companies. Admittedly, the 
                                                 
837  See the summary in Roe, 2013, p. 986 at note 33, and Davies et al, 2014 at pp. 22-24.  
838  McKinsey Report, 2017, p. 3.  
839  Ibid.  
840  Ibid, p. 2. 
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McKinsey Report, 2017 does not attempt to directly demonstrate that SMST is harmful. 
Instead, it only presents research that a longer-term approach may be more beneficial than a 
shorter-term approach, based on a select set of variables. Further, this study raises the 
question of how the allegedly longer-term oriented companies were able to pursue their long-
term approach given the pressures for short-term returns identified in the stock market.  
 
The argument could be made that the longer-term companies are just better managed, 
and, therefore, the discussion should be around superior verses mediocre performing 
managers – with the stock market keeping mediocre managers on a tighter leash through calls 
for short-term financial returns. This accords with the discussion in Subsection B(2)(b) of 
Chapter 5 (Is There a SMST Problem?) that owners of listed company pursue short-termism 
in project choice in order to limit managerial rent-seeking behaviour. However, although the 
longer-term companies may do a better job of communicating long-term value to the market, 
this does not confirm that the remaining companies are poorly managed. It is equally possible 
that these short-term focused companies could particularly benefit from regulatory and 
financial industry reforms meant to reduce the excessive discounting causing SMST.   
 
The analysis provided in this Chapter suggests that if SMST is harmful, such harm 
most plausibly relates to reduced trust in the stock market and a wealth transfer from future to 
current shareholders. The evidence presented in this Chapter, however, does not definitively 
demonstrate market-wide failings caused at least in part by SMST. Given the evidentiary 
issues inherent in viably measuring the deleterious effects of SMST, definitive proof of such 
harms may never be convincingly provided. Regardless of the evidentiary issues in 
definitively proving that there is a harmful SMST problem, the analysis provided in 
Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) demonstrates that there has been some – albeit limited – 
SMST reform. Consequently, policymakers and the financial industry appear to be, at least to 
some degree, accepting the evidence provided that SMST is a problem. As there is some 
evidentiary basis to affirm the validity of such a response by regulators and the financial 
industry, SMST concerns cannot entirely be written off as delusional or only a rhetorical 
cover for other reform efforts. Possibly in response to the lack of evidentiary substantiation of 
the harms of SMST, reform efforts to date have mainly been ‘light’ touch and a ‘gentle 
nudge’ rather than a ‘push’. The next Chapter assesses these reforms and whether such 
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reforms at least conceptually address the SMST problem based on the conclusions reached in 
Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?) and Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms).  
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SMST REFORMS 
 
‘[B]ehavioral theory implies that we should be more skeptical about the ability of rule 
makers to correctly perceive the real problem and find the appropriate remedies.’841 
 
The previous Chapters demonstrate that if a harmful SMST problem is occurring, a 
significant contributing factor appears to be the excessive discounting of future financial 
returns by asset owners and asset managers. This undue discounting then causes company 
managers to prioritize short-term financial returns and actions that improve, or at least do not 
negatively impact, share prices. As discussed in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission 
Mechanisms), such excessive discounting by asset owners and asset managers requires a 
transmission mechanism into listed companies. The most likely conduits for such SMST are 
the actions of a wide range of investors primarily via the approval of short-term equity-based 
compensation of company managers, and corporate governance and legal mechanisms which 
give asset owners the ability to make changes to the board of directors, and, as a result, the 
management of a listed company. This SMST arguably may be intensified by asset managers 
who are incentivized to act in their clients’ short-term interests, and by asset manager 
compensation structures focused on short-term financial returns. As discussed in Chapter 7 
(What Harm Does SMST Cause?), there is some plausible evidence suggesting that SMST 
results in a reduced trust in the stock market as a capital raising venue, which is problematic 
as a robust stock market is intrinsically important to modern capital markets, and that SMST 
may also result in an uncompensated wealth transfer from future to current asset owners, 
which is also problematic as it causes a net loss to the investing public.  
 
Based on this analysis, notionally effective reforms to address the SMST problem 
require either: (1) minimizing the excessive discounting of future returns; or (2) cutting off 
the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company  ̶  i.e. de-coupling the short-
termism of investors from the actions of company managers. This dual pathway to SMST 
reform is explored further in Section A of this Chapter. Section B then provides an 
examination of whether the implemented SMST reforms identified in Chapter 4 (What Has 
Been Done?) conceptually address the SMST problem by employing either of Option (1) or 
Option (2) identified in Section A as necessary corrective measures. Based on this 
examination, the conclusion reached in Section B is that few of the implemented SMST 
reforms considered in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) adequately hit the mark and 
                                                 
841  Jurrikkala, 2012, pp. 92-93.  
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conceptually address the SMST issue. Given these issues, and the resulting difficulty in 
effectively regulating to correct the alleged SMST issue, it is not surprising that the 
implemented SMST reforms to date have been minimal and are relatively ‘light’ touch. 
Section C then goes on to explore whether this ‘light’ touch approach may actually not be 
particularly problematic, concluding that with the appropriate regulatory and financial 
industry messaging, this ‘light’ touch approach may be, if not the ideal, rather the most 
feasible and realistic method of providing a gentle ‘nudge’ to correct the SMST problem.  
 
A. DUAL PATHWAY FOR SMST REFORM 
 
If SMST is the harmful material problem it is alleged to be, any potential regulatory 
or financial industry solution requires either: (1) minimizing the excessive discounting issues 
around future returns  ̶  i.e. assisting capital markets to more accurately assess long-term 
financial performance and encouraging asset owners to take a longer-term approach; or (2) 
cutting off the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company  ̶  i.e. preventing 
the asset owner/asset manager preference for short-term financial returns getting into listed 
companies at all. This dual pathway is illustrated in Figure 12 below. Before analyzing 
whether the SMST reforms identified in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) conceptually 
address the SMST issue through either of these options, it is, however, first necessary to 
delve deeper into the theory behind how such options would work to counter SMST.  
 
Figure 12. Dual Pathway for SMST Reform 
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1. Option 1: Reduce Excessive Discounting  
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), it is certainly 
reasonable that asset owners and asset managers may apply deep discounts to future profits of 
listed companies given the myriad of uncertainties inherent in actually delivering on long-
term performance objectives. Also, as discussed earlier in this thesis, it has been argued that 
rather than being a problem, such significant discounting might instead just be a crude way of 
adjusting for – and even constraining – company manager optimism and market 
uncertainties.842 However, as presented in Chapter 5 (Is There A SMST Problem?), the 
evidence is suggestive that this discounting appears to be in excess of what is reasonably 
necessary to account for company manager optimism and market uncertainties. Further, as 
company managers are aware of this excessive discounting and the resulting negative share 
price impact, evidence suggests that they may pursue actions to provide short-term financial 
gains which are more favorably received by the market, but do not build fundamental value 
thereby resulting in a later share price correction and a net loss to the investing public.  
 
Consequently, the SMST problem should either be addressed by reducing this 
excessive discounting, or, as discussed in Subsection A(2) below, by cutting off the 
transmission of such excessive discounting entirely. There are several logical ways of 
reducing excessive discounting in share pricing. One approach – as considered in further 
detail in Subsection A(1)(a) below – involves the difficult proposition of increasing asset 
owner and asset manager confidence that company managers will actually deliver on stated 
long-term performance objectives. For this approach to be at least conceptually effective, 
asset owners – and correspondingly asset managers – will also need to appreciate the benefits 
of a longer-term approach. Accordingly, Subsection A(1)(b) below considers the option of 
‘improving’ asset owners – and by extension asset managers – mainly by facilitating 
engagement and collective action and by ‘enlightening’ asset owners on the existence of a 
harmful short-term bias, and the corresponding benefits of a longer-term approach. Another 
approach that may work to reduce excessive discounting – which is considered in further 
detail in Subsection A(1)(c) below but ultimately rejected as a viable basis for SMST reform 
– involves tackling the agency problem underlying the excessive discounting by facilitating 
listed companies towards a controlling asset ownership structure. 
                                                 
842  See the summary of research in Dodd, 2009, p. 118. 
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a. Reduce Performance Uncertainty 
 
As indicated above, reducing the excessive discounting that appears to be causing 
SMST is a two-part process that involves both reducing performance uncertainty and 
‘improving’ asset owners. Key to this process is that listed company long term performance 
objectives and results of such performance should be clearly communicated to the market. 
Providing such clear communication may reduce the actual or perceived excessive 
discounting of future returns by asset owners, and, thereby, assist asset owners and asset 
managers to rely to a lesser degree on short-term financial returns. The extent to which the 
SMST-driven reforms identified in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) attempt to tackle the 
alleged SMST issue by reducing performance uncertainty of listed companies are considered 
in Section B of this Chapter and are summarized in tabular form in Appendix ‘C’. As will be 
demonstrated in the analysis in Section B of this Chapter, these SMST reforms primarily 
include introducing long-term strategic reporting requirements linked to remuneration 
reports. For these reforms to effectively reduce excessive discounting, it is not enough for 
company managers to more clearly communicate long-term performance strategy. Asset 
owners – and by extension asset managers – will also need to recognize the existence of a 
harmful short-term bias, and the corresponding benefits of a longer-term approach.  
 
b. ‘Improve’ Asset Owners    
 
For the reform approach of reducing performance uncertainty to be at least 
conceptually effective, asset owners – and correspondingly asset managers – also need to 
appreciate the benefits of a longer-term approach – i.e. the current behaviour of asset owners 
and asset managers needs to be ‘improved’. Unlike Subsection A(1)(a), this ‘improvement’ 
approach does not center on communication of long-term performance objectives and results 
by company managers. Instead, the ‘improvement’ approach focuses on: (1) educating – and 
thus ‘enlightening’ – asset owners and asset managers on the existence of a harmful short-
term bias, and the corresponding benefits of a longer-term approach; and (2) collective action 
and engagement by asset owners and asset managers in order to reduce concerns contributing 
to excessive discounting by increasing confidence that company manager actions are being 
monitored. As will be demonstrated in the analysis in Section B of this Chapter, SMST-
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driven reform efforts in this ‘improvement’ area include efforts to ‘enlighten’ asset owners 
and asset managers on the benefits of a longer-term approach, facilitating collective action 
and engagement by asset owners and asset managers – meant to reduce concerns contributing 
to excessive discounting by increasing confidence that the actions of company managers are 
being monitored –, and efforts to reduce the emphasis on short-term financial reporting.  
 
As discussed further in Section B below, there are numerous reservations around 
increased engagement and collective action by asset owners including that such action could 
amplify existing SMST concerns if asset owners continue to pursue short-termist objectives. 
It has also been suggested that engagement and collective action reform efforts may be most 
effective if lead by institutional investors, provided that they are ‘enlightened’ towards the 
harms of SMST and the benefits of a longer-term investing approach.843 Consequently, asset 
owner ‘enlightenment’ is a key part of the SMST reform process. The concept of 
‘enlightenment’ involves SMST reforms that inform investors of the benefits of a longer-term 
approach and the potential negative impacts of an undue short-term focus in investing. The 
extent to which the SMST-driven reforms identified in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) 
attempt to tackle the alleged SMST issue by ‘enlightening’ asset owners – and by extension 
asset managers – is considered in Section B and summarized in tabular form in Appendix ‘C’.  
 
c. Controlling Asset Owners    
 
Another option that has the potential to reduce the excessive discounting by asset 
owners is for a listed company to have a controlling shareholder. However, this option as a 
standalone solution is ultimately rejected as a viable basis for reform given the uncertainty 
around whether such approach positively impacts firm value. The argument that the presence 
of a controlling asset owner will reduce SMST is best understood in the context of agency 
theory. Such excessive discounting may occur as a result of a perceived information 
asymmetry and the resulting costly monitoring844 needed to be incurred by asset owners often 
                                                 
843  See Ambachtsheer, 2014, p. 9, where the author suggests that ‘institutional investors around the globe, led 
by the pension fund sector, are well placed to play a ‘lead wagon’ fiduciary role’ in efforts to end SMST,  
and Barton & Wiseman, 2014, p. 44, where the authors argue that big investors have an obligation to ‘end 
the plague of short-termism’.  
844  As discussed in the seminal work of Jensen, Michael C and Meckling, William H, ‘Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economic 
305, at p. 308, on agency theory, ‘monitoring includes more than just observing the behaviour of the 
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via asset managers, as principals, to scrutinize and ensure the long-term financial value 
generation of listed companies by their agents, namely boards of directors and by extension, 
company managers. Holding a ‘significant ownership stake’ could provide motivation for a 
principal to incur such monitoring costs.845 Such principals may be incentivized to incur 
monitoring costs to protect their investment as they may in practice have a reduced ability to 
‘vote with their feet’, the so-called ‘Wall Street Walk’ – i.e. sell their share position at a 
favourable price  ̶ , because selling a control block tends to depress the share price.846  
 
There is no bright line test for what constitutes a ‘significant ownership stake’ in the 
context of listed companies. As a starting point, the term ‘control’ in corporate law generally 
means holding a majority of the voting shares of a company, or having the right – via 
shareholdings or contract – to appoint a majority of the board of directors.847 With respect to 
business combinations, the Delaware General Corporation Law reduces the presumption of 
control to 20% of the voting rights of a company, which threshold applies in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary.848 As listed companies have dispersed shareholdings, 
particularly in Anglo-American corporate markets, by and large the percentage of shares 
actually voted on significant matters is considerably less than 100%. In the UK in the 2017 
AGM season, for example, only 70% of FTSE 250 company shares were voted, and less than 
50% the capital was voted in other UK listed companies.849 As not all shares are voted given 
dispersed shareholdings in listed companies, as a general observation, an ownership position 
of 20% may be considered to be a ‘significant ownership stake’ in a listed company.  
 
The effect of ownership and control on firm value is a long standing question in 
finance.850 Such control may be considered in the context of ‘inside’ control – i.e. control by 
                                                                                                                                                        
agent…[i]t includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behaviour of the agent through 
budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.’  
845  Cheffins, 2002, p. 360.  
846  Dasguta & Piacentino, 2015, p. 2853.  
847  For example, see the UK Companies Act, section 1159, which defines control in the context of subsidiaries, 
and the discussion of the Delaware court position in Wolf, Daniel E, ‘Controlling Stockholders in Delaware 
– More Than A Number’ (12 November 2014) Harvard Law Forum <Online: 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/12/controlling-stockholders-in-delaware-more-than-a-number/>. 
848  Delaware General Corporation Law, §203(c)(4). 
849  AGM Trends 2017, Ernst & Young (September 2017) p. 15 <Online: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-agm-trends-2017/$FILE/ey-agm-trends-2017.pdf>.  
850  For example, see Demsetz, 1983; Bolton, P, and Thadden, E-L von ‘Blocks, liquidity, and corporate 
control’ (1998) 53 Journal of Finance 1; Cho, M H ‘ Ownership structure, investment, and corporate value: 
An empirical analysis’ (1998) 47 Journal of Financial Economics 103; and Demsetz, H, and Villalonga, B 
‘Ownership structure and firm performance’ (2001) 7 Journal of Corporate Finance 209. 
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a founder – as discussed Subsection C(1)(a) in Chapter 5 (Is There a SMST problem?), and 
‘outside’ control – i.e. the presence of a significant shareholder unconnected to the business 
of the listed company.851 The presence of either type of significant shareholder could 
conceivably provide confidence to the market on the listed company’s ability to produce 
long-term results, which in turn could reduce the excessive discounting. To advocate for 
facilitating significant shareholders as a SMST-reform, there needs to be some evidentiary 
basis to suggest that a significant shareholder has a positive impact on firm value. However, 
the impact of significant shareholders on firm value remains ambiguous.852 Studies indicate 
that significant shareholders may play a beneficial role in mitigating the potential conflict of 
interest – i.e. agency costs – between managers and shareholders and, thereby, improve firm 
performance, benefiting all shareholders.853 For example, Dent summarizes the evidence of 
the potential benefits that a company may receive from the presence of a large block holder, 
which benefits may include more effective CEO performance pay, increased share prices and 
increased investment by the listed company in research and development.854  
 
Conversely, evidence suggests that listed companies with significant shareholders 
may in practice have lower firm values than their non-controlled counterparts.855 However, 
this lower valuation of firm value does not appear to be due entirely to inefficient monitoring. 
Rather, the discounting may come from the market perception that private benefits are 
extracted from listed companies for the benefit of the significant shareholder.856 In support of 
this position, there is some research to suggest that significant shareholders may influence 
firm policies to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests857 or reduce the liquidity of a 
firm’s shares858. It stands to reasons that these negative effects may be mitigated through 
strong legal protections for minority shareholders. However, monitoring by a controlling 
                                                 
851  See the discussion in Nguyen, Bang Dang and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner ‘When Blockholders Leave Feet 
Firm: Do Ownership and Control Affect Firm Value?’ (26 June 2013). <Online: SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285453>. 
852  Ibid, p. 5.  
853  Grossman, Sanford J and Hart, Oliver D ‘Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation’ (1980) 11:1 Bell Journal of Economics 42; Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny Robert W, ‘Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94:3(1) The Journal of Political Economy 461; Cheffins, 2002, 
p. 366. 
854  Dent, 2010, pp. 116-117.  
855  Lin, 2017, p. 458; and see the discussion in Cheffins, 2002, p. 366.  
856  Ibid.  
857  Demsetz, 1983. 
858  Glosten, Lawrence and Milgrom, Paul ‘Bid, ask and’ transaction prices in a specialist market with 
heterogeneously informed traders’ (1985) 14 Journal of Financial Economics 71; and Maug, Ernts ‘Large 
shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity and control’ (1998) 53:1 The Journal of 
Finance 65. 
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shareholder even with strong legal minority protections may also not add long term value, as 
a shareholder with a significant stake may, as a result of such stake, be poorly diversified.859 
Though the shareholder may be incentivized to monitor its investment, as its capital is tied up 
in one firm, such shareholder may also be risk adverse and therefore incentivized to ‘preserve 
wealth rather than create it’860. This would reduce the monitoring benefits of having a 
significant shareholder.861 Given the ambiguity of the evidence and that any monitoring 
benefits gained by having a significant shareholder may be negated by the perceived 
extraction of value by significant shareholders or risk aversion, increasing control is not 
advocated in this Chapter as a viable standalone option for effecting SMST reform.  
 
2. Option 2: Cut-Off Transmission Mechanisms 
 
As an alternative to reducing excessive discounting, another notionally effective 
option for SMST reform is to cut-off the transmission of SMST. As discussed in Chapter 6 
(SMST Transmission Mechanisms), the most probable cause of SMST transmission is 
through the impact of an actual or perceived decline in share prices. The primary reason why 
company managers care about declining share prices is the impact on their compensation and 
job security. If executive compensation is structured to reward short-term financial objectives 
and if asset owners and asset managers remove directors – and senior managers – who fail to 
provide positive short-term financial results, then SMST will continue to be an issue in equity 
markets. Consequently, one option for SMST reform is to insulate boards and thereby 
company managers from the alleged short-termism of asset owners and asset managers, and 
to impose legal or corporate governance restrictions on executive compensation that rewards 
short-term financial performance. The theory behind how each of these methods may act to 
reduce SMST is considered further below, and whether any of the reforms in Chapter 4 
(What Has Been Done?) employ these methods are considered in Section B below.  
 
a. Board Insulation 
 
The concept of cutting off potential SMST by insulating boards from asset owners 
and asset managers was put forward in the 1990s by well-known corporate lawyers, Martin 
                                                 
859  Cheffins, 2002, p. 357.  
860  Ibid, referencing ‘In the Family’s Way’, The Economist (London), 15 December 2001, 75. 
861  Ibid.  
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Lipton and Steven Rosenblum of the New York firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Their 
precise proposal was to replace the annual election of directors with a ‘quinquennial’ election 
 ̶  i.e. five-year terms  ̶  and to bar non-board approved changes in control between board 
elections.862 Lipton and Rosenblum’s stated intent was to provide ‘a framework that permits 
the corporation to carry out long-term plans and permits stockholders to assess their results 
before deciding whether to they are satisfied with their director’s performance’863.  
 
Arguments for board insulation have been broadly advanced not only by legal 
practitioners such as Lipton and Rosenblum, but also by a wide variety of other parties. Such 
advocates include prominent legal academics864, economics and business professors865, 
management thought leaders866, business columnists867, organizations such as the Aspen 
Institute868, and in the Kay Review, the recommendations of which were endorsed by the UK 
government869. The unifying principle held by those persons advocating a board insulation 
approach, as observed by Bebchuk, is that ‘the long-term costs of short termism, produced by 
both shareholder interventions and fears of such interventions, make it desirable to shield 
boards from shareholders’870. Specifically, insulating boards from short-term shareholder 
pressure, it is argued by Bebchuk, ‘enables them to focus on enhancing long-term value and 
thereby better serve the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders’871. 
 
After acknowledging the considerable influence of the arguments to insulate boards 
on policymakers and public officials872, Bebchuk disputed the benefits of doing so. While 
acknowledging that board insulation may produce some long-term benefits, he argued 
                                                 
862  Lipton & Rosenblum, 1991, p. 225.  
863  Ibid, p. 228.  
864  Stout, Lynn, ‘The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, 
and the Public’ United States: Berrett-Koehler Publishers (2012); Bainbridge, Stephen M, ‘Response, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1735; Bratton, 
William W and Wachter, Michael L, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, (2010) 158 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 653. 
865  Fox, Justin and Lorsch, Jay W, ‘What Good Are Shareholders?’ (2012) 90:7 Harvard Business Review 48 
and Porter, Michael E, ‘Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry’ (1992) 5:2 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 57.  
866  For example, see Drucker, Peter F, Editorial, ‘A Crisis of Capitalism’ Wall Street Journal (30 September 
1986) at A32 arguing outside pressures push top managements toward short-term decisions.  
867  For example, see Nocera, Joe, ‘What Is Business Waiting For?’ New York Times (16 August 2011), and 
Sorkin, Andrew Ross, ‘Shareholder Democracy Can Mask Abuses’ New York Times (25 February 2013). 
868  Aspen Report, 2009 and Aspen Report, 2010.  
869  Kay Review Progress Report, 2014.  
870  Bebchuk, 2013, p. 1639.  
871  Ibid.  
872  Ibid, p. 1640.  
 192 
 
‘insulation advocates overlook the fact that these benefits might be outweighed by significant 
countervailing costs’873. These costs are the benefits of shareholder engagement, Bebchuk 
asserted, and the accountability and discipline such engagement produces. This accountability 
and disciple ‘provide incentives to avoid shirking, empire building and other departures from 
shareholder interests that are costly both in the short and long term’874. The potential 
collateral damage inherent in insulating boards requires further analysis in the context of any 
specific reform proposal. However, if asset owners and asset managers are transmitting short-
termism into listed companies, cutting off such transmission is one possible option for 
reform. The extent to which the reforms reviewed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) act 
to counter the alleged harms of SMST by insulating the board are considered in Section B.  
 
b. Reduce Short Term Compensation 
 
Another transmission method by which SMST is seen to get into listed companies is 
through short-term focused executive or asset manager compensation structures. As discussed 
in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms), declining share prices may have personal 
financial implications for company managers as a significant portion of management 
compensation – particularity in the US, although this US model is gaining momentum 
worldwide – is often tied to share prices. The argument has been made that eliminating stock-
based compensation, and other forms of short-term rewards, will help reduce the incentive for 
executive leadership to focus on the short term.875 To be effective, however, cutting off 
SMST transmission via changes to executive compensation structures will need to be ‘hard’ 
law restrictions or such compensation structures will be susceptible to the alleged short-
termism of shareholders, or will need to occur in tandem with board insulation measures.  
 
If deviations away from short-term performance objectives in executive compensation 
are encouraged on a voluntary basis, but asset owners and asset managers continue to have 
considerable latitude to change the board of directors, SMST will, theoretically at least, 
continue to be transmitted into listed companies. Consequently, insulating boards and altering 
execution compensation structures may not be an ‘either/or’ scenario. This was recognized by 
Lipton and Rosenblum. Their proposal for the ‘quinquennial concept’ involved not only five-
                                                 
873  Ibid, p. 1643.  
874  Ibid.  
875  Martin, 2011, and Kay Review, 2012, p. 13 (Recommendation 15). 
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year board terms, but also linked this board insulation to a five-year strategic report, which 
would be independently evaluated. This five-year report would serve as the basis for 
executive compensation and, in doing so, would ‘link a significant portion of the financial 
risks and rewards for managers to corporate performance against the corporation’s five-year 
goals’876. Section B of this Chapter, as a result, considers whether any of the SMST-driven 
reforms at least conceptually attempt to cut off SMST either on a non-voluntary ‘hard-law’ 
basis, or by both insulating the board and limiting short-term executive compensation.  
 
In addition to executive compensation structures, concerns have also been raised that 
the compensation structures of asset managers may contribute to SMST. The argument made 
is that asset managers are not incentivized towards long-term investing as their compensation 
may be based on quarterly assessments of performance of assets under management. 
Although SMST may be transmitted from asset owners to asset managers through short-term 
oriented compensation structures, the method of addressing this transmission is through 
Option 1(b) discussed above. If asset owners are ‘improved’, asset manager compensation 
structures will theoretically at least be less short-term focused, and the SMST issue will be 
minimized. Consequently, the only method to cut-off SMST transmission between asset 
owners and asset managers considered in respect of this Option 2(b) in Section B are ‘hard’ 
law changes, which specifically restrict the short-term compensation of asset managers. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
This Section B analyzes each of the implemented SMST reforms summarized in 
Appendix ‘A’, to determine whether any of these implemented SMST reforms conceptually 
address the alleged SMST problem by employing one or more of the options identified in 
Section A above. The results of this analysis are presented in tabular form in Appendix ‘C’. 
As demonstrated below, this analysis indicates that of the implemented SMST reform in this 
area, very few of the reforms at least theoretically meaningfully address the SMST concerns. 
 
                                                 
876  Bebchuk, 2013, p. 239.  
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1. Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner Oriented SMST Reforms 
 
The following Subsection A(1) analyzes each of the implemented Asset Owner 
Oriented SMST reforms summarized in Appendix ‘A’, Table 1 (Asset Owner Oriented 
SMST Reforms). These implemented SMST reforms are assessed on the basis of whether 
they, at least theoretically, act to address the alleged SMST problem by employing one or 
more of the options identified in Section A above. The results of this analysis are then 
presented in tabular form in Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of 
Implemented Asset Owner Oriented SMST Reforms). As demonstrated below, this analysis 
indicates that of the implemented SMST reform in this area, few of the reforms at least 
theoretically meaningfully address the SMST concerns. 
 
a. Measures Favouring Long-Term Share Ownership 
 
The first grouping of SMST-driven reforms considered is reforms providing 
additional voting rights and rewards for long-term shareholders, as this area has received 
considerable attention. Despite much discussion, however, implemented reforms are modest, 
and consist only of the Florange Law in France, the use of L-Shares in certain EU countries, 
and the limited introduction of dual class shares structures on the SGX meant to give 
additional voting rights to certain asset owners. As discussed further in Subsection A(1) of 
Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), these reforms are meant to encourage longer-term 
shareholding and shareholding by insiders of listed companies, the rationale being that such 
shareholders are more likely to consider the long-term interests of listed companies and are 
less likely to use their voting authority solely to further their own short-term financial gain. 
 
The Florange Law enacted ‘hard’ law SMST-driven legislative change in 2014 meant 
to counter SMST by re-setting the corporate law default position in France to provide that 
double voting rights must be given to all shareholders who hold their shares for at least two 
years. Companies may opt out of this new default position, provided that the requisite 2/3 rd 
shareholder approval is obtained. Increasing voting rights of all shareholders holding shares 
for over two years does not reduce SMST via Option 2 – Cutting Off Transmission 
Mechanisms. Boards are not insulated from short-term interests, and short-term compensation 
structures are not restricted by measures in the Florange Law. Similarly, there are no 
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provisions in the Florange Law designed to reduce performance uncertainty as per Option 
1(a), which would include improved reporting of long-term objectives by company managers. 
There is also no indication that the Florange Law would ‘improve’ asset owners as per 
Option 1(b) either through increased communication and engagement with company 
managers, or ‘enlightenment’ towards a longer-term approach. It is arguable that the Florange 
Law may create significant asset owners through the granting of double voting rights. 
However, there are no assurances that this will occur in practice, and even if it does, as 
discussed in Subsection A(1)(c) there are questions around whether this would positively 
impact firm value. In fact, there is suggestion of the opposite, as existing shareholders who 
get such rights may use the opportunity to realize on their investments by selling some shares 
while retaining their previous voting positions. Consequently, as shown in Appendix ‘C’, 
Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner Oriented SMST Reforms), 
the Florange Law is not considered a conceptually effective SMST reform.   
 
Based on the same reasoning applied to the Florange Law, voluntary uses of L-Shares 
granting bonus shares by French listed companies and other L-Share structures used by listed 
companies in certain EU jurisdictions that provide either bonus shares or increased voting 
rights to long-term shareholders are not considered a conceptually effective SMST reform. 
Such L-Shares do not cut off the transmission of SMST into the listed company or reduce 
excessive discounting central to the SMST concern either by furthering communication 
between asset owners, improving reporting of long-term objectives by company managers, or 
‘enlightening’ asset owners as to the benefits of a longer-term approach.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), dual-class share structures, long 
permitted in certain jurisdictions including the US and Canada, have also been touted as a 
means of ameliorating the negative effects of SMST. The general argument raised is that such 
dual class structures allow founders or other insiders to retain a controlling voting position, 
thus allowing management to ignore the short-termism often seen in financial markets. 
Despite much discussion of the potential benefits of dual class structures, the only instance of 
dual class structures being introduced based on SMST concerns is the permission granted for 
dual-class listings of secondary listings on the SGX. However, dual class listings do not cut 
off the transmission of SMST as per Options 2(a) and 2(b) as boards of directors are not fully 
insulated from shareholders nor is management compensation tied to long-term performance 
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in these structures. Further, dual class listings do not reduce performance uncertainty as set 
out in Option 1(a) by better disclosing long-term performance objectives or ‘improving’ asset 
owners as per Option 1(b) by facilitating communication or ‘enlightenment’ towards a 
longer-term approach. There may be benefits to having a controlling shareholder as 
facilitated by dual class structures. However, as discussed in Subsection A(1)(c) there are 
questions around whether this would positively impact firm value, and further, there are no 
assurances that the controlling shareholder created in the dual class structure would pursue a 
longer-term approach. Thus, of the SMST-driven reforms that introduce measures favouring 
long-term share ownership, none conceptually address the SMST issue.  
 
b. Disclosure Reforms  
 
Reforms to the timing and quality of information disclosed to the market by listed 
companies have also been a focus for SMST reformers. As considered further in Chapter 4 
(What Has Been Done?), the specific concerns raised are that the content of public disclosure 
is too focused on short-term financial objectives, and also the pace of such dissemination may 
exacerbate alleged SMST concerns, as company managers feel pressured to constantly 
generate short-term results to produce fresh news. These concerns have generated some 
SMST reform, specifically ‘hard’ law changes to mandatory quarterly reporting the EU and 
UK, and ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law changes to corporate governance reporting in the EU and UK. 
 
Based on a recommendation in the Kay Review, the UK Government adopted 
regulations removing mandatory quarterly reporting requirements. The UK changes took 
effect in November 2014, a year ahead of when amendments to the EU Transparency 
Directive removed mandatory quarterly reporting for all EU Members. These reforms do not 
reduce performance uncertainty as per Option 1(a), as the reforms take away information 
from the market rather than provide greater disclosure around longer-term performance. 
However, it may be argued that removing mandatory quarterly reporting ‘improves’ asset 
owners, and by extension asset managers, as per Option 1(b). Arguably, asset owners, often 
via their assets manager, are too focused on short-term performance metrics. A significant 
contributor to such short-term approach is quarterly reporting by listed companies. The 
removal of mandatory quarterly reporting, therefore, provides space for companies to report 
results to the market over a longer time period, and could thus act to ‘improve’ asset 
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managers and asset owners by facilitating longer-term reporting. As discussed in Chapter 4 
(What Has Been Done?), however, the impact of such reforms may be minimal as these 
changes are optional and US investors may still prefer quarterly reporting.  
 
Removing mandatory quarterly reporting could cut off the transmission of SMST into 
the listed company as per Option 2(a), as this action may insulate boards from having to 
provide short-term financial reporting. This is not an effective severing of the transmission of 
SMST concerns because, as noted above, the change is optional, and shareholders may still 
push for such reporting. Further, these reforms do not limit short-term executive 
compensation as per Option 2(b), which as noted in Section A, is also necessary for such 
reform to effectively cut off SMST. However, as the removal of EU and UK mandatory 
quarterly reporting requirements may ‘improve’ asset owners, and by extension asset 
managers, these are included as conceptually effective SMST reforms in Appendix ‘C’, 
Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner Oriented SMST Reforms).  
 
The changes in the EU and the UK providing for longer-term strategic reporting could 
also be considered a means of reducing excessive discounting pursuant to Options 1(a) and 
(b). These reforms include the strategic reporting requirement for all UK listed companies 
adopted in October 2013 in the UK and the FRC guidance on such reporting issued in June 
2014, together with EU changes including the EU recommendation in 2014 on the quality of 
corporate governance reporting and the EU Directive on non-financial reporting in place in 
EU Member States by December 2016. As analyzed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), 
these reforms essentially intend to connect corporate actions with long-term strategy and 
focus less on short-term – e.g. quarterly – earnings results; and (2) emphasize CSR and ESG 
factors in addition to financial measures of performance of a listed company, which factors, 
notionally at least, represent inherently longer-term interests than short-term earnings.  
 
These reforms certainly do not cut-off transmission of SMST into listed companies 
pursuant to Option 2. However, as noted above, they may, theoretically at least, act to reduce 
excessive discounting by asset owners or asset managers on a listed company’s long-term 
performance as per Options 1(a) and (b). This would occur by such disclosure reducing 
performance uncertainty and ‘improving’ asset owners, and by extension asset managers, 
through emphasizing the benefits of a longer-term approach. Particularly, the changes to 
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corporate governance reporting could better assist asset owners and asset managers to more 
accurately assess and measure long-term performance objectives. As an example, the UK 
strategic report may provide asset owners and asset managers with a yard stick by which to 
measure a company’s long-term performance, and the details of how such objectives will be 
achieved and measured may give the market confidence that it will occur thereby reducing 
excessive discounting. Whether these measures will act to reduce excessive discounting 
thereby correcting SMST in practice remains to be seen; however, these reporting reforms are 
noted in Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner 
Oriented SMST Reforms), as at least conceptually effective SMST reforms. 
 
c. Direct Communication/Engagement 
 
The argument has been presented by SMST reformers that channels between asset 
owners and company managers should be strengthened, and asset owners and company 
managers should communicate and engage directly. Such actions are meant to counter SMST 
by facilitating engagement between companies and long-term asset owners, which asset 
owners supposedly have a greater interest in long-term growth of listed companies than short-
term shareholders. ‘Hard’ law reforms in this area are limited to Articles 3a and 3b of the EU 
Amended Shareholder Rights Directive, which require that EU Members must ensure that: 
(1) intermediaries provide listed companies with information on asset owner identity; and (2)  
information on listed companies must be directly communicated to asset owners either via the 
company’s website or transmitted without undue delay. Another SMST-driven initiative is 
the UK Investor Forum, meant to facilitate collective discussion and engagement with UK 
listed companies, arising from recommendations in the Kay Review. 
 
Neither the reforms in Articles 3a and 3b of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive nor the UK Investor Forum cut off SMST via Option 2. In fact, both reforms may 
have the opposite effect and could act to increase the transmission of SMST interests of asset 
owners into the listed company, as not only long-term focused asset owners may take 
advantage of such communication channels. The question then is whether either of these 
reforms may act to counter SMST by reducing the excessive discounting inherent in share 
pricing. It is difficult to see how the reforms in the EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive could act to reduce excessive discounting as per Option 1(a) or 1(b), as they 
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facilitate the flow of all information and do not require any specific reporting on long-term 
objectives by listed companies or encourage asset owners to take a longer-term approach.  
 
The UK Investor Forum, however, has the potential to reduce excessive discounting 
by ‘improving’ asset owners pursuant to Option 1(b). The intent of the UK Investor Forum is 
to facilitate dialogue by asset owners and asset managers, and company managers and its 
stated purpose is to ‘[p]osition stewardship at the heart of investment decision-making by 
facilitating dialogue, creating long-term solutions and enhancing value’877. Such 
‘enlightened’ collective action and discussion may act to reduce monitoring costs of long-
term performance by any one individual asset owner or manager, and thereby encourage 
listed companies to take a longer-term approach. There is no indication that this initiative will 
overcome the numerous hurdles related to collective action including concerns over free-
riding and regulatory issues around insider dealings. Therefore, although the UK Investor 
Forum is shown in Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset 
Owner Oriented SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform, there are serious 
questions around whether this initiative will be an effective counter to SMST in practice.  
 
d. Restrictions on Stock Lending 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), stock-lending has occasionally 
been raised in connection with SMST concerns. Although not clearly articulated, the concern 
appears to be that stocks may be ‘lent’, often by an asset manager, to a third-party borrower, 
which third party borrower is not interested in the long-term viability of an organization. In 
the Kay Review, Kay proposed that asset owners should have more information on when 
their shares are being lent to third parties, and, therefore, be able to exercise greater judgment 
on when such lending is appropriate. This theme of disclosure as a means of correcting 
SMST was picked up by the EU and adopted as a ‘hard’ law reform in the UCITS Directive. 
The EU reform requires that investors in EU UCITS, EU collective investment schemes, 
receive all income from stock-lending net of operational costs. These EU changes do not 
have any impact on the SMST issue via Option 2 – Cutting Off Transmission Mechanisms as 
they do not cut-off the short-termism of asset owners and managers from listed companies. 
Further, these changes do not reduce excessive discounting either by reducing performance 
                                                 
877  https://www.investorforum.org.uk/.  
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uncertainty or ‘improving’ asset owners as per Options 1(a) and (b). Consequently, this 
reform is not included in Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented 
Asset Owner Oriented SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform. 
 
e. Long Term Funds 
 
Based on concerns that it is difficult for asset owners, often via asset managers, to 
adequately assess if a listed company is generating sustainable longer-term corporate value, 
the LTVC Index was developed in 2016. As considered further in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?), the LTVC Index is an index of about 250 companies identified through a Dow Jones 
proprietary system to take a long-term view, which companies are also meant to have a 
sustained history of financial quality. This financial industry initiative does not directly cut 
off transmission of SMST into listed companies pursuant to Option 2. Rather, the purpose of 
the LTVC Index is to reduce excessive discounting by identifying listed companies with 
proven track-records of long-term value generation to asset owners and asset managers who 
are ‘enlightened’ to the benefits of a longer-term approach. If the LTVC Index is successful, 
companies on this LTVC Index may feel more confident that their long-term prospects are 
not excessively discounted and, therefore, company managers may be more confident when 
proceeding with long-term objectives and less likely to focus on short-term financial 
objectives. This LTVC Index could also ‘improve’ asset owners if the indexed listed 
companies generate returns over the long-term that are superior to other stock market 
indexes, and these results are communicated to the market. Theoretically, therefore, this 
initiative may reduce SMST via Options 1(a) and (b), and this reform is thus included in 
Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner Oriented 
SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform. However, this is a big ask for a 
relatively untested financial industry voluntary initiative, particularly one which has struggled 
to gain support from leading global investors. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether 
this LTVC Index will have a material impact on excessive discounting.  
 
Of the asset owner-oriented reforms analyzed in this Subsection B(1), as illustrated in 
Appendix ‘C’, Table 5 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Asset Owner Oriented 
SMST Reforms), only half address the SMST issue using one of the options identified in 
Section A as necessary for SMST reform. None of the reforms cut-off SMST transmission as 
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per Option 2. The implemented asset owner SMST reforms that address SMST using one of 
the options identified in Section A appear to do so through Options 1(a) and/or (b)   ̶ reducing 
excessive discounting by asset owners either by reducing performance uncertainty or 
‘improving’ asset owners. These SMST reforms include the EU and UK removal of 
mandatory quarterly reporting, ‘soft’ law UK and EU strategic and governance reporting 
requirements, and the UK Investor Forum and the US LTVC Index, each of which is a 
voluntary financial industry initiative. As discussed above, there are questions around how 
effective such SMST reforms may be in practice. However, in theory at least, these 
implemented asset owner reforms could conceptually reduce SMST concerns. 
 
2. Analysis of Intermediary Oriented Reforms 
 
The following Subsection B(2) analyzes the implemented intermediary oriented 
SMST reforms summarized in Appendix ‘A’, Table 2 (Intermediary Oriented SMST 
Reforms). As with the asset owner oriented SMST reforms analyzed in Subsection B(1) 
above, these intermediary reforms are assessed on the basis of whether they, at least 
theoretically, address the alleged SMST of intermediaries by employing one or more of the 
options identified in Section A above. The results of this analysis are presented in tabular 
form in Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Intermediary 
Oriented SMST Reforms). As demonstrated below, as with the asset owner oriented SMST 
reforms, of the implemented reforms meant to address intermediary SMST, few of these 
implemented reforms actually meaningfully address the SMST concerns. 
 
a. Stewardship and Disclosure 
 
An area that has witnessed significant discussion and generated some implemented 
reform, is the concept of guiding principles establishing desired behaviour for market 
participants and the disclosure of adherence to such principles. These guiding principles are 
meant to encourage accountability, mainly from intermediaries who manage other people’s 
money, by focusing on sustainable long-term returns. As set out in Chapter 4 (What Has 
Been Done?), specific SMST-driven reforms in this space include the Stewardship Code in 
the UK, which the UK Government indicated was amended in 2012 in line with the 
recommendations in the Kay Review to require asset managers to engage with listed 
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company on long-term strategy in order to deliver long-term sustainable returns, the adoption 
of a Japanese Stewardship Code based on the UK Stewardship Code promoting engagement 
by asset managers with listed companies in order to deliver long-term sustainable returns, and 
the NAPF Stewardship Disclosure Framework encouraged asset managers to clearly 
articulate stewardship approaches on long-term investment objectives to their clients. Similar 
to requirements contained in many stewardship codes, and Articles 3h and 3i of the EU 
Amended Shareholder Rights Directive require institutional investors publicly disclose how 
investment strategy and report on such strategy to institutional investors. The UK Investor 
Forum has also been cited as a SMST-driven reform meant to facilitate collective 
engagement and encourage best practice by asset managers. Financial industry initiatives in 
this space include Dominic Barton of McKinsey and CPPIB’s online platform developed in 
2013, FCLT, which intended to develop practical structures, metrics, and approaches for 
longer-term behaviour in the investment and business worlds, and the calls to action by Larry 
Fink, CEO of BlackRock, in 2016, 2017 and 2018 for asset managers to be more involved in 
holding listed companies to account for delivering long-term sustainable value. 
 
Although this is an area of SMST reform that has seen some action, questions remain 
as to how these reforms actually act to counter SMST. They do not cut-off the transmission 
of SMST into listed companies via Options 2. These reforms instead encourage or require 
asset managers – and asset owners – to support listed companies in their efforts to deliver 
long-term sustainable value. This approach attempts to ‘improve’ asset owners as per 
Option 1(b). Although admirable, the difficulty with this approach, based on the analysis 
provided in this thesis, is that such ‘improvement’ will only work if efforts are made in 
tandem to reduce performance uncertainty as per Option 1(a). The excessive discounting 
appears to be occurring precisely because asset managers and asset owners have a short-term 
preference in large part because they are not able to adequately rely on the ability of company 
managers to deliver long-term results. Consequently, merely asking asset managers to 
commit to greater long-term value generation, theoretically at least, will not act to reduce 
excessive discounting. Such ‘improvement’ needs to coincide with better quality long-term 
reporting by company managers. As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?) there are 
also real questions around whether there has been meaningful buy-in to stewardship 
principles by market participants. Therefore, although these reforms are included in 
Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Intermediary Oriented 
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SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform on the basis of Option 1(b), 
questions remain around whether such reforms will actually be effective in practice. 
 
b. Asset Manager Remuneration 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), concerns have been raised that 
asset managers are not sufficiently incentivized towards long-term investing as their 
compensation may be based on quarterly assessments of performance of assets under 
management. The UK Government pointed to the NAPF Stewardship Disclosure Framework 
and other financial industry initiatives such as the IMA’s guidance on disclosure of charges 
by funds, as examples of how the financial industry in the UK was addressing such SMST 
concerns. Rather than prescribing how asset managers should charge for their services, these 
measures instead simply provide for disclosure of asset manager fee structures to asset 
owners. This compensation disclosure is meant to assist asset owners ensure that the actions 
of asset managers are appropriately aligned with the asset owner’s interests.  
 
These reforms do not act to reduce excessive discounting as per Option 1(a) by 
reducing performance uncertainty. Nor do these reforms insulate boards from the short-
termist pressures of asset owners or asset managers as per Option 2(a). It could be argued that 
these changes ‘improve’ asset managers as per Option 1(b) as they focus on transparency of 
asset manager pay structures. Further, it is arguable that such reforms may act to reduce the 
short-term focus of asset managers compensation as per Option 2(b). However, as discussed 
further in Chapter 6 (SMST Transmission Mechanisms), the flaw in this reasoning is that 
asset managers may loyalty be pursuing their client’s interests by engaging in short-termist 
behaviour. Such short-termism may be traced back to asset owners as they set the 
compensation and investment parameters in their contractual relationships with asset 
managers. Though better-quality disclosure of remuneration structures is useful to ensure the 
interests of asset owners and asset managers are aligned, there is nothing to suggest that such 
additional disclosure will reduce short-term focused compensation structures of asset 
managers. Therefore, these reforms are not included in Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual 
Effectiveness of Implemented Intermediary Oriented SMST Reforms) as an effective SMST 
reform. To be conceptually effective, such measures would need to specifically limit short-
term compensation, which is what is done in reforms to the EU UCITS Directive.  
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As set out Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), the EU UCITS Directive, which only 
applies to the management of certain EU collective investment schemes, does include 
restrictions on the short-term compensation of asset managers. These reforms include that: 
(1) guaranteed variable remuneration – e.g., guaranteed bonus of x% of returns – is only to be 
paid in exceptional circumstances; (2) remuneration policies must be reviewed yearly and 
should be consistent with effective risk management; (3) a substantial portion of 
remuneration must be paid in EU UCITS units and deferred for a reasonable period of time; 
and (4) staff cannot use personal hedging strategies or insurance in remuneration. These 
restrictions may act to reduce SMST by imposing ‘hard’ law restrictions on executive 
compensation that rewards short-term financial performance which cuts off SMST as per 
Option 2(b). These ‘hard’ law restrictions may, theoretically at least, act to reduce SMST by 
linking asset manager remuneration to longer-term fund performance, thereby reducing the 
incentive of asset managers to push for short-term financial returns from listed companies. 
These changes are also mandated regardless of the interests of investors, and, therefore, 
would apply even if the investors in such programs would prefer shorter-term returns. These 
changes are limited as they only apply to EU UCITS. However, these reforms are included in 
Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Intermediary Oriented 
SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform. 
 
c. Voting Restrictions 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), SMST concerns have been raised 
in the context of voting by intermediaries. The concern is that such intermediaries have 
discretion to vote on behalf of asset owners, but such intermediaries may be pursuing their 
own short-term interests rather than the long-term interests of asset owners. Reforms in the 
UK and at the EU level have focused on disclosure of the voting process as a means of 
ameliorating such SMST concerns. In the UK, changes to the UK Stewardship Code placed a 
duty on intermediaries to disclose voting policies and to make use of such voting power. At 
the EU level, the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive includes provisions meant to 
ensure that intermediaries facilitate the exercise of asset owner rights, including voting rights, 
or explain why they do not. Reforms in Switzerland, based on the Minder Initiative, went 
further, and restricted voting by intermediaries. Specifically, the Swiss Constitution now 
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prohibits all proxy voting by an intermediary or by a depositary in respect of any Swiss 
public companies listed on stock exchanges in Switzerland or abroad, and Swiss pension 
funds must vote in the interests of the beneficiaries and disclose how they voted. 
 
None of the changes to the UK Stewardship Code, the EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive, or the Minder Initiative act to reduce SMST via Option 1(b) by ‘improving’ 
asset owners, or via Option 2, by cutting off SMST transmission mechanisms. Instead, these 
measures are meant to encourage voting by existing asset owners, rather than intermediaries. 
Arguably, such reforms could reduce performance uncertainty as per Option 1(a) by better 
connecting asset owners with listed companies and reducing intermediary self-interest. 
Further, such reforms may be commendable as they help ensure that the interests of asset 
owners are better communicated into the listed company. However, from a SMST 
perspective, rather than alleviate SMST concerns, such measures may actually make the 
perceived SMST issue worse. For the reasons discussed in this thesis, if there is a SMST 
problem it appears to originate from asset owners excessively discounting long-term returns 
thereby causing company managers to prioritize short-term financial returns. Consequently, if 
asset managers are acting on the parameters set by their clients and asset owners are short-
termist, increasing asset owner voting channels into listed companies could just exacerbate 
the SMST issue. Such concerns in respect of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive 
were also raised by Johnston and Morrow, who expressed concern that the changes ‘will 
further empower shareholders with a short-term perspective’878. As a result, these reforms are 
not included in Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented 
Intermediary Oriented SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform. 
 
d. Proxy Advisors 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), the connection between SMST 
and the proxy advisory process is tenuous at best. However, the claim made is that proxy 
advisors  ̶  entities which provide voting advice to asset owners and asset managers  ̶  may 
contribute to SMST as asset owners and asset managers rely heavily on voting 
recommendations that could contain conflicts or do not reflect the investment horizons of 
asset owners. The only implemented reform in response to such concerns has been in the EU 
                                                 
878  Johnston & Morrow, 2014, p. 1.  
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Amended Shareholder Rights Directive. The EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive 
includes ‘hard’ law provisions requiring proxy advisors to adopt and adhere to a code of 
conduct or explain why they do not. This code is meant to ensure that research and voting 
recommendations are accurate and reliable and are developed in the client’s sole interest. 
This reform does not act to reduce SMST via Option 2, by cutting off SMST transmission 
mechanisms. Although better transparency and accountability in the proxy advisory process 
is worthwhile to ensure prudent management of investments, it is difficult to see how the 
proxy advisor code of conduct could act to reduce excessive discounting as per Option 1(a), 
as it does not increase asset owner/asset manager confidence that company managers will 
deliver on long-term performance objectives. Similarly, there is no indication that such code 
of conduct will ‘improve’ asset owners towards longer-term perspective. Therefore, this 
reform is not included in Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented 
Intermediary Oriented SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reform. 
 
Of the implemented intermediary-oriented reforms analyzed in this Subsection B(2), 
as illustrated in Appendix ‘C’, Table 6 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented 
Intermediary Oriented SMST Reforms), only one reform actually addresses the SMST issue 
by employing one of the options identified in Option 2 as necessary for SMST reform. This 
reform is the ‘hard’ law changes made to the EU UCITS Directive, which restrict certain 
forms of short-term compensation payable to asset managers of EU UCITS. This reform may 
reduce SMST by cutting off the transmission of SMST from asset owners in accordance with 
Option 2(b) as SMST transmission is cut off through the legislative restrictions on short-term 
focused compensation structures. In theory at least, this implemented intermediary reform 
could act to effectively reduce SMST concerns, albeit on a limited basis as the reform only 
applies to asset managers of EU UCITS. There are also a number of implemented 
intermediary reforms including UK/Japan Stewardship Code, UK NAPF Stewardship 
Framework, UK Investor Forum, Black Rock Letter and FCLT, UK NAPF Stewardship 
Framework/IMA and Financial Industry Guidance which may also act to reduce SMST via 
Option 1(b) – ‘improving’ asset owners. However, each of these SMST reforms is voluntary 
or ‘soft’ law, and to be at least conceptually effective, will also need to coincide with 
improved quality longer-term reporting by company managers.  
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3. Analysis of Company Manager Oriented Reforms 
 
The following Subsection B(3) analyzes each of the implemented company manager 
oriented SMST reforms summarized in Appendix ‘A’, Table 3 (Company Manager Oriented 
SMST Reforms). As with the asset owner and intermediary oriented SMST reforms analyzed 
in Subsections B(1) and (2) above, these company manager SMST reforms are assessed on 
the basis of whether they, at least theoretically, act to address the alleged SMST problem by 
employing one or more of the necessary options identified in Section A above. The results of 
this analysis are presented in tabular form in Appendix ‘C’, Table 7 (Conceptual 
Effectiveness of Implemented Company Manager Oriented SMST Reforms). As 
demonstrated below, as is the case with the asset owner and intermediary oriented SMST 
reforms, of the implemented SMST reforms meant to address company manager SMST, few 
of these actually meaningfully address the underlying SMST concerns. 
 
a. Company Manager Remuneration 
 
Executive compensation reform is a significant area of discussion, and the focus of 
much guidance and regulation, particularly around ‘say-on-pay’ votes by shareholders of 
listed companies. As discussed in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), the analysis in this 
thesis is limited to reforms to executive compensation which intend to address the SMST 
issue. This does not include ‘say-on-pay’ voting structures, as these appear to be motivated 
more by concerns over excessive compensation and linking pay to performance rather than 
specific SMST factors. SMTS-driven reforms in this space are meant to reduce or limit 
executive remuneration if such pay is based on short-term performance and unrestricted 
equity – i.e. no vesting requirements –, as it has been argued that this type of pay results in 
short-sighted decisions by company managers at the cost of longer-term economic 
performance of listed companies. Despite the arguments to restrict short-term compensation, 
implemented ‘hard’ law SMST-driven reforms have been limited to enhancements of 
executive compensation reporting enacted in the UK, at the EU level and in the US, and to 
‘soft’ law guidance linking long-term performance to compensation in governance codes. 
 
‘Hard’ law reforms include the UK Remuneration Regulations enacted in 2013, which 
changes require a remuneration report to be presented by companies to their shareholders 
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annually setting out each director’s pay for the previous financial year, and how such pay is 
linked to performance. At the EU level, the Article 9a of the EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive includes a requirement for an executive remuneration policy, which must be 
in line with a listed company’s long-term interests, and Article 9b mandates a remuneration 
report, which report must specify how executive remuneration is linked to the listed 
company’s long-term performance. In the US, to some degree in line with Lipton and 
Rosenblum’s proposal for a quinquennial report linked to executive compensation, the SEC 
implemented a change to Item 402 of Regulation S-K in 2015. This change required that, 
commencing with 2018 registration statements and annual 10-K filings for US regulated 
entities, US listed corporations must disclose the relationship between executive 
compensation actually paid for five years and corporate financial performance. However, 
unlike Lipton and Rosenblum’s proposal, this report is retrospective rather than forward 
looking. SMST-driven executive compensation reform has also seen more general ‘soft’ law 
reform in the form of encouraging links between long-term performance and pay in a variety 
of governance codes, including in Australia, Norway and Singapore.    
 
 These reforms do not insulate the board from short-term interests of asset owners or 
asset managers pursuant to Option 2(a), nor do they act to ‘improve’ asset owners as per 
Option 1(b). Of these reporting measures, only the EU reporting measures intend to reduce 
short-term compensation of company managers and to link executive pay to longer-term 
performance by listed companies. These measures theoretically could reduce SMST pursuant 
to Option 2(b), if they cut off the transmission of asset owner and asset manager short-term 
interests into a listed company. However, the ‘hard’ law reforms are based on disclosure of 
the remuneration practices of listed companies, and the ‘soft’ law reforms just encourage pay 
to be linked to long-term performance, rather than providing prescriptive restrictions on the 
types of compensation payable to company managers. Consequently, such measures will not 
be conceptually effective on their own to cut off transmission of SMST into listed companies, 
as they will also require insulation of the board. Such reforms insulating the board from the 
pressures of asset owners and asset managers have not been implemented.  
 
The question remains as to whether the reforms discussed above may be effective in 
reducing performance uncertainty pursuant to Option 1(a). As discussed in 
Subsection B(1)(a) above, strategic reporting in the UK may be considered a conceptually 
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effective SMST reform as it could reduce performance uncertainty by providing asset owners 
and asset managers with a clear yard stick by which to measure a company’s long-term 
performance. Similarly, it could be argued that the ‘hard’ law reporting requirements in the 
UK, EU and US could be seen to assist asset owners and asset managers to better determine 
whether company managers are meeting long-term performance objectives. Whether these 
measures will act to reduce performance uncertainty thereby correcting SMST in practice 
remains to be seen, and will require strong, tangible connections between long-term strategic 
plans and executive compensation. The ‘soft’ law guidance on long-term compensation 
included in various governance codes arguably does not go far enough as only general 
statements are provided rather than specific guidance on reporting. Further, the reporting in 
the US and the UK does not expressly link to longer-term performance. Consequently, only 
Articles 9a and 9b of the EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive are included in 
Appendix ‘C’, Table 7 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Company Manager 
Oriented SMST Reforms) as a conceptually effective SMST reforms, as these reforms 
theoretically could act to reduce excessive discounting by asset owners and asset managers. 
 
b. Best Practices for Company Managers 
 
Various voluntary initiatives have been put in place encouraging company managers 
to manage listed companies for the long-term. As set out further in Chapter 4 (What Has 
Been Done?), these initiatives include the recommendations from the Institute of Directors in 
numerous jurisdictions, governance guidance in Australia and South Africa, financial 
industry initiatives such as Tomorrow’s Company and the Generation Foundation, and the 
specific calls for company managers to focus on the long-term by Larry Fink and others.  
 
These measures do not address SMST through cutting off transmission from asset 
owners or asset managers via Option 2, nor do they act to ‘improve’ asset owners as per 
Option 1(b). As with reforms to company manager remuneration discussed above, the 
question remains as to whether these efforts could address SMST by reducing performance 
uncertainty as per Option 1(a). To do so, these voluntary initiatives would need to increase 
asset owner/asset manager confidence that company managers will actually deliver on long-
term performance objectives there by reducing the real or perceived excessive discounting by 
asset owners. Although these measures may be helpful in demonstrating asset owner and 
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asset manager interest in long-term performance, without robust and measurable strategic 
long-term reporting to asset owners and asset managers, such initiatives will not act to reduce 
excessive discounting. Consequently, these reforms are not included in Appendix ‘C’, 
Table 7 (Conceptual Effectiveness of Implemented Company Manager Oriented SMST 
Reforms) as a standalone conceptually effective SMST reform.    
 
 The analysis in this Section demonstrates that of the 24 areas of implemented reform 
identified, only 12  ̶  or 50%  ̶  conceptually address the SMST issue by employing one of the 
options set out in Section A as necessary for effective SMST reform. Each of these 
theoretically effective SMST reforms is summarized in Appendix ‘C’, Table 8 (Conceptually 
Effective SMST Reforms). This table also indicates the type of reform   ̶ i.e. ‘hard’ law, ‘soft’ 
law or voluntary initiative, revealing that six of the ten conceptually effective SMST reforms 
are ‘hard’ law changes. The limitations of these conceptually effective SMST reforms are 
also identified. The limitations identified are that these SMST reforms are disclosure-based, 
voluntary, untested or limited in scope, with all of the ‘hard’ law reforms being disclosure or 
‘comply or explain’ based, limited in scope or ‘opt-in’. As discussed earlier in this thesis, 
disclosure-based regulation can be a powerful tool in impacting corporate behaviour. 
However, use of this approach does suggest reform has generally been a much ‘lighter’ touch 
from regulators than called for by SMST reformers. Whether such ‘light’ touch approach is 
indeed the most feasible means of addressing SMST is considered below.   
  
C. WHY A LIGHT REGULATORY TOUCH WITH A CLEAR MESSAGE MAY BE THE SOLUTION  
 
As demonstrated through the analysis in Chapter 4 (What Has Been Done?), very 
little regulatory or financial industry SMST-driven reform has actually been implemented 
despite a plethora of reform proposals and considerable discussion of the SMST issue. 
Further, of the implemented reforms identified in Section B above that have the theoretical 
potential to address the SMST issue, most are limited in scope or are voluntary or disclosure-
based rather than prescribing, or restricting, specific action. This relatively ‘light’ touch 
approach may be explainable due to the complexities involved in defining the SMST 
problem, and the evidentiary issues around proving the harms caused by such SMST.  
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Further, even going out on a limb and accepting that SMST is a clearly definable 
problematic issue requiring correction, the prescriptive regulatory action required to 
implement Option 2 by cutting off SMST transmission mechanisms has collateral concerns. 
As discussed in Subsection B(2) of this Chapter, Option 2 necessitates a two-pronged 
significant ‘hard’ law reform effort to insulate boards and limit short-term focused 
compensation. Such board insultation raises questions about management accountability and 
whether with such board insulation there would be sufficient constraints on management 
excess. Given this landscape, it is not surprising that SMST-driven reform efforts to date have 
been relatively ‘light’ touch and have primarily involved efforts to reduce performance 
uncertainty via Option 1(a), and ‘improve’ or ‘enlighten’ asset owners via Option 1(b). 
 
I contend that SMST reform efforts should primarily be ‘light’ touch and focus on 
ways to minimize excessive discounting by asset owners via a combination of Options 1(a) 
and (b). Eliminating, or at least reducing, the short-term bias of asset owners by ‘improving’ 
asset owners, while concurrently reducing performance uncertainty of listed companies 
appears to be the optimal way to reduce SMST. With such bias reduced or eliminated, there 
would be no need to cut off transmission mechanisms or be concerned about constrains on 
management. In support of this argument is the proposition considered further in Chapter 5 
(Is There A SMST Problem?) that the discounting of future returns by asset owners, although 
excessive, is in part based on rational concerns about future financial performance. 
Consequently, forcing a reduction of such discounting through ‘hard’ law measures cutting-
off SMST transmission will not impact the underlying concerns held by asset owners. 
Further, assuming that the discounting is excessive to the point where there is a market-wide 
bias, and asset owners may be considered to be acting sub-optimally, arguments have been 
made that rather than correction through paternalistic intrusive regulation of financial 
markets, a ‘lighter’ touch may be more effective to reduce bias.    
 
‘Hard’ law, prescriptive regulatory measures may be justified and effective in certain 
circumstances – for example, legal restrictions on gambling which aim to save us from our 
biases, such as an optimism bias where we over-estimate small probability events, or in the 
capital market context, such as restrictions on harmful insider trading. US law professors, 
Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein, identified this insulation or ‘choice-blocking’ approach 
using law, but also articulated another approach, namely ‘debiasing through law’, which 
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approach may be more appropriate in certain cases of ‘bounded rationality’.879 The concept of 
‘bounded rationality’ was made famous by Herbert Simon and built on by Nobel Prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman.880 ‘Bounded rationality’ essentially means decisions are made rationally, 
but within the limits of available information881, and, as added by Kahneman882, mental 
constraints – such as a intuition and use of heuristics – i.e. mental short-cuts – in decision-
making. Rather than insulating legal outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality, Jolls 
& Sunstein’s ‘debiasing through law’ approach operates directly on the boundedly rational 
behaviour. This ‘debiasing through law’ approach attempts to help people either reduce or 
eliminate negative behaviour.883 For example, a ‘debiasing through law’ approach in the 
capital market context would be requiring specific risks disclosure for risky investments, such 
as initial coin offerings, rather than prohibiting such capital raisings entirely.  
 
Jolls & Sunstein articulate the advantages of this ‘debiasing through law’ approach as 
‘a less intrusive, more direct, and more democratic response to the problem of bounded 
rationality’884. Sunstein further advocated for this ‘light’ touch approach – also termed 
‘nudging’ – in his 2014 book, which he opened by affirming that ‘[h]uman beings can be 
myopic and compulsive, giving undue weight to the short-term’. However, Sunstein asserted 
that ‘in light of the pervasive risk of government error and the inescapable fact of human 
diversity, it is usually best to use the mildest and most choice-preserving forms of 
intervention’885. These softer forms of action include ‘nudges’, which Sunstein explained as 
‘initiatives that maintain freedom of choice while also steering people’s decisions in the right 
direction (as judged by people themselves)’886.   
 
Legal researcher Oskari Juurikkala added specificity to such assertion that ‘nudges’ 
are better than ‘hard’ law to address issues of bounded rationality in the context of complex 
capital market concerns. Juurikkala presented five arguments in favour of simpler and 
                                                 
879  Jolls & Sunstein, 2006, p. 200.  
880  Bollen, 2012, p. 137.  
881  Simon, H A ‘ Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’ (1955) 69:1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 
at p. 99. 
882  Kahneman, Daniel, ‘A Perspective on Judgement and Choice’ (2003) 58:9 American Psychologist 697, at 
697.  
883  Jolls & Sunstein, 2006, p. 200.  
884  Ibid, p. 200-201. 
885  Sunstein, Cass R, ‘Why Nudge: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism’ (Yale University Press: 2014), at p. 
17. 
886  Ibid. 
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‘lighter’ regulation of financial markets.887 Juurikkala’s arguments were that: (1) novel ‘light’ 
touch regulations can change behaviour; (2) faulty market perceptions seem to be best 
corrected by market-based solutions; (3) simple rather than complex regulation may be better 
at solving problems caused by lack of market discipline, pricing inefficiencies and financial 
innovation; (4) regulatory rule makers are subject to imperfect rationality reducing the quality 
of regulatory intervention   ̶  an extension of the public choice theory888; and (5) regulatory 
complexity exacerbates the harmful effects of limited rationality.889 Applying Juurikkala 
specific arguments, and Jolls & Sunstein’s general position that ‘debiasing through law’ may 
be an optimal response in certain circumstances, to the context of the SMST issue supports 
the conclusion that SMST concerns may be best addressed through a ‘light’ touch approach.  
Such approach would use the method of reducing performance uncertainty as per Option 1(a) 
and ‘improving’ asset owners and asset managers as per Option 1(b) of the dual pathway.  
 
This ‘light’ touch regulatory approach also provides guidance and assistance to 
market participants who are behaving sub-optimally while not restricting the freedom and 
innovation of other parties.890 The specific ‘light’ touch regulatory options identified, in order 
of increasing intervention, include default rules, framing and information disclosure rules, 
cooling-off periods and limitations on choice.891 Four of the ten conceptually effective 
regulatory SMST reforms identified in Section B and summarized in Appendix ‘C’, Table 8 
(Conceptually Effective SMST Reforms) involve targeted disclosure. Particularly, these 
reforms require disclosure around future performance objectives and results of such strategy, 
or disclosure on the links between executive compensation and long-term performance of 
listed companies. There may be questions on whether the language in such reforms is 
sufficiently targeted towards long-term performance. However, this approach may in theory 
be an effective means of ‘nudging’ market behaviour away from a short-term bias.    
 
                                                 
887  Jurrikkala, 2012, pp. 36-38.  
888  Public choice theory is a widely accepted theory in economics that challenges the assumption of rational 
and well intentioned law-making. See the summary in Jurrikkala, 2012, pp. 37, and generally in Lucas & 
Tasic, 2015, in which the authors consider behavioural public choice theory, which expands traditional 
public choice theory to encompass research in behavioural economics.  
889  Jurrikkala, 2012, pp. 36-38.  
890  Ibid, p. 51. 
891  Ibid, referring to Camerer, Colin et al, ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for “Asymmetric Paternalism”’, (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1211 (2003).  
 214 
 
Another argument raised is that the market is best left to the task of debiasing.892 As 
demonstrated in this thesis, there have been numerous calls for regulatory intervention in 
order to debias equity markets from their supposed current short-term focus. There are, 
however, significant concerns about regulatory debiasing, and resources and incentives to do 
so are weak in comparison to the private sector.893 The argument that the financial industry is 
best placed to carry on with such debiasing is strengthened by the likelihood that 
policymakers are themselves not free from behavioural biases and self-interest. In the case of 
SMST, as discussed in Chapter 3 (An Evolving Concern?), the swell of public interest and 
corresponding pressure to address the SMST may have caused regulators to adopt measures 
in the name of SMST correction, many of reforms which on rigorous analysis, actually 
appear not to even conceptually address the SMST issue. Rather than implementing 
reactionary regulation meant to appease an interested public, short-termism debiasing may be 
more effective if it develops from the market itself, with some direction from regulators. 
 
Accordingly, in the context of SMST, it may be more valuable for policymakers to 
start the ball rolling through an assessment of their relevant market place  ̶  as was done in the 
UK with the Kay Review, and in the EU with the EU Governance Green Paper, 2011, and to 
continue monitoring SMST in the context of specific equity markets. However, the reform 
baton should then pass to participants in financial industry who have been ‘enlightened’ as to 
the harms of SMST and the benefits of longer-term approach to continue to press for 
corrective measures. This process is currently seen in several financial industry initiatives 
including the UK Investor Forum, LTVC Index, the FCLT project initiated by McKinsey, and 
the call to company managers to focus on long-term value generation by prominent CEOs 
including BlackRock’s Larry Fink. There is merit to this approach – particularly with respect 
to the continued ‘enlightenment’ of equity market participants – but, I argue that there 
continues to be a material role for policymakers to play in reducing excessive discounting, 
particularly on disclosure reforms related to long-term performance. Therefore, SMST reform 
should not be left exclusively in the realm of the financial industry.  
 
  Finally, an argument has been made that simple – e.g. guidance-based –, rather than 
increasingly complex – e.g. prescriptive –, regulation is more effective at solving problems 
caused by a lack of market discipline, pricing inefficiencies and financial innovation, and 
                                                 
892  Ibid, p. 36. 
893  Ibid, p. 60.  
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regulatory complexity may actually exacerbate the harmful effects of bounded rationality.894 
The crux of this argument is twofold. First, excessive regulation may result in ‘box ticking’ 
rather than substantive compliance.895 Second, market phenomena, which arguably include 
the intricate issue of SMST, are complex and multi-faceted. Interfering with such complex 
phenomena via invasive regulation arguably is unlikely to work and may have significant 
costs and unintended consequences. Detailed ‘hard’ law regulation is justified and effective 
in certain circumstances in capital markets where the harms associated with non-intervention 
are considerable – e.g. restrictions on insider trading. But where the harms are less clear and 
the complexities greater – such as with SMST – simple and less prescriptive is in all 
probability better. Noted economist, Robert J. Shiller, made this point in the context of 
regulating against stock market bubbles, arguing that ‘most of the thrust of our national 
policies to deal with speculative bubbles should take the form of facilitating more free trade, 
as well as greater opportunities for people to take positions in more and freer markets’896. 
Consequently, market driven initiatives led by ‘enlightened’ asset owners and asset managers 
and supported by ‘light’ touch targeted regulatory disclosure reforms meant to reduce 
performance uncertainty and clear messaging to the financial industry may be the most 
feasible, if not ideal, way to ‘nudge’ the market away from the potential harms of SMST.  
                                                 
894  Ibid, p. 36-38, 66-74 and 86-90.  
895  Ibid, p. 82 referring to Bardach, Eugene and Kagan, Robert A, ‘Going By The Book: The Problem Of 
Regulatory Unreasonableness’ (1982), describing compliance culture, and Ayres, Ian and Braithwaite, John 
‘Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate’ (1992), providing examples of compliance 
culture and possible strategies to reduce it.  
896  Shiller, 2015, p. 237.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
‘Generally, there is a need to change the investment culture from short-termism towards 
longer-term productive investment.’897 
 
The research in this thesis has been undertaken primarily because allegations of 
harmful ‘crisis’ level short-termism in public equity markets have increased dramatically 
since the GFC. Allegations of SMST have instigated a flurry of reform proposals in financial 
markets around the world. These proposals have resulted in some implemented reforms by 
policymakers and the financial industry meant to correct SMST, primarily in the UK, the EU 
and the US. This wide-ranging burst of activity and high-level attention to the SMST issue, 
coupled with the increasing interconnectedness of modern equity markets, presents the need 
for a broad ranging study of such SMST-driven reforms, and a detailed examination on the 
causes and effectiveness of such implemented reforms. The hypothesis tested in this thesis, 
and ultimately disproved, is that the significant level of discussion and attention given to the 
perceived problem of SMST has resulted in substantial implemented regulatory and financial 
industry reforms, which will, conceptually at least, address the short-termism problem. Based 
on the review of in this thesis, I conclude that despite much discussion, there has not been 
much prescriptive ‘hard’ law reforms aimed at correcting SMST, and of the reforms 
implemented, few conceptually effectively address the most probable causes of SMST. 
 
 The problematic short-termism behaviour considered in this thesis has been reviewed 
and defined as asset owners and intermediaries in the equity ownership chain weighing near-
term financial outcomes too heavily at the expense of more profitable longer-term investment 
opportunities. This weighing is reflected in share pricing as short-term financial actions by 
company managers have positive impacts on share price and longer-term objectives are 
undervalued. This impact to share prices causes company managers of listed companies to 
take actions that prioritize the short-term financial returns of the listed company to the 
detriment of listed companies, which by extension includes their investors and broader 
constituent elements. This definition of stock market short-termism necessitated further 
analysis of whether short-termism is problematic and, in particular, if SMST is evident in the 
share pricing of listed companies, as share prices are an important communication 
mechanism between the market and listed companies. This thesis accepts that stock markets 
are generally informationally efficient. However, the basis of share pricing as a measure of 
                                                 
897  Croce et al, 2011. 
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fundamental efficiency was questioned based on evidence suggesting that asset owners and 
intermediaries excessively discount future returns of listed companies. Such discounting 
results in company managers prioritizing short-term financial returns. In other words, the 
value of share process as an indicator of fundamental firm value is questionable as it 
increases unduly based on short-term returns and does not adequately value longer-term 
returns. Such excessive discounting appears to be transmitted into listed companies mainly 
via shareholder activism and executive compensation structures. Consequently, any remedy 
to the alleged SMST problem requires either completely cutting off these transmission 
mechanisms or addressing causes of excessive discounting issues around share pricing. 
 
This thesis also considered the evidence on whether SMST is actually detrimental, as 
short-termism in stock-markets only matters if it results in a demonstrable harm. SMST is a 
complex and nebulous issue, meaning that it is difficult to empirically isolate the harms 
arising from excessive discounting of long-term financial returns. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 7 (What Harm Does SMST Cause?), there is research suggesting that SMST results 
in a reduced trust in the stock market as a capital raising venue, and there appears to be a 
wealth transfer from future to current asset owners. Regardless of whether these arguments 
may be conclusively proven, they appear compelling enough to drive regulatory and financial 
industry reform. It is unlikely that SMST will ever be definitively proven to be detrimental 
or, alternatively, an innocuous phenomenon. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 (An 
Evolving Concern?), SMST rhetoric has long overlapped with the financial market concerns 
of the day, but arguably appears to be connected to the increasing financial intermediation of 
public markets and the corresponding increased reliance on short-term performance of asset 
managers rather than the underlying performance of a listed company. Therefore, a real 
SMST issue is weavings its way into the fabric of listed company corporate governance, and 
it is highly probable that SMST will continue to motivate financial industry and regulatory 
reform for years to come. Consequently, it remains important to understand the most 
plausible causes of SMST, and to properly assess whether implemented reforms, at least from 
a theoretical perspective, actually effectively address such causes.  
 
The implemented financial industry and regulatory reforms which claim to be 
motivated at least in part by SMST concerns were considered in Chapter 4 (What Has Been 
Done?) and summarized in Appendix B (Table 4  ̶  Implemented SMST Reforms). The results 
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of this analysis indicate that despite the significant level of discussion and many reform 
proposals, the actual output of SMST reform in all jurisdictions surveyed has been relatively 
modest. Additionally, of the implemented reforms most are generally ‘light’ touch rather than 
prescriptive ‘hard’ law reforms. The assessment of such implemented reforms in Chapter 8 
(Conceptual Effectiveness of the Implemented SMST Reforms) further narrowed these 
results and revealed that of the implemented SMST reforms few actually addressed the most 
probable causes of SMST. Such analysis was based on the conclusion reached in this thesis 
that any reform efforts to address SMST must do so via a dual pathway for reform, which 
requires either: (1) minimizing the excessive discounting of future returns; or (2) cutting off 
the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company. Of the implemented reforms 
that do not conceptually address the SMST issue, they appeared to either merely use SMST 
as rhetoric or, worse, contain flawed logic and have the potential to increase the SMST issue. 
Of the remaining few conceptually effective implemented reforms as identified in 
Appendix C (Table 8 ̶ Conceptually Effective Implemented SMST Reforms) most were 
‘hard’ law but were limited in that they were disclosure-based, meaning that they were ‘light’ 
touch rather than prescriptive in their application. However, this may not diminish the 
conceptual effectiveness of the implemented reforms, as such a ‘light’ touch approach could 
be the most feasible, if not the ideal, means of addressing the SMST issue.    
 
 While there undoubtedly will continue to be questions around whether SMST is a real 
and harmful phenomenon, it is highly probable that policymakers and the financial industry 
will maintain their drive for longer-term sustainable investment in and by listed companies, 
and that SMST will continue to be viewed as a contributing factor hindering such longer-term 
investment. Consequently, effective SMST reform should be considered in the context of the 
dual pathway for reform identified in this thesis. This analysis identifies Option (1) of the 
dual pathway, and in particular the two sub-paths in Option (1), namely Option 1(a)  ̶  
reducing performance uncertainty, and  Option 1(b) ‘improving’ asset owners, as the reform 
methods which employ a ‘light’ touch approach. Primarily, implemented reforms in this 
space focus on disclosure, particularly around long-term strategy, measurable long-term 
objectives, and linking executive compensation to such long-term deliverables. There is 
significant room for improvement in further targeting and refining such disclosure on long-
term performance. However, for a myriad of reasons, including that regulators are themselves 
subject to bias, cost and resource restrictions, and that complex, paternalistic intrusive 
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measures can result in harmful unintended consequences, such ‘light’ touch approach guided 
by policymakers and implemented and supported by the financial industry may be the most 
effective method of ‘nudging’ capital markets away from their current short-term focus.    
 
 A-1 
 
APPENDIX ‘A’ – SMST REFORMS BY JURISDICTION 
 
TABLE 1. ASSET OWNER ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
Implemented Reforms (‘Hard’ Law – <>, ‘Soft’ Law – <> and Voluntary Initiatives - <>) 
Jurisdiction1 
Measures Favouring 
Long-Term Share 
Ownership 
Taxation Incentives 
Based on Duration 
of Share Ownership 
Disclosure (Removal of Mandatory 
Quarterly Reporting and ‘Better’ 
Quality Disclosure) 
Direct Communication/ 
Engagement between Asset 
Owners and Companies 
Restrictions on 
Stock- Lending 
Long Term 
Funds 
Hedge 
Funds 
United 
Kingdom 
Considered and 
rejected in Kay 
Review 
Considered and 
rejected in Kay 
Review 
Kay Review recommends removal of 
mandatory quarterly reporting and 
advocates for ‘better’ reporting  
Recommended in Kay 
Review  
Kay Review 
recommended 
restrictions 
None None 
UK Government removes mandatory 
quarterly reporting and enacts Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Report 
Regulations 
UK Government cites EU 
efforts and Good Practice 
Statement  
UK Government 
supports finance 
industry 
guidelines and 
UCITS 
Directive 
FRC Guidance on Strategic Report UK Investor Forum 
United States Dual class shares 
already permitted 
Capital gains 
revision and excise 
tax suggested in 
Aspen Report and 
by US reformers 
Aspen Report/US reformers call for 
greater transparency in investor 
disclosure  
None None LTVC 
Index 
Brokaw 
Act 
Proxy Access Rules 
overturned by Court, 
continue in practice 
European 
Union2 
Proposed EU 
amendments on 
voting rights to EU 
Amended 
Shareholder Rights 
Directive rejected 
Proposed EU 
Financial 
Transactions Tax 
EU recommendations on governance 
reporting and CSR/ESG disclosure 
EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive 
(Articles 3a and 3b) 
UCITS 
Directive 
restricting stock-
lending 
None None 
EU Transparency Directive, EU Non-
Financial Reporting Directive  
France Florange Law  None None None None None None 
L-Shares 
Netherlands L-Shares None None None None None None 
Italy Enacted but not 
renewed  
None None None None None None 
Singapore SGX approves dual 
class listing for 
secondary market 
None SGX considering removing mandatory 
quarterly reporting 
None None None None 
Other None None Proposed IIRC reporting framework None None None None 
1  All jurisdictions with significant public equity markets were surveyed, but only jurisdictions which have proposed or implemented reforms at least in part based on express 
short-termism concerns are included in this table. 
2  The EU was considered separately as a governing body from each of its member states.   
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TABLE 2. INTERMEDIARY ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
Implemented Reforms (‘Hard’ Law – <>, ‘Soft’ Law – <> and Voluntary Initiatives - <>) 
 
Jurisdiction1 
Stewardship& 
Disclosure 
Duty to Further 
Long-Term Interests? 
Asset Manager 
Remuneration 
Voting 
Restrictions 
Direct 
Shareholding by 
Asset Owners 
Metrics and 
Models 
Proxy Advisors 
United 
Kingdom 
UK endorsement of 
Kay Review 
stewardship and good 
practice statements 
Recommended in the 
Kay Review 
Kay Review recommends 
structuring remuneration 
with timescale of asset 
owners 
Amendments to UK 
Stewardship Code re 
disclosure/ use of 
voting powers 
Kay Review 
recommended 
direct share 
holding 
Kay Review 
recommended 
further review 
Not addressed in 
Kay Review 
UK Stewardship 
Code Amendments 
UK Law Commission 
report/UK 
Government 
recommends minimum 
standards 
UK Government endorses 
Good Practice Statements  
UK Government 
supporting of EU 
CSD Regulation 
(to be implemented 
in 2023) 
UK Government 
commissioned 
research on models 
and metrics 
UK NAPF 
Stewardship 
Framework  
NAPF Stewardship 
Framework 
UK Investor Forum IMA and other finance 
industry guidance on fund 
disclosure  
United States None Aspen Report and 
other reformers call 
for ‘fiduciary’ duties 
for intermediaries 
Aspen Reports 
recommends regulation to 
base compensation on 
long-term performance  
None  None None SEC confirms onus 
is on asset managers 
European 
Union2 
EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights 
Directive re voting 
rights (Articles 3h 
and 3i) 
MiFID II EU UCITS Directive 
limiting remuneration 
EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights 
Directive re voting 
rights (Article 3c) 
EU CSD 
Regulation (to be 
implemented in 
2023) 
None EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights 
Directive 
(Article 3j) 
Switzerland None None None Minder Initiative 
restricts voting by 
intermediaries 
None None None 
Canada Focusing Capital on 
the Long-Term  
None None None None None None 
Japan Stewardship Code None None None None None None 
Others Various voluntary  
Stewardship Codes  
None None None None None None 
PRI, UNEP and UN 
Global Compact 
None None None None None None 
 
1  All jurisdictions with significant public equity markets were surveyed, but only jurisdictions which have proposed or implemented reforms at least in part based on express 
short-termism concerns are included in this table. 
2  The EU was considered separately as a governing body from each of its member states.  
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TABLE 3. COMPANY MANAGER ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
Implemented Reforms (‘Hard’ Law – <>, ‘Soft’ Law – <> and Voluntary Initiatives - <>) 
 
Jurisdiction1 Company Manager Remuneration Best Practices of Company Managers Mergers and Acquisitions 
United 
Kingdom 
Kay Review recommends structuring executive 
compensation to relate incentives to long-term 
performance and for longer-time frames for 
compensation 
Kay Review Good Practice Statement for Directors 
endorsed by UK Government 
 
Kay Review recommended M&A activity 
be kept under review 
UK Government approved the Kay Review ‘Good 
Practice Statement for Directors’  
Institute of Directors recommends strengthening 
boards 
UK Government felt M&A sufficiently 
regulated and CMA has long-termism built 
into its strategy 
 
UK Government adopted Remuneration 
Regulations with new reporting requirements 
United States US Amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K Various finance industry initiatives including 
BlackRock CEO Letters 
None 
European 
Union2 
EU Amended Shareholder Rights Directive Articles 
9a and 9b includes similar new reporting 
requirements to UK Remuneration Regulations 
Various finance industry initiatives None  
Switzerland Minder Initiative reforms on executive 
compensation 
None None 
Brazil None Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance, 
‘Sustainability Guide for Companies’ 
None 
Australia Governance Code (pay should link to long-term 
strategy) 
None None 
Norway Governance Code (pay should link to long-term 
strategy) 
None None 
South Africa None King Report on Governance None 
New Zealand None New Zealand IOD, “The Four Pillars of 
‘Governance Best Practice’ 
None 
Singapore Singapore Code of Governance remuneration 
reporting requirements and dual class listings 
None None 
 
1  All jurisdictions with significant public equity markets were surveyed, but only jurisdictions which have proposed or implemented reforms at least in part based on express 
short-termism concerns are included in this table. 
2  The EU was considered separately as a governing body from each of its member states.  
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APPENDIX ‘B’ – IMPLEMENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
TABLE 4. IMPLEMENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
‘Hard’ Law  
(Statutory) 
‘Soft’ law  
(Non-Statutory) 
Financial Industry Initiatives (Voluntary) 
Mandatory/ Prescriptive ‘Comply or Explain’/‘Opt-
Out’/Disclosure-Based 
UCITS Directive (limited to EU 
UCITS) 
Florange Law (France) FRC guidance re disclosure (UK) L-Shares (e.g. L’Oréal France) 
Minder Initiative (Switzerland)1 Removal of Mandatory Quarterly 
Reporting (UK)  
Recommendation 2014/208/EU and 
Directive 2014/95/EU re disclosure (EU) 
UK Investor Forum 
EU Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive2 
EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive (Article 3c, 3h, 3i, 3j , 9a 
and 9b)**  
UK Stewardship Code Amendments (UK)  LTVC Index 
Remuneration Regulations (UK)  EU Transparency Directive Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 
(remuneration reporting) 
Voluntary organizations (e.g. PRI, 300 Club, 
etc.) 
Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report Regulations (UK) 
 Governance Codes (Australia and Norway) Governance and professional organization best 
practice guidance 
US Amendments to Item 402 of 
Regulation S-K 
  BlackRock CEO letters  
EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive (Articles 3a and 3b) 
  Focusing Capital on the Long-Term 
   NAPF Stewardship Disclosure Framework 
(UK) 
   IMA and other finance industry guidance on 
remuneration of asset managers (UK) 
   Various stewardship codes (e.g. the 
Stewardship Code (Japan)) 
   UNEP and UN Global Compact 
 
1 Only with respect to limits on intermediary voting. Although the stated purpose of the reforms is to ‘counter the culture of short-termism’, there is little detail to support 
how the reforms actually do so with respect to executive compensation reforms.  
2 Not yet implemented but entered into force on 9 June 2107 and EU Member States have until 10 June 2019 to implement these changes into national legislation.  
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APPENDIX ‘C’ – CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SMST REFORMS 
 
TABLE 5. CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTED ASSET OWNER ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
SMST Reform Measures Favouring Long-Term 
Share Ownership 
Disclosure (Removal of Mandatory Quarterly 
Reporting and ‘Better’ Quality Disclosure) 
Direct Communication/ 
Engagement between Asset 
Owners and Companies 
Restrictions 
on Stock- 
Lending 
Long Term 
Funds 
 Florange 
Law 
Financial 
Industry 
Use of L-
Shares 
SGX Dual 
Class 
Shares 
Removal of 
Mandatory 
Quarterly 
Reporting 
(UK & EU) 
Strategic 
Report and 
Directors’ 
Report 
Regulations 
(UK) 
Recommendation 
2014/208/EU, EU 
Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive 
UK 
Investor 
Forum  
EU Amended 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Directive 
(Articles 3a 
and 3b) 
EU UCITS 
Directive 
US LTVC 
Index 
Option 1(a) – 
Reduce 
Performance 
Uncertainty  
X X X X ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ 
Option 1(b) –  
‘Improve’ Asset 
Owners/Asset 
Managers  
X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ 
Option 2(a) –  
Insulate Board 
X X X X X X X X X X 
Option 2(b) – 
Reduce Short-Term 
Compensation 
X X X X X X X X X X 
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TABLE 6. CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTED INTERMEDIARY ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
SMST Reform Guiding Principles/Stewardship Asset Manager Remuneration Voting Restrictions Proxy Advisors 
 UK/Japan 
Stewardship 
Code /UK 
NAPF 
Stewardship 
Framework 
EU 
Amended 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Directive 
(Articles 3h 
ad 3i) 
BlackRock 
Letter and 
FCLT & 
UK 
Investor 
Forum 
UK NAPF 
Stewardship 
Framework/IMA 
and Financial 
Industry 
Guidance 
EU UCITS 
Directive (Asset 
Manager 
Compensation) 
UK 
Stewardship 
Code 
EU Amended 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Directive 
(Article 3c) 
Swiss Minder 
Initiative  
EU Amended 
Shareholder Rights 
Directive – Proxy 
Advisory Code of 
Conduct (Article 3j) 
Option 1(a) – 
Reduce 
Performance 
Uncertainty 
X X X X X X X X X 
Option 1(b) –  
‘Improve’ 
Asset 
Owners/Asset 
Managers 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X 
Option 2(a) –  
Insulate Board 
X X X X X X X X X 
Option 2(b) – 
Reduce Short-
Term 
Compensation 
X X X X ✓ X X X X 
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TABLE 7. CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTED COMPANY MANAGER ORIENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
SMST Reform Company Manager Remuneration Best Practices for Company Managers 
 UK 
Remuneration 
Regulations 
US Item 402 
Regulation S-K 
Amendments 
EU Amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive (Articles 
9a and 9b) 
Governance Codes IOD 
Recommendations 
to Strengthen 
Boards 
Governance 
Guides 
Black Rock Letter 
Option 1(a) – 
Reduce 
Performance 
Uncertainty 
X X ✓ X X X X 
Option 1(b) –  
‘Improve’ Asset 
Owners/Asset 
Managers 
X X X X X X X 
Option 2(a) –  
Insulate Board 
X X X X X X X 
Option 2(b) – 
Reduce Short-
Term 
Compensation 
X X X X X X X 
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TABLE 8. CONCEPTUALLY EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTED SMST REFORMS 
 
 
SMST Reform 
 
Method of Addressing SMST 
 
Type of Reform 
 
Limitations 
Removal of Mandatory Quarterly 
Reporting (UK and EU) Option 1(b) – ‘Improve’ Asset Owners ‘Hard’ Law 
 
‘Opt-In’ 
 
 
Strategic Report and Directors’ Report 
Regulations (UK) 
 
Option 1(a) – Reduce Performance 
Uncertainty & Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ 
Asset Owners 
‘Hard’ Law 
 
Disclosure-based 
 
 
Recommendation 2014/208/EU, EU Non-
Financial Reporting Directive 
 
Option 1(a) – Reduce Performance 
Uncertainty & Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ 
Asset Owners 
‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Law 
 
Disclosure-based 
 
 
UK Investor Forum 
 
Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ Asset Owners Voluntary Initiative  
 
Voluntary 
 
US LTVC Index 
 
Option 1(a) – Reduce Performance 
Uncertainty & Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ 
Asset Owners 
Voluntary Initiative 
 
Untested and Limited Buy-In 
UK/Japan Stewardship Code /UK NAPF 
Stewardship Framework, UK Investor 
Forum, BlackRock Letter and FCLT, UK 
NAPF Stewardship Framework/IMA and 
Financial Industry Guidance 
Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ Asset Owners ‘Soft’ Law and Voluntary Initiative  
 
 
Voluntary 
EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive (Articles 3h and 3i) 
Option 1(b) ‘Improve’ Asset Owners ‘Hard’ Law 
Disclosure-based and ‘comply and explain’ 
 
 
EU UCITS Directive (Asset Manager 
Compensation) 
 
Option 2(b) – Reduce Short-Term 
Compensation 
‘Hard’ Law 
 
Limited to EU UCITS 
 
EU Amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive – Article 9a and 9b 
 
Option 1(a) – Reduce Performance 
Uncertainty 
‘Hard’ Law 
 
Disclosure-based 
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